Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

167. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Edson) and the Executive Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Walker) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, August 26, 1983

SUBJECT

• Taking Stock

The current popular perception is that this Administration lacks a foreign policy “success.” In the public mind, “success” may be synonymous with results in the three major issue areas—Central America, the Middle East, and arms control. Tangible “success” in those areas, however, will probably take time and patience—which, as the Secretary has said, should not be confused with indecision.

Obviously, we should not permit our policy to be railroaded by the public clamor for “success.” Nevertheless, policy isn’t made in a vacuum, and the Administration needs public support for its policies. Moreover, the criticism about our lack of success is demoralizing: Jimmy Carter’s “malaise” may not exist in the country at large, but we sense that it pervades Foggy Bottom. Finally, while the current spate of criticism can be attributed to the White House’s traditional pre-election year need for results, it could also represent a more fundamental loss of confidence in the seventh floor’s ability to run the building (rather than vice versa). For all these reasons, we must stoke the fires in the building, capture peoples’ imagination, and move our policy forward wherever practicable.

This means, generally speaking, that we must stop paying obeisance to the folkways of the building. Indeed, several calculated moves—be they process-oriented, or personnel-oriented—that run contrary to the folkways of the building may be just what the doctor ordered for malaise.

For the Secretary, the task of moving our policy forward translates into a question of identifying a few areas on which to focus his resources over the next 18 months, and in which he can make a significant contribution. The first step in this process is to recognize that the Secretary’s discretionary time is limited. Whether we like it or not, the inertia of foreign policy is such that the bulk of the Secretary’s time must be devoted to the major issue areas—arms control, Central America and the Middle East. Accordingly, this paper first examines those three areas in an effort to identify possible openings for constructive action, and then identifies some other issues wherein the Secretary would get the biggest return for his investment of time and influence. Finally, the paper notes how we might better present our track record.

ARMS CONTROL, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Arms control is not an area that lends itself to any new and radical policy departures. Indeed, movement in this area may be more dependent on the Soviets than it is on us. Some benefit may be derived, however, from identifying the Secretary more closely (and more personally) with our arms control efforts. In particular, such an identification would increase the Secretary’s effectiveness in selling the MX, etc., on the Hill. A well-timed speech (or better still, an op. ed. piece under the Secretary’s signature) would achieve this end.

Central America presents a sufficiently fluid situation—on the ground, and within the U.S. bureaucracy—to permit further Department action. Of the four elements of our Central America strategy, only one—the security shield—is an area where the Department cannot make a major contribution. We should, therefore, make an effort to move our policy forward in the other three areas—democracy and human freedom, negotiation, and economic development. We should consider, for example, the pros and cons of spelling out for the Kissinger Commission² the specifics of an economic initiative for Central America. Your September 15 speech in Houston could be just the first (rather than the last, as we fear) step in this effort.

In the Middle East, our efforts, especially on Lebanon, are limited to incremental progress—e.g., ensuring that IDF redeployment occurs without incident, reestablishing a confessional consensus, etc. The September 1 initiative is, if not wholly moribund, held hostage to Lebanon.

We need not acquiesce in this situation. We could sever Lebanon from the peace process. It is untenable for one individual to hold both portfolios simultaneously: just as Phil’s peace process credentials were vitiated by his work on Lebanon, so, too, may Bud’s credentials be destroyed.

Therefore, in an effort to breathe new life into the September 1 initiative (and we believe it deserves another chance before it is scrapped—a possibility we must, nevertheless, start to consider), we recommend that Bud continue to work on Lebanon, while the Secretary makes a dramatic trip to the area to work exclusively on the peace process. Such a trip, of course, would not yield a breakthrough. Rather, it would be designed simply to (1) let the Arabs hear that the process is not dead; (2) put the Syrians on notice that their intransigence cannot impede us from acting in our own interests, and in the interests of a wider peace (this would support Bud’s mission); (3) explore West Bank issues with the Israelis; (4) move the Egyptians to more constructive participation in the peace process; and (5) create an atmosphere of enthusiasm and hope.

OTHER ISSUES

There are a variety of issues—other than arms control, Central America, and the Middle East—that could yield results were the Secretary to commit himself to them. In choosing among them, we believe the Secretary should play to his strengths—economics and mediation.

(1) International Economic Affairs

The Secretary has been criticized for the lack of a success in arms control and the Middle East. However, he has yet to receive what is potentially the most damning criticism of all: a failure to show progress in his own area of expertise—international economics. That alone might be a compelling reason for making a push in the economic area. In addition, there are increasing signs that the debt situation is deteriorating, particularly in key strategic countries such as Venezuela and the Philippines. Moreover, economic development is quickly becoming a cornerstone of our Central America and Africa policies. Finally, the idea of a debt moratorium is gaining adherents, especially in Latin America. All of these points argue in favor of some initiative in the economic area.

Arguing against an economic initiative is the bureaucratic pitfall of potentially cutting across Treasury’s bow. And from a substantive perspective, doing nothing (except promoting our own non-inflationary recovery) may be a better solution to current global economic problems than doing something (although proposing an acceptable alternative now to the status quo may preempt more radical alternatives later).

