You know of my concern that we develop a coherent vision of what we want
to achieve over the next two years, lest we remain hostage to events and
find ourselves unable to explain, much less execute, a consistent,
purposeful foreign policy. The Administration’s original emphasis, quite
rightly, was on rebuilding American strength and credibility. But we
have failed to articulate, except in piecemeal fashion, how we intend to
use our refound strength and credibility to improve the international
order and advance our interests.
I would like you to consider the attached package, which contains some
preliminary thoughts on where we should be headed. The central theme of
the core paper (Tab 1) is that strengthening the fabric of the
non-communist world—politically, economically, and strategically—is a
necessary complement to a policy of restraining the Soviet Union. This
does not imply a shift in emphasis from the last two years. Rather, it
completes an overall concept of how the US can advance its strategic
interests and strengthen international order in this dangerous decade
and the next. The concept places a premium on the revitalization of
Western institutions, a drawing together of the West and the Third
World, and the fostering of a non-communist order based on peaceful
change and the rule of law.
This is by no means an approach free of controversy or cost, if we push
beyond mere slogans. It envisions, inter alia, an intensive effort to
overcome political differences with key countries (e.g., Germany, China,
Saudi Arabia), an effort to bring developing countries more fully into
the Western economic—and, less directly, security—system, and a program
of improving international peacekeeping/peacemaking mechanisms. It
contemplates a continued willingness on the part of the US to shoulder
the burden of “system maintenance”, while recognizing that we are more
dependent than ever on the cooperation of our partners. It calls for no
radical departures. Indeed, it incorporates some of
[Page 439]
the initiatives we already have underway,
but in a more integrated way than we’ve done so far.
This core paper is not meant to be a detailed blueprint. But it could,
with your imprint, serve as a general guide to help form specific
regional and functional policies. More refined thinking is needed,
though this framework can provide a common conceptual reference point.
An agenda of specific policy reviews is also attached (Tab 2).2 Some of these studies (e.g., those on international
economic policy) are already underway; but these should now be viewed in
light of the general framework.
You’ll notice that I’ve suggested a study on rebuilding bipartisan
support for foreign policy. With the possible exception of the nuclear
arms race issue, I see no foreign policy question on the horizon with
the potential to divide the country as severely as Vietnam and detente.
Moreover, a general framework of the sort presented here should evoke
broad support. So we have an opportunity—the first in a generation—to
rebuild a bipartisan foreign policy, and we should seize that
opportunity.
I would welcome your reactions. At a minimum, this paper will, I hope,
help you organize your thoughts about what we should be trying to
achieve. Beyond that, you may want to plan a relaxed discussion with
your principal officers. You might also want to discuss it with an
outsider or two. I stand ready to refine–or overhaul—the paper if you
decide it’s worth coming up with a finished product to send to the
President or simply circulate in the Department.3
Tab 1
Paper Prepared in the Office of the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs5
Washington, undated
TOWARD A STRONGER NON-COMMUNIST ORDER
Introduction: Basic U.S. Interests and the International System
With an eye to the past and an eye to the future, the US intended the
Post-War order to serve three purposes, each crucial to American
strategic and, secondarily, economic interests: (1) to facilitate
recovery, prosperity and stability in the West; (2) to provide for
peaceful settlement of disputes; (3) to prevent Soviet expansion.
While the basic purposes remain valid, the order is in need of
rehabilitation if it is to serve and advance our national interests
for the remainder of the century. Each of the main elements needs
attention:
- (1)
- The political-economic health and integrity of the advanced industrialized West is
endangered by protracted recession, lack of cooperation, a
reduced sense of responsibility among some of the key
partners, and the failure of societies to adapt as their
economies have evolved.
- (2)
- The Third World has become more
important strategically, yet prospects for peaceful change
and stability remain poor, owing to artificial boundaries,
Soviet subversion, uneven (at best) economic development,
lack of sustained Western interest, immature political
institutions, and the failure of international mechanisms to
help settle disputes.
