Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXX, Public Diplomacy

147. Memorandum From Robert Putnam of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 3, 1978

SUBJECT

• ICA Initiative on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament

At John Reinhardt’s suggestion, you established an interagency committee to develop a public diplomacy program on arms control and disarmament.² The committee has made reasonable progress, and its report will be ready by September 1st. The purpose of this memo is to provide you with an interim report³ on committee activity and to set before you one issue on which there are divergent views within the committee.

The committee has addressed four questions:

1. What specific US interests in the arms control field are likely to be affected by foreign opinion over the next year or two?

We have focussed on SALT, theater nuclear issues, MBFR, CTB, non-proliferation/nuclear energy, CAT, and regional arms control arrangements.

2. What are the present attitudes of key foreign publics on arms control issues?

Judging by reports from our posts in key countries, the most salient issues among European attentive publics are SALT, non-proliferation/nuclear energy, MBFR, theater nuclear issues, and CAT. Outside Europe, the only salient topics are CAT, regional arms control (e.g., Ayacucho), and non-proliferation/nuclear energy. Attentive publics everywhere are reported to be supportive of US policy on SALT, CTB, and MBFR, but suspicious on CAT and non-proliferation. On the latter two issues, relatively few foreign publics seem to support greater restraint on their own policies. In short, on CAT and non-proliferation we have a major selling job to do with attentive world publics.

3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of current Soviet propaganda efforts in the arms control field?

We have commissioned a CIA/FBIS study on this topic. It is already clear that the Soviets make a massive effort, but there is no systematic evidence of its effectiveness.

4. What specific programs should ICA conduct over the next year to foster understanding of arms control issues and US policy among attentive publics in key countries?⁴

The committee is considering three programmatic objectives:

(1) Sell SALT

We should convince foreign publics that SALT II will contribute to world peace and Western security, aiming for positive feedback into Senate opinion next spring.⁵

(2) Sell CAT and Non-proliferation

Since unilateral US policies won’t work forever, we should seek to build support for restraint among influential publics abroad.⁶

(3) Explore emerging issues

On issues such as MBFR, theater nuclear issues, and regional arms control, where our policies and those of other governments are still evolving, we should stimulate reasoned discussion of the alternatives, without aiming at persuasion in a specific direction.⁷

The committee has not yet assigned priorities to these objectives, but some participants strongly suggest something like a 60%–20%–20%⁸ division of energy, giving SALT clear predominance. In my view, objectives #2 and #3 are more important than that, particularly since this program’s effects will probably be more important in the long-term than in the short-term. In your view, should we:

Devote most of our efforts under this program to selling SALT abroad

Devote roughly equal attention to all three objectives⁹

Other:

Apart from this question of priorities, no significant disagreements have yet emerged in the committee’s work. The final report will probably need formal SCC blessing, since it will serve as ICA’s marching order, but a meeting of principals may be unnecessary.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Putnam Subject File, Box 30, Disarmament: Public Diplomacy: 8–10/78. Confidential. Sent for both information and action. Inderfurth initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. See Document 134.
3. An unknown hand underlined “interim report.”
4. Putnam wrote “DA” and drew a downward pointing arrow in the left-hand margin next to this point. Below this, Aaron wrote “[illegible] SALT with CAT & N.P.”
5. Aaron wrote “60%” in the left-hand margin next to this point.
6. Aaron wrote “30%” in the left-hand margin next to this point.
7. Aaron wrote “10%” in the left-hand margin next to this point.
8. Inderfurth underlined “60%–20%–20%.” He placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote: “I think this is a good division. Rick.” Below this, Putnam wrote Inderfurth’s initials and drew an arrow from his initials to Inderfurth’s handwritten comment.
9. Brzezinski approved this option. Putnam wrote Brzezinski’s initials in the left-hand margin next to this option and drew an arrow from the initials to the option.