Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

122. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kaplan) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Wolfowitz)¹

Washington, October 29, 1982

Paul:

Re — Meeting on Foreign Policy Planning

— Our papers at Tab 2 summarizing goals, accomplishments and issues/major resource implications still appear sound and provide a good basis for your interventions.²

— Bremer dropped our cover memo containing talking points from the package. It should prove helpful as initial talkers at the meeting. (attached)³

— A basic thread running through our presentation, especially on national security issues, is (if you’ll pardon the expression) “stay the course”—we’ve made only a good start. (Larry wants another START.)

— By contrast, Larry’s first paragraph (Tab 3)⁴ speaks of “the Administration’s original emphasis . . . on rebuilding American strength and credibility . . . but we have failed to articulate . . . how we intend to use our refound strength and credibility to improve the international order and advance our interests.” (emphasis added)

— Beyond this basic difference, there is much we can agree with in Larry’s goal of shaping a stronger non-communist order; indeed, we share all three of his key purposes:

• Facilitate recovery prosperity and stability in the West. Indeed it has been S/P that was a voice in the wilderness on the debt issue.
• Provide for peaceful settlement of disputes. We have active diplomatic initiatives going in the Mideast and southern Africa and face a series of additional problems in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Central America, etc.
• Prevent Soviet expansion. Proxy issue relevant here.

— Larry goes on (p. 2) to set forth a number of tasks essential to strengthening the non-communist order. Again, no big problem with goals, but stated as goals (p. 3) without implementing strategy (e.g. break protectionist cycle, reinvigorate trade, etc.).

— Most contentious point is list of “pivotal countries” (p. 4), which include Germany, Saudi Arabia, China, Japan, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela.

• Excludes everyone else.
• Implies we should lean very far over backwards not to annoy these countries ever, ever. . . .
• We’ve dealt with “pivotal countries” before (e.g. Iran).
• Better approach is to build our power and devise strategies that “create facts” and thereby help our friends and limit choices of our adversaries.
• Also, simplistic and serious mistake to put all our eggs in any regional basket; if it collapses. We lose all our eggs. . . .
• Each of paragraphs on pp 4–6, on pivotal countries, will suggest obvious rejoinder to you. You could comment especially on Taiwan and Israel. More generally, we fully agree on the need to strengthen the Alliance. But strengthening the Alliance is more likely to result from developing cooperation on the range of allied political, economic, security and regional issues than on achieving harmony by adjusting to lowest common denominator positions.

— Third World section is fairly light. I’d suggest S/P work further with McCormack and Wallis on it. Regional policemen reappear in silly way (Kenya? Mexico? etc.) at bottom of p. 6. Do we want India to police Pakistan? Afghanistan?

— The UN/ICJ stuff (p. 7) under “peaceful settlement of disputes”—the appeal to law—is straight pot.

— The Soviet section (p. 8) moves us toward dialogue from strength and wooing Soviet clients away. Usual Gompert analysis.

— Policy reviews are attached, that flow from above.

— Two final points.

• Resources will continue to be the key, and that means our foreign policy will remain hostage to the revival of our national economy. That’s just the way it is.
• Politics will be in command, especially if the President takes a bath next Tuesday.⁵ This means clear sense of priorities and limited time to achieve them. Democratic Presidential candidates may start announcing shortly after January 1 in order to get matching funds. And this week three reports contained 1984 related items.

— King Hussein worrying whether US would pursue June 1 Reagan plan beyond 1984;

— Soviets saying summit a bad idea because it could help Reagan in 1984;

— Botha questioning Namibia settlement as Reagan could be replaced by Mondale or Kennedy in 1984.

You could have a lot of fun, but shouldn’t in the interest of P/EA relations. Nonetheless, lots to say from our pieces, and much to critique in factual, constructive way.

Bon chance.

Phil

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW Chrons 10/21–31/82. Secret.
2. Not attached. The two papers are printed as attachments to Document 119.
3. Not attached.
4. Not attached; see Document 117.
5. Midterm U.S. election, November 2.