- (3)
- East-West stability has remained
elusive, largely because US efforts to remain strong have
been cyclical, while Soviet efforts to grow stronger have
been unrelenting.
In its first two years, the Administration’s emphasis has been on
restoring American power, credibility, and leadership—the premise
being that in the absence of these qualities our vital interests
cannot be preserved. This emphasis, coupled with recent Soviet
failures and greater awareness of Soviet vulnerabilities, has begun
to reduce a decade’s accumulation of doubts about America’s will and
ability to restrain the Soviet Union.
But the economic health and political integrity of the West—crucial
in their own right to US interests as well as in helping us compete
effectively with the Soviet Union—have not fared well. Nor has the
Third
[Page 441]
World grown less
susceptible to Soviet encroachment, though developing countries are
growing more suspicious of the Soviets. Finally, despite the move
toward a more robust U.S. military
posture, we face major political obstacles in strengthening
relationships which are crucial in maintaining and improving our
position in four key strategic arenas: Central Europe, Southwest
Asia, East Asia, and Central America. In sum,
owing to our own efforts and Soviet failures, there has been an
erosion in our adversary’s position, but the fabric of our own
order has become weaker and, in places, torn.
Against this backdrop, the main task for the next
two years must be to strengthen the non-communist international
order. The main elements of this task are:
- (1)
- to foster political-economic health in the West;
- (2)
- to build partnerships in the four key strategic
arenas;
- (3)
- to draw the Third World closer to the West and erect
regional barriers to Soviet influence, presence, and
subversion;
- (4)
- to intensify the quest and
strengthen mechanisms for peaceful settlement of
disputes.
Within two years, we would like to see a non-communist order—of which
the Third World is increasingly an integral part—which is more capable of peaceful change, more conducive to
economic growth, and more resistant to Soviet disruption.
Such an order would be more peaceful, more
lawful, more prosperous, and more hospitable for
American strategic and economic interests than is today’s
world. To the degree that it also serves our partner’s interests,
they will feel a stronger sense of responsibility, a greater
willingness to share the burden, and a view closer to our own about
how to deal with the East. Success in strengthening the
non-communist order will yield lasting advantages to the US in its
historic competition with the USSR.
This is not to suggest that the effort to expand American power and
remove doubts about our resolve can be relaxed. Indeed, if it is
thought that we will retreat from our military program and fail to
act when our interests are threatened, the effort to rehabilitate
the non-communist order will be stillborn.
I. A Healthier Western Political-Economy
Preserving an open trading system will not guarantee Western economic
recovery; but protectionism is sure to retard recovery. Moreover,
whereas allies can compete commercially and still be allies,
security cooperation and political trust are sure to suffer if
competition turns to economic confrontation and to efforts to shift
both the costs and the blame.
[Page 442]
Because of our strategic interests, our economic interests
(especially with the US economy becoming more exposed to the world
economy), and the fact that only we have the political stature and
purposefulness to take the lead, we should be prepared—indeed
determined—to:
- —
- break the protectionist cycle and be the most relentless,
principled advocate of open, non-discriminatory
trading;
- —
- reinvigorate—and, where necessary, adapt—trade, monetary
investment, banking, and energy institutions within the
advanced industrialized “family”;
- —
- develop cooperative efforts to hasten recovery without
fueling inflation;
- —
- create mature US–EC,
US-Japan—and, ideally, EC-Japan—relationships, such as through innovative
consultation procedures and joint anticipation of
problems;
- —
- work out a consensus on rules and goals to govern economic
relations with the USSR
and with Eastern Europe;
- —
- develop a strategy for drawing the Third World closer to
the West, economically and politically, and promoting
solvency.
