42. Editorial Note
The crisis in Poland reached a tipping point in December 1980. On December 2, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) issued an Alert Memorandum noting that the Soviets were increasing preparations for an invasion of Poland: “Recent military activities in and around Poland are highly unusual for this time of year. We are aware of preparations for an imminent unscheduled joint service exercise involving Soviet, East German, Polish, and possibly Czechoslovak forces” which “could also serve as cover for an intervention.” While cautioning that Soviet preparations did not denote an imminent invasion, the Agency concluded that intervention was increasingly likely. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 65, Poland: 11/80–1/81) The memorandum is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume VII, Poland, 1977–1981. The following