123. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) to all Assistant Secretaries of State and the Directors of the Policy Planning Staff (Wolfowitz), the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe), and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Montgomery)1

SUBJECT

  • Foreign Policy Directions

The Secretary is most interested in getting underway some fresh thinking about how to advance U.S. world interests. He sees this not merely as a mid-term exercise but one that should set policy directions and favorable trends for the longer haul.

[Page 475]

The general framework for this work should be the recognition that U.S. interests are best served by a healthy non-communist international order. Such an order requires American leadership, which in turn requires that we sustain the effort to restore U.S. strength and credibility, and to insist on Soviet restraint. Conversely, the healthier the security and economic systems we lead, the stronger our strategic competitive position.

In broad terms, we should be working toward an order in which:

the “Western” political-economic system—the markets, institutions, and rules of the advanced industrialized countries—is operating effectively and facilitating general growth;
the developing countries are drawn into this system, thus boosting development and making them less susceptible to disorder and Soviet subversion;
political problems are overcome in our relations with key countries in vital strategic regions (Central Europe, Southwest Asia, East Asia, and Central America);
Western diplomacy, supported by effective international dispute-settlement machinery, has reduced the number of festering and potentially dangerous disputes;
the US is seen—and treated—as the champion of an international order based on the rule of law, peaceful change, and human rights.

It is obviously a lot easier to define such broad goals than to translate them into practical, achievable policies. The Secretary has asked us to ask you to do the hard part. Bearing in mind his general sense of the sort of international order we want to promote, as well as his desire to receive innovative and far-reaching—albeit concrete—ideas, bureaus are being asked to prepare specific policy studies.

Several such studies are tasked below in clusters that correspond to several of the broad goals; others will be tasked in due course as part of what we expect will be an open-ended stream of Department-wide policy planning. Like the challenges we face, the studies are neither strictly regional nor strictly functional. A collegial effort among bureaus will therefore be essential.

We do not want this to become a massive, mechanical exercise. We leave format up to you, asking only that there be separate sections for analysis and prescriptions, and that analysis and arguments be rigorous, objective, and backed up by concrete facts. Prescriptions may, but need not, include specific action plans. The papers need not be formally cleared, though we have indicated where we expect the lead bureau to solicit ideas from others. S/P is invited to offer views on any and of the topics. INR is encouraged to produce analytical papers that dovetail with the issues. Lead bureaus should ensure that differences of opinion are clearly stated.

[Page 476]

There are no deadlines. Suffice it to say that the Secretary is keenly interested in these products. As they are completed, he will want to meet on them, by cluster, starting next month. In some cases he will want to assign specific follow-up actions; in others the knowledge we’ve gained as a result of the process will be the sole product.

This process will be coordinated through S/SClay McManaway. Dave Gompert and Ned Walker will be available, along with Clay, to get together with you and/or those you select to do this work, if, for instance you want to clarify or re-shape the studies.

Cluster I—Toward A Healthier Western Political-Economy

1.
How can we break protectionist pressures and encourage adjustment in trade and industrial patterns that will curb such pressures in the future? (EB, with inputs from EUR and EA.)
2.
How can we revive and adapt Western economic institutions, in light of favorable economic realities? (EB, with inputs from EUR and E.)
3.
How can we make U.S., European, and Japanese recovery efforts mutually reinforcing? (EB, with inputs from EUR and EA.)
4.
How can we create more mature and stable US–EC and US-Japan political-economic relationships? Should we propose new consultative arrangements? (EUR and EA, respectively, with inputs from EB.)
5.
Can we use the effort underway to shape a common Western approach to East-West economic relations as a model to bring about greater harmony in “West-West” economic relations? (EUR, with inputs from EB and EA.)

Cluster II—Overcoming Political Obstacles in Relations with Key Countries in Vital Strategic Regions

1.
How can we reinforce German attachment to the West across the broadest range of German political opinion? How can we build a more assertive US-German partnership to deal with some of the problems mentioned in Cluster I? (EUR, with inputs from PM and EB.)
2.
What kinds of security relationships do we want, over the long run, with key moderate Arab countries, and how do we get from here to there, taking into account our commitment to Israel and political conditions in the Arab world? (NEA, with inputs from PM.)
3.
How can we preserve (or enhance) the strategic benefits of US-Chinese relations—and Sino-Soviet antagonism? (EA)
4.
How can we strengthen and use to our advantage, especially in Central America, our relations with key Latin American countries: Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil? How should our “strategic” interests in these relationships affect the bilateral agendas? (ARA)
[Page 477]

Cluster III—Drawing the Third World Closer and Erecting Barriers to Disorder and Subversion

1.
How can we better engage developing countries in “Western” markets, institutions, rules and consultations? (EB)
2.
What are the proper regional roles for Brazil, Nigeria, and India, from the point of view of our interests, and how can we foster these roles? (ARA, AF, NEA)2
  1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons 1/1–15/83. Confidential. Sent through Bremer. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. A stamped date indicates that it was received on November 4 at 6:26 p.m.
  2. In a January 4, 1983, memorandum to multiple recipients, Dam and Eagleburger indicated that responsibility for the papers requested in their November 3, 1982, memorandum “is being transferred to the newly formed Foreign Policy Planning Council under the chairmanship of Steve Bosworth.” (Ibid.) In a January 7, 1983, memorandum to the S/P staff, Bosworth requested that they provide their “initial reactions” concerning “the substance and procedure of this project” to Kaplan. (Ibid.)