Recognizing that our partners follow interventionist economic and
industrial policies largely because the socio-political adjustment
to economic evolution is too painful, we have got to show
sensitivity if we expect them to cooperate in the interest of the
system. In return, we should insist that out major partners
subordinate—if gradually—their own narrow, near-term interests, as
we would be doing, to the goals of openness, fairness, and
efficiency, recognizing that our interest in these goals remains
strong even if EC and Japanese
performance is uneven. The EC
presents a special problem, in that discriminatory policies can have
a role in achieving the larger goal of enhanced European political
cohesion, which we continue to support. But we should not allow the
Europeans to use that larger goal as a cover for discrimination that
is really commercially motivated. Finally, we should make clear to
our partners that, as by-products of recovery, we expect expanded
defense efforts and assistance to key Third World areas.
II. Improved Strategic Relationships
Based on the location of our vital interests abroad and the
importance of “forward bases” in our global military strategy, our
main strategic interests are in Central
Europe, Southwest Asia, East Asia, and Central America. Yet key
relationships in all these areas are encumbered by serious political problems:
- —
- In Europe, recession, qualms about
nuclear weapons, and differences over East-West relations
weaken the foundation for defense cooperation and political
cohesion.
- —
- In Southwest Asia, intra-regional
conflicts and the Arab-Israeli dispute hamper our effort to
strengthen and work with key natural allies.
- —
- In East Asia, stagnation or future
disruptions in Sino-American relations would relieve
pressure on the Soviets; and the same political-economic
problems that plague the Atlantic partnership trouble our
relationship with Japan.
- —
- In Central America, our ability to
work with key natural partners has been damaged by the
Falklands crisis6 and other, less transient, political
differences, including spillover from our quarrels with the
Europeans.
The pivotal countries are: Germany, Saudi Arabia, China, Japan and,
in this Hemisphere, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela.7 These are difficult
partners—indeed, “partnership” is too ambitious a concept for the
sort of relationship we can expect or want with China. But if Soviet
leaders could list the countries whose relationships with us they
would most like to see collapse, these would be at or very near the
top.
In two cases, China and Saudi Arabia—and, more generally, East and
Southwest Asia—relations are impaired by important US political (as
distinct from strategic) ties to Taiwan and Israel respectively. Our
ability—and, in domestic political terms, freedom of action—to
improve relations and cooperation in these two areas depends on
success in enhancing the sense of security of Taiwan and Israel:
- —
- In the case of Taiwan, we have China’s commitment to
peaceful intentions toward Taiwan, and should now set our
sights on the opening of a serious process toward
accommodation.8
- —
- In the case of Israel, we should aim to keep Egypt out of
an Arab military coalition and secure the broadest
possible—including Palestinian—acceptance of Israel’s right
to exist.
Both problems are, of course, circular. Our handling of arms sales to
Taiwan and our ability to bring the Israelis to negotiate in good
faith on the autonomy question will, respectively, determine our
chances of enhancing Taiwan’s and Israel’s sense of security.
Japan has the economic means and interests to
be not simply a regional partner but a global partner. Indeed, a
more active Japanese
[Page 444]
non-security role outside of East Asia would be more acceptable than
an expanded security role within East Asia. The constraints and
superstitions that apply to Japanese defense capabilities need not
limit Japanese resource transfers to front-line states in Southwest
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Indeed, we should not allow our own
(not altogether groundless) fears about eventual remilitarization to
inhibit our effort to get the Japanese to accept greater
responsibilities. As we try to overcome our economic problems with
Japan and resume growth, it has to be clear to the Japanese that
they must share more of the load for making the Western economic and
security system work.
With regard to NATO, economic
cooperation and recovery are necessary but insufficient. We must
work to restore within German society, on the broadest possible
basis, the unambiguous sense of belonging to the West that
characterized Adenauer’s
Germany.9 No
relationship—between the two governments and between the two
peoples—is more in need of attention. The polarization of German
politics has become a distinct possibility, what with the left-ward
movement of the SPD, which is
likely to accelerate once out of power. This is potentially a
dangerous development, especially if it produces competition within
Germany between extreme views of how that country should provide for
its security. As frustrating and distasteful as it may be, US
contacts with even a radicalized SPD must be maintained.
