Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXX, Public Diplomacy

146. Paper Prepared in the Office of Research and Evaluation, Associate Directorate for Programs, International Communication Agency¹

Washington, August 1, 1978

[Omitted here are the title page and a page listing the attachments.]

OVERVIEW

The Concerned Publics

Except in Europe and South Asia, the publics who influence government policy or public opinion on arms control/disarmament issues, or who have a deep and continuing interest in such issues, seem to number no more than 100 persons per country. In three of the four African countries included in this survey, posts believe that fewer than 20 persons constitute this public. Similarly small numbers are believed to be professionally involved or particularly concerned with these issues in the two Arab countries and in two of the four Latin American countries where posts participated in the ICA inquiry.

In most major European countries, in the East as well as in the West, the professionally involved or particularly concerned publics for arms control/disarmament issues are thought to range between 100 and 150 persons per country. Only in half a dozen countries out of the 30 surveyed, do the primary arms control/disarmament publics appear to be larger—between 150 and 600 persons.

ESTIMATED SIZE OF ARMS CONTROL/DISARMAMENT PUBLICS

Under 20	Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania; Egypt, Saudi Arabia; Mexico, Venezuela.
20–50	Argentina; Israel
50–100	Nigeria; Indonesia, Japan, Korea (?); Brazil (?)
100–150	Canada, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden; Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR (?); Iran
150–300	Germany, Yugoslavia; Australia
300–600	Great Britain; India, Pakistan

In general, those with influence over policy or opinion concerning arms control/disarmament issues are most likely to be found in the country’s cabinet, in special elements of the foreign and defense ministries, in specialized government or private research institutes, on the political science, law and international relations faculties of major universities, in enterprises dealing with the production of energy or with the sale or purchase of arms, and in the press. Nearly every USICA post can name the concerned elements of the government, the relevant research centers, and the particular scholars, editors and columnists who work on arms control/disarmament issues.

In addition to these narrowly-defined influential publics, there exist in many countries larger publics deeply interested in some aspects of arms control/disarmament policies but with relatively little influence over them. While in Europe these larger publics may be concerned with SALT and MBFR, in most other countries their interest is more parochial. Of greatest concern are the issues believed to affect directly the country’s security and the balance of power within its region. These larger publics include environmentalists worried about the dangers of nuclear power production, the storage of nuclear waste or the fallout from nuclear testing; nationalists resentful of their country’s dependence on foreign sources for nuclear fuel and subservience to foreign controls; those fearful that arms control agreements or human rights concerns might prevent their country from purchasing the arms needed for defense; and those concerned that controls will curtail their arms sales and thereby create unemployment and unfavorable trade balances. It also includes the many ordinary citizens genuinely concerned about the dangers of nuclear, or conventional, war. These larger publics may run into the thousands or—as in Japan, Germany and the U.K.—even millions.

Interest in Arms Control/Disarmament Issues

Interest in various arms control/disarmament issues differed considerably by region. It was strongly affected by the country’s perceived security needs and by present or anticipated requirements for nuclear energy. Both in Europe and elsewhere, however, interest is high in nuclear non-proliferation and regional arms control, low in radiological and chemical weapons, antisatellite systems and the linkage between disarmament and development. Conventional arms transfers, in Europe of high interest primarily to the major arms exporters, is of great interest to most non-European countries because they want to purchase the arms they feel they must have or deny them to potential enemies.

The concerned European publics generally oppose nuclear proliferation out of genuine fear that the spread of nuclear weapons will increase the danger of nuclear holocaust. Yet they want assured supplies of nuclear fuels with minimal restrictions, and in some cases the right to unhampered export of nuclear technology. Non-European publics, although for the most part officially committed to nuclear non-proliferation, want to retain their country’s option of joining the nuclear club, or at least of purchasing fissionable materials for the production of energy without burdensome foreign controls.

Interest in regional arms control arrangements is generally limited to the country’s immediate region: to MBFR in Europe, to Ayacucho² and Tlatelolco³ in Latin America, to the Indian Ocean in the littoral states.

SALT II and III is of great interest to most European countries, both East and West. The relatively low interest in SALT outside of Europe is in part attributable to the view that weaker countries cannot influence the negotiations between the superpowers and will not be strongly affected by their outcome. Interest in a comprehensive test ban treaty, on the other hand, is quite low in Europe, very high in Japan and high in several other non-European countries.

Theater nuclear or “grey area” issues, which in major European countries are followed with high interest, are of low salience in most non-European countries other than Japan, Australia, Korea and Pakistan. Among other AC/D issues of relatively high interest must be counted the enhanced radiation weapon (primarily in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan) and nuclear-free zones (primarily in Scandinavia and Latin America.)

Finally, several countries—notably Egypt, Israel, S. Korea, S. Africa—are so preoccupied with more immediate problems that their concerned publics show little interest in AC/D issues unrelated to these problems.

Perceived Attitudes of Concerned Publics

ICA posts and EU’s policy office estimated the perceived agreement of “a majority of members of concerned publics” with a series of statements related to arms control or disarmament. They recorded their estimates on a five-point scale ranging from “agree strongly” to “disagree strongly.” Results are tabulated in appendix C⁴ and summarized below.

1. Opinions About U.S. Policies and U.S. Strength

Concerned publics in most countries appear to agree that the United States “is genuinely interested in achieving meaningful arms control and disarmament.” Even Romania and Yugoslavia, who identify with the nonaligned countries and generally see eye-to-eye on disarmament issues, grant that the U.S. really wants arms reductions. While concerned publics in other East European countries and the Soviet Union as well as Italy are divided on the question of American sincerity, those in India, South Africa and Tanzania and the general public in Japan doubt that America really means what it says about arms control.

On two subjects of great interest to specialists in most countries—conventional arms transfers and nuclear non-proliferation—opinion about U.S. policies is divided. Probably reflecting America’s role as the largest arms supplier, concerned publics in a majority of the 30 surveyed countries seem to disagree with the contention that American policies in this area are well intentioned and constructive. NATO members Italy and France along with such U.S. friends as Egypt, and Israel, Iran, Japan and S. Korea share with the Soviet Union and East European countries a jaundiced view of U.S. arms sales policy. And on non-proliferation, German publics join the French, Soviets, and East Europeans, among others, in disagreeing that “U.S. policies on nuclear non-proliferation are well intentioned and constructive.” In fact, concerned publics in many countries—including Germany, Italy, France and Sweden as well as the USSR and its satellites—tend to agree with the cynical view that U.S. policies on nuclear non-proliferation “stem primarily from its desire to retain its dominant position in the nuclear fuel market.” On MBFR negotiations, on the other hand, which for most non-European countries have low salience, publics with an identifiable opinion on the subject (except in Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union) generally attribute a constructive role to the U.S.

In a majority of the survey countries, the concerned publics are believed to agree, at least with reservation, that the United States is militarily superior to the Soviet Union. Even in the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies and in Yugoslavia they are believed to see the U.S. as the stronger country, although public opinion in Western Europe tends to view the USSR as militarily equal to or ahead of the United States. In about half the countries—including India, Japan, Mexico and, not surprisingly, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia—the United States is viewed as having more armaments than necessary to meet its legitimate defense needs.

2. Opinions About Soviet Policies

Concerned publics in most countries other than the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Great Britain and Australia do not perceive the Soviet Union as being genuinely interested in achieving meaningful arms control and disarmament. Further, except in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, these publics are thought to agree that the Soviet Union has more arms than it needs. Several countries in addition to the USSR and its satellites credit the Soviet Union with a constructive approach to the MBFR negotiations.

3. Opinion About Host Country Policies

In almost none of the 30 countries do concerned publics feel that their own country has more armaments than are necessary to meet legitimate defense needs. The exceptions are Germany, Britain and Italy, where opinions on this question is thought to be divided. And only a few West European countries agree that their country “should exercise greater restraint in international sales or purchase of conventional arms.” The notion that one’s own country “should exercise greater caution in developing plutonium or nuclear reprocessing capabilities” is also rejected in a majority of these countries. On the other hand, there is high agreement that one’s country should take an active, or more active, role in international arms control and disarmament discussions.

4. Opinions on Various Arms Control/Disarmament Issues

Several of the very important questions raised in this section turned out to be “motherhood” issues. Thus, there is near-universal agreement—even in countries with low interest in these issues—that nuclear-weapons free zones can contribute importantly to world peace, that completion of the SALT II agreement and of the comprehensive test ban treaty are of great importance for all countries and that the United States should continue to pursue an agreement with the Soviet Union on arms restraints in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, specialist publics in a number of important Western-oriented countries appear to agree that the U.S. “is likely to sacrifice the interests of its friends and allies as it pushes for a SALT II agreement.” And, in most non-European countries, these publics seem to have been swayed by the Soviet campaign against the “neutron” bomb, although in Western Europe only Norway and Sweden agree that ERW should be prohibited.

Opinion on regional agreements to limit conventional arms transfers is divided. Several Western allies join the Soviet Union and East European countries in disagreeing that such arrangements are impractical. In about the same group of countries, concerned publics believe that significant unexploited opportunities for regional arms control exist in their region.

Finally, there is a great divergence of opinion among concerned publics about the Carter administration’s initiative in linking arms exports to human rights violations. Despite strong West European approval of American human rights initiatives on the part of the general public, the specialized AC&D publics in France, Great Britain and Italy are believed to agree with the Soviet Union, East European countries and others that arms suppliers should be at liberty to transfer arms to countries “guilty of gross and consistent violations of basic human rights.”

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Putnam Subject File, Box 30, Disarmament: Public Diplomacy: 8–10/78. No classification marking. The paper is entitled “Interest and Attitudes of Concerned Publics Regarding Arms Control/Disarmament Issues.”
2. See footnote 2, Document 138.
3. The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), which prohibited and prevented the development, testing, use, or manufacture of nuclear weapons, contained two protocols. Protocol I committed countries outside of the Treaty zone to undertake obligations of the Treaty with respect to their territories within the Zone. Protocol II called upon states possessing nuclear weapons that agree to respect the obligations in the Treaty to not use nuclear weapons against the parties to the Treaty. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 226. The United States signed Protocol II in 1968 and Protocol I in 1977.
4. Attached but not printed at Appendix C are the tabulates for all 30 countries involved in the survey.