On balance, we believe the pros outweigh the cons and that the time is ripe for an international economic initiative led by the Secretary. Such an initiative could involve any one of the following:

• Endorse Hugh Corbett’s Ministerial Group. The advantage of this idea is that it is already on the drawing board and the Secretary has already been asked to chair it or kick it off. Moreover, if at least the nominal country representatives were to be foreign ministers, then the Secretary would not seem to be usurping Don Regan’s role. (Certainly, some kind of acceptable division of labor could be worked out with Treasury.) The downside risk, of course, is that foreign ministers are notorious for proposing economically unsound solutions.
• Initiate a Latin American Debt Conference. The advantage of this idea is that we would be attacking the heart of the problem, since the bulk of the debt burden is in Latin America. Moreover, a conference—on our terms and under our aegis—might head off the current clamor for a debt moratorium. Our objective would not be to create new institutions, but to develop new mechanisms (such as Feldstein’s proposal utilizing the Exim Bank) for alleviating the LDC debt burden. The downside risk of a Latin Debt Conference is that, unless it were properly coordinated, it is sure to ruffle feathers at Treasury.
• Launch a Pacific Basin Economic Initiative. This idea would create fewer bureaucratic problems with Treasury. We should consider, however, whether there is a sufficient rationale—be it economic or political—for such an initiative. The Pacific Basin is economically better off than most areas of the world. More importantly, such an initiative would tend to lump together a group of politically diverse countries, thus undercutting the need to treat China differently in view of the role of the “China card” in U.S.-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, a Pacific Basin Initiative, if properly structured, could complement the President’s upcoming trip and serve as a vehicle for practicing what we preach regarding free trade, open markets, etc.

In addition to these initiatives, we would argue that consideration should be given to an even bolder idea—namely, the articulation, by the Secretary, of a global economic strategy (call it an International Economic Compact). This would build on the President’s Cancun speech, the Secretary’s North-South speech, and our UNCTAD address. Its purpose would be to articulate a policy superstructure that coherently links the CBI, the African economic initiative, GSP renewal, and any or all of the above suggestions. In effect, we propose that George Shultz issue his own “14 Points” speech, outlining how the economic relationship between North and South should develop over the next 20 years. Granted, this is grandiose-sounding. But the international economic area presents the Secretary with his best opportunity for making a lasting contribution to U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, many of the elements of a global economic program already exist, or can be practically implemented. What remains is for someone to be tasked with drawing them together into a comprehensive program.

(2) Mediation

The Secretary is obviously a superb mediator/negotiator. However, except for the Lebanon-Israel agreement, his talent has been unused. Obviously, negotiations can consume a great deal of the Secretary’s time. On balance, however, we believe that he will get a greater return by investing his time in a negotiation, than in the many multilateral meetings and conferences he attends (and to which substitutes could be sent, if necessary). One negotiation-like process in which the Secretary should become involved has already been mentioned—the Middle East peace process. Several others follow:

• Namibia Negotiations. The French seem to be falling off these negotiations, but the Angolans seem to have become more forthcoming. In short, the negotiations could go either way. To put the Secretary’s prestige on the line in such a volatile situation would entail a substantial risk. But the even greater risk is that the negotiations will fall through and the Secretary’s lack of involvement will be singled out as the cause.
• Iran-Iraq. The conventional wisdom has been that the USG can serve no useful role in this conflict. Yet there is much current activity, and the Secretary’s involvement in this issue—even if tangible results must be left for the long term—would lend credibility to his UNGA speech, which focuses on the U.S. role in resolving regional conflicts.

PUBLICIZING OUR TRACK RECORD

Finally, despite the public clamor for “success,” our track record is a good one, suffering not from a lack of success but from a paucity of publicity. There are four areas in particular where we have made substantial progress: (1) human rights, (2) nuclear nonproliferation, (3) U.S.-China relations, and (4) relations with our neighbors, Canada and Mexico.

The first two subjects can and should be publicized in speeches by the Secretary and/or Deputy Secretary. Such speeches would serve to raise the profile of the Department, thereby increasing our effectiveness at the margin. A Presidential visit to the PRC would spotlight the improvement in U.S.-China relations.

But one of the best-kept secrets of this Administration remains our improved relations with Canada and Mexico. Given the importance of these countries to our economy, and hence to jobs, we should not hesitate to publicize this improvement and continue to build on it. One dramatic, yet substantively sound, way to do that would be to initiate a Shultz-MacEachen-Sepulveda meeting. Such a meeting could be used to lay the cornerstone of a new policy initiative—the establishment of a permanent “Northern Hemisphere Association.” This Association would complement the OAS and the CBI, and serve to reinforce the growing interdependence of states within the hemisphere.

CONCLUSION

An 18-month program designed to move our policy forward in a significant way would, therefore, involve the following (in order of priority):

(1) The Secretary commits himself to reviving the peace process by travelling to the Middle East;

(2) the Secretary launches an international economic initiative:

(a) by articulating a global 20-year strategy, and/or

(b) by implementing one or more new programs (e.g., Latin Debt Conference, Central American Economic Initiative, Northern Hemisphere Association);

(3) the Secretary involves himself—in a low-key way—in the Namibia negotiations;

(4) the Secretary identifies himself personally with the arms control process, and U.S.-Soviet relations generally;

(5) the Secretary speaks out on human rights and/or nuclear nonproliferation.

This is a program of action—action designed to achieve results in major policy areas. While there may be cause to differ over some of the elements of this program, the first step must be a decision on your part and the Secretary’s to provide direction, commit resources, and demand performance.

1. Source: Department of State, D Files, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memos To/From S 1983. Confidential. Gary Edson initialed for Walker.
2. See footnote 2, Document 166.