The Federal Republic is our natural ally in attempting to resuscitate
the economic institutions of the advanced industrialized community
and to improve conventional defense of the Central Front; Germans
have more incentive and ability to do both than any other partner.
Moreover, our reaching out for such a partnership could give Germans
a greater sense of responsibility and attachment.
As a nation bound by restraints, the Germans are extraordinarily
sensitive to—indeed, transfixed with—whether others are taking their
interests into account. Our performance in INF negotiations—which are essentially about the
nuclear threat to Germany—means as much, if not more, to Germans as
START means to Americans.
This will require a genuine effort to produce progress in INF talks. Progress in START but not in INF would remind Germans that those
entrusted to take care of German interests tend first to take care
of their own.
Finally, while Central America may now rank fourth in our strategic
concerns, it could easily become first. A threat on our border, in
the form of cancerous instability and/or Soviet foothold, would skew
our entire outlook. The key to American military strategy, in the
broadest sense, is forward position; this is demanding under the
best of
[Page 445]
conditions, but
far more difficult with an Achilles heel. We need partners, and
Venezuela and Mexico are the only serious candidates. Yet the
Falklands crisis seems to have damaged quite seriously Venezuelan
interest in cooperation with us; and the myriad trade and emigration
problems bedeviling US-Mexican ties—and Mexico’s own serious
sickness—make political-security cooperation difficult. The
strategic significance of these two countries must enter into all
decisions affecting the future of the relationships.
III. Drawing the Third World Closer
Economic recovery in the OECD will
help produce economic recovery in the Third World only to the extent
that the latter is connected with the former. In the absence of
access to Western markets, financing, investment, and aid, the Third
World will remain vulnerable to economic disease, political
instability, and Soviet exploitation. Conversely, the frequently
hostile rhetoric of the NAM should
matter little to us if the Third World fundamentally identifies with
the West, subscribes to the same principles of international order,
and makes economic progress. Indeed, the anti-colonialist glue of
the NAM is crumbling, and we can
hasten this by expanding West-South cooperation.
Rather than “global negotiations”, we and our Western partners should
extend an offer to cooperate to ensure that our growth becomes
theirs as well.10
Through such an offer of “global cooperation”, we should try to
steer West-South trade, technology transfer, banking and investment
patterns in a way that will give at least key developing countries a
stake in the Western system. Concessional aid should be concentrated
in the “poorest” category, where the benefits of expanding,
efficient, international markets will be felt less.
West-South economic cooperation is more practical on a regional or
bilateral basis than on a global basis. Natural CBI-like groupings can be identified
in every continent, and our Western partners could and should take
the lead where we can’t. As the ASEAN experience shows, supporting regional cooperation
has the additional advantage of raising barriers to Soviet influence
and intrusion, even if that cooperation is economic and not
security-oriented. If relationships with key regional Third World
countries can be pursued without our damaging ties to their
neighbors, these poles of development, stability, and strength can
help toughen the entire Third World structure against Soviet
subversion. Brazil, Nigeria, India, Egypt, Kenya and Mexico may not
fit the mold of regional policeman, as we hoped Iran would, but
their prospects and policies can contribute importantly to regional
stability. The key is not to be too explicit about our interest in
promoting regional
[Page 446]
powers—and not to confuse specific bilateral differences with the
important structural role these countries can play.
IV. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
Violence and lawlessness in the international order—whether or not
perpetrated by the USSR—are
inimical to US interests. There is, of course, no substitute for
imaginative, energetic American diplomatic efforts to settle
disputes peacefully, or at least to prevent them from being settled
non-peacefully. Uniquely qualified to produce results, we should be
less timid—without becoming clumsy—about “getting into the middle”
of disputes (e.g., in Latin American and the Horn), to go with our
efforts underway in Southern Africa and the Middle East.
