253. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Panama1

334024. For the Ambassador. Subject: Iranian Request for Extradition.

1. Press reports from Tehran indicate that the militants on the Embassy compound are taking seriously the equivocal Panamanian [Page 602] reaction to their request for the Shah’s extradition.2 We know from other sources that Iranian authorities seriously believe this initiative may be successful.

2. The positive interpretation being given to Royo’s statement3 could severely complicate our efforts to free the hostages. While we are confident that was not his intention, the effect of holding out some hope to the militants and the Iranian regime could substantially delay release of the hostages.

3. Please see Royo urgently to point out these factors to him and to request that he consider a clarifying statement which would disabuse the Iranians of their hope that the Shah may be extradited from Panama.4 As long as that hope persists in Iran movement to free the hostages will be complicated.

Christopher
  1. Source: Department of State, S/S–1 Executive Secretariat, Information Management Section, David P. Newsom Files, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, The Shah December 1979 Volume IV. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to the White House and the USUN. Drafted by Precht; cleared by Hurlings and Bowdler; and approved by Newsom.
  2. See Document 252. In telegram 10542 from Panama City, December 29, Moss reported that Royo’s press statements and subsequent clarification reflected two currents of thinking which had characterized Royo and Torrijos since the Shah’s arrival: 1) a desire to preserve a “neutral” image and “extreme sensitivity” over possibly being seen as a U.S. agent and 2) “an almost uncontrollable desire to leap ahead and become the mediator who freed the hostages.” Moss did not think Royo or Torrijos would seriously contemplate handing over the Shah. (Department of State, S/S–1 Executive Secretariat, Information Management Section, David P. Newsom Files, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, The Shah December 1979 Volume IV)
  3. A copy of Royo’s statement to the Islamic Council of the Revolution, in which he communicated that if the appropriate documents were presented within 60 days, “the extradition demand will be accepted as formal and the executive will proceed to consider it and later decide on it,” is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 60, Panama: 6/79–1/80.
  4. In telegram 2 from Panama City, January 2, 1980, Moss reported on his January 1 meeting with Royo during which Moss raised the U.S. Government’s concerns. Royo said he had informed the Iranian emissaries that Panama “could not hand over the Shah under any circumstances” but was willing to accept and consider an extradition request as a “face-saving” device, provided the “GOI put itself into conformity with international law by releasing the hostages.” Royo also shared plans to send a mission to Tehran to negotiate the release of the hostages and receive the extradition request. Moss reminded Royo that he had agreed to refrain from taking “any action we asked them not to take” and concluded Royo “still wants badly to become the man who freed the hostages, and he will keep trying.” (Department of State, S/S–1 Executive Secretariat, Information Management Section, David P. Newsom Files, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, The Shah, Panama—Jan-Mar 1980, Egypt Jan–July 1980)