226. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1
- US Adherence to Protocol to Treaty Creating Latin American Nuclear Free Zone
- In my memorandum to you of October 25, 1967 (Enclosure A), I recommended that you inform President Diaz of Mexico that the United States intends to sign Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Enclosure B).2 This Treaty, which has been signed by 21 Latin American countries and ratified by Mexico [Page 550]and Brazil, would prohibit Latin American Parties from producing, testing, or possessing nuclear weapons in their respective territories; it would also forbid the receipt or installation of any nuclear weapons in such territories. In addition, Latin American Parties to the Treaty would undertake to use nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Treaty contains two protocols which are open for signature by the United States.
- Protocol I calls for countries outside the Treaty zone to undertake
the obligations of the Treaty with respect to their territories within
the zone. US adherence to this Protocol would result, for example, in
the incorporation of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands in the zone. On
December 10, 1965, Bill Foster
wrote the Chairman of the Negotiating Committee of the Preparatory
Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America that:
“We do not wish to have included in the proposed nuclear free zone the Virgin Islands, since it is United States territory, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, because of its integral relationship with the United States. In the case of both of these areas, the United States must deal with disarmament policies affecting other nuclear powers …”
- Protocol II calls upon nuclear-weapon states to agree to respect the obligations set forth in the Treaty and to promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Contracting Parties to the Treaty.
- On October 26, 1967, you informed President Diaz 3 that the United States intends to sign Protocol II with an interpretive statement after consultations with the Congress (Enclosure C). These consultations, necessary because ratification of Protocol II will require the advice and consent of the Senate, are now complete. Both the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Foreign Relations Committee have been briefed in executive session on the Treaty and on our plan to sign Protocol II. Except for Senator Curtis who questioned the reference to general and complete disarmament in the preamble (a similar reference appears in the preamble of the Limited Test Ban Treaty) no objections were raised. At Senator Fulbright’s request, a personal call was made to Senator Hickenlooper who had been present at the Joint Committee but not at the Foreign Relations meeting. Senator Hickenlooper, without committing himself, indicated that, on balance, he would not object to signature of Protocol II with a statement of interpretation, but that he thought ratification should depend on the degree of acceptance of the statement of interpretation [Page 551]by Latin American countries. In addition, Senator Dirksen, the members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the staff of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee have been advised that we are giving sympathetic consideration to signing Protocol II. No objections have been expressed.
- As indicated in my memorandum to you of October 25 (Enclosure A), I believe that, by adhering to Protocol II, the US would not only be identified with a major arms control measure of special significance to our hemisphere relations, but would also be in a better position to influence the implementation of the Treaty in a manner favorable to our interests. The interpretive statement (Enclosure D) which I would recommend to accompany signature is designed to resolve five matters of concern to the United States. The statement would: 1) make clear that ratification of Protocol II would not constitute United States acceptance of the territorial claims of Latin American Parties; 2) emphasize that the Treaty and its Protocols have no effect upon our transit rights in Latin America; 3) explain our pledge in Protocol II “not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Contracting Parties” so as to permit a nuclear response in the event of an armed attack by a Latin American Contracting Party in which it is assisted by a nuclear-weapon state; 4) reiterate the position of the United States that this Treaty prohibits Contracting Parties from acquiring nuclear explosive devices even if intended for peaceful purposes, but permits the United States to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes for the Contracting Parties; and 5) state that the United States would act in the same manner with respect to the Latin American territories of Protocol I adherents as it would with respect to the territories of the Contracting Parties to the Treaty, thereby encouraging the Netherlands,4 France, and the United Kingdom5 to ratify Protocol I and providing additional evidence of our support for the proposes of the Treaty at negligible cost. Our “interpretations” would not constitute “reservations” which are prohibited by the Treaty and they would serve to offset interpretations which differ from our own. (For example, the dominant Latin American view, with which we concur, that Contracting Parties cannot acquire nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is not shared by Brazil and Argentina.)
- The Latin American countries are observing US actions on Protocol II closely as an indication of our support for the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone and arms control measures generally. An early public announcement, prior to signature of the Protocol, would be highly desirable [Page 552]in order to encourage ratification of the Treaty by additional Latin American nations and to obtain their support in the NPT negotiations.
- The United States should not sign Protocol I at this time because of security requirements.
- The United States should sign Protocol II as soon as possible, accompanying signature with the interpretive statement set forth in Enclosure D.
- You should publicly announce at an early date that the United States is prepared to sign Protocol II.
These recommendations are concurred in by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1968. Secret. The source text was submitted under cover of an undated memorandum from Fisher to Secretary Rusk, which enclosed for Rusk’s approval “a self-explanatory Memorandum to the President recommending that the United States sign Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty with an interpretive statement.”↩
- Enclosure B, entitled “Text of LANFZ Treaty” is not attached. For text of Protocol II, see 22 UST 754. The United States is not a signatory to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Treaty of Tlatelolco) which was signed by 14 Latin American nations at Mexico City on February 14, 1967. Vice President Humphrey signed Protocol II to this Treaty on behalf of the United States at Mexico City on April 1, 1968.↩
- At the invitation of President Johnson, President Diaz of Mexico made a State visit to the United States October 26-28. For text of the joint communique issued by Diaz and Johnson on October 27 following private discussions, and for other remarks issued by both during this visit, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson , 1967, Book II, pp. 945-962.↩
- The Dutch have expressed concern to us that Protocol II does not expressly apply to their Latin American territories. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- The United Kingdom signed Protocols I and II on December 20, 1967. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