But in addition, we should try to strengthen the rule of law by
supporting, using, and, where need be, reforming international
mechanisms which serve the rule of law. The UNSYG, ICJ, and regional peacemaking/peacekeeping mechanism
are worth promoting, especially at the expense of the UNSC and UNGA. Of course, our interest in strengthening
international mediation and adjudication authority may collide with
our interest in keeping ourselves free of such authority,
particularly if it can be used by anti-Western elements. Still, on
balance, we should be willing to run some risks if the return is an
improved ability to settle disputes before they become crises,
especially since we have the political power to safeguard our
interests from excessive international authority. The US should
consider calling for a serious new look at strengthening
international security mechanisms.
More generally, instead of casting our rhetoric in terms of the
Soviet challenge to US, or even Western,
vital interests, we should stress the Soviets’ disregard for a
moderate world order and peaceful change. We should stress—and, in
general, our policies should reflect:
- —
- the unacceptability of attempting to obtain by force what
can’t be obtained peacefully;
- —
- the obligation of states to negotiate over their
differences;
- —
- the insistence that agreements be kept;
- —
- the illegality of subversion; and
- —
- self-determination.
Emphasizing these standards—especially if we’re prepared to live by
them—can help establish that US foreign policy is based on the same
principles of international order that most non-communist countries
consider important. Along with expanding our power and convincing
others of our will to act, the key to effective leadership is
standing for widely shared principles.
It is equally important—politically and strategically—to support
peaceful change, in rhetoric and in practice. Attempting to preserve
[Page 447]
the status quo can
weaken the system, create uncontainable pressures, and permit our
adversaries to claim that they are fighting for justice. Similarly,
fostering democratic institutions can enhance stability and
non-violent change. Indeed, we will usually find that acting in
accordance with our values serves equally well our strategic
interests, since the kind of order that is hospitable to our values
will be hospitable to our interests.
Dealing with the USSR and Its Allies
How we conduct our relations with the USSR and its allies will have a major effect on our
ability to strengthen ties with our allies and to draw the Third
World closer to us. In managing this crucial relationship, we face
two imperatives.
- —
- to maintain and improve our capability to respond to
direct or indirect Soviet aggression;
- —
- to establish a credible dialogue with Moscow on certain
global trouble spots (e.g., Southern Africa) and arms
control.
Both are necessary; an “either/or” approach won’t work. Particularly
during this leadership transition period, we need to earn Soviet
respect for our capacity to compete for the longer-term, and to
demonstrate that we are willing to reach accommodations in our
mutual interest in the near-term.
Simultaneously, we should pursue a differentiated policy towards
Eastern Europe and towards Soviet clients and proxies in the Third
World. Our goal toward Soviet clients should be to increase their
foreign policy independence and their domestic democratization. This
will require a mix of stick and carrot, with the precise proportions
decided in each specific situation. It may well be easier with those
countries not contiguous to the Soviet Union to bring about a
reduction in ties with Moscow and repudiation of a Soviet-style
communist system. Our goal toward Soviet proxies should be to
heighten their concern about direct US reactions. We need to decide
how best to bring about one or more individual reversals, i.e.,
whether to target disproportionate resources/assets on a few
countries. We should examine the vulnerabilities of each
separately.
Throughout, we need to be conscious of the fact that too
confrontational a policy towards the Soviet Union will alienate our
Allies, just as too accommodationist a policy will disarm them. A
balanced approach will avoid talking about sudden collapse and
nuclear war, but it will focus on the essentially antagonistic
relationship between the closed Soviet system and the open Western
system, on the need for prudent measures to bring about more
moderate Soviet behavior internally and
[Page 448]
externally, and on stimulating independence
and diversity among its allies. Our Allies and most of the Third
World would view this as a sound approach.
