Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXX, Public Diplomacy

138. Telegram From the International Communication Agency to Multiple Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, July 7, 1978, 1745Z

15297. Subject: Disarmament.

1. At NSC direction, ICA is chairing interagency committee which will plan multi-year public diplomacy initiative on major arms control and disarmament issues. Deadline for resulting report to NSC is tight.

2. Posts requested cable by July 21 information on interest in, and attitudes about, arms control/disarmament issues by concerned publics in host country. In preparing reply PAO should consult with other members of Mission. Insofar as possible, given host country political context, discreetly query local sources, particularly with respect to sections 1, 2, and 3 of response.

3. Response should consist of six parts:

4. First section should discuss size and character of publics concerned with arms control/disarmament issues. These publics defined as individuals and institutions professionally involved with such subjects who influence government policy or public opinion, whether inside or outside the government, as well as individuals who have a deep and continuing interest in such issues, even though they are not professional specialists in those areas. Given numbers of individuals, names of organizations, and any other basic information you believe would be useful.

5. Second section should describe in one or two paragraphs main arms control/disarmament issues of interest to these publics.

6. Third section should indicate degree of interest these publics have in specific topics. This section discusses interest only, not perceived importance of issues, or availability of possible remedies. For each topic select most appropriate term from following list: very high, high, medium, low, very low, insufficient information.

A. SALT II and III.

B. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

C. Theater nuclear or “grey area” issues.

D. Radiological and chemical weapons.

E. Anti-satellite systems.

F. Regional arms control arrangements (e.g., MBFR, Ayacucho,² Indian Ocean,³ Sinai disengagement,⁴ regional confidence building measures).

G. Conventional arms transfers.

H. Nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation.

I. International disarmament machinery.

J. Linkage between disarmament and development.

K. Other arms control/disarmament issues (e.g., nuclear-weapons-free-zones, ERW) (specify).

7. In designing programmatic activities on arms control/disarmament, it highly useful have general idea where concerned publics stand now on key issues. For this purpose fourth section should contain post’s thoughtful response to brief questionnaire, completing it as you believe it would be completed by majority of members of concerned publics defined in section 1 of your reply. Washington will interpret responses to questionnaire with due caution, bearing in mind their necessarily impressionistic nature. Posts may, where appropriate, supply brief explanation of responses to individual statements, including an assessment of how opinions expressed may differ from official host country policies. Where there are marked differences of opinion within concerned public, indicate the differing views, the groups holding them, and their relative strengths. If post has insufficient information regarding certain statements, so indicate. For each of the following assertions, select a response from following list: strongly agree, agree with reservations, opinion about equally divided, disagree with reservations, strongly disagree, insufficient information.

A. The United States is genuinely interested in achieving meaningful arms control and disarmament.

B. The Soviet Union is genuinely interested in achieving meaningful arms control and disarmament.

C. The United States has more armaments than are necessary to meet its legitimate defense needs.

D. The Soviet Union has more armaments than are necessary to meet its legitimate defense needs.

E. The host country has more armaments than are necessary to meet its legitimate defense needs.

F. The United States is militarily superior to the Soviet Union.

G. The Soviet Union is militarily superior to the United States.

H. The U.S. is likely to sacrifice the interests of its friends and allies as it pushes for a SALT II agreement.

I. Completion of a SALT II agreement is of great importance for all countries.

J. Completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is of great importance for all countries.

K. The enhanced radiation (neutron) warhead should be prohibited.

L. U.S. policies on conventional arms transfers are well-intentioned and constructive.

M. U.S. policies on nuclear nonproliferation are well-intentioned and constructive.

N. Regional agreements to limit conventional arms transfers are an impractical objective.

O. The host country should exercise greater restraint in international sales or purchases of conventional arms.

P. Arms suppliers should not transfer arms to countries guilty of gross and consistent violations of basic human rights.

Q. The U.S. has had a constructive approach to the MBFR negotiations.

R. The Soviet Union has had a constructive approach to the MBFR negotiations.

S. The United States should continue to pursue an agreement with the Soviet Union on arms restraint in the Indian Ocean.

T. Nuclear weapons free zones can contribute importantly to world peace.

U. U.S. policies on nuclear nonproliferation stem primarily from its desire to retain its dominant position in the nuclear fuel market.

V. The host country should exercise greater caution in developing plutonium or nuclear reprocessing capabilities.

W. The host country should take a more active role in international arms control and disarmament discussions.

X. There are significant unexploited opportunities for regional arms control in the region of host country.

Y. The current disarmament machinery (e.g., U.N. bodies, CCD) needs radical restructuring.

8. Fifth section should contain summary of results of any recent systematic in-country opinion surveys on these subjects, and any additional information post feels would be useful to Washington planners.

9. Sixth section should briefly indicate way you went about completing your response and your assessment of overall reliability of information provided.

10. In optional seventh section, include any innovative programmatic approaches (e.g., involving new institutional linkages) you wish suggest, recognizing that Washington already considering standard activities such as seminars and VTRs.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Putnam Subject File, Box 30, Disarmament: Public Diplomacy: 7/78. Unclassified; Priority. All brackets are in the original. Drafted by Blackburn; cleared by Hedges, Nalle, Morton Smith, and Chatten; approved by Alan Carter. Blackburn initialed for all clearing officials. Sent Priority to Ottawa, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Oslo, Stockholm, London, Budapest, Warsaw, Bucharest, Moscow, Belgrade, Cairo, New Delhi, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Islamabad, Jidda, Canberra, Jakarta, Tokyo, Seoul, Lagos, Dakar, Pretoria, Dar es Salaam, Buenos Aires, Brasilia, Mexico City, and Caracas. For the 30–country summary, based on the cabled responses, see Document 146.
2. Reference is to the December 1974 Ayacucho Declaration, signed by officials from Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, and Panama, which limited armaments and prevented the acquisition of offensive weapons. (David Binder, “8 Latin Nations Declare Intention to Limit Arms,” The New York Times, December 13, 1974, p. 1.)
3. Reference is to the 1971 UN General Assembly Resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. (A/RES/2832/XXVI)
4. Presumable references to the 1974 Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, the 1974 Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement, and the 1975 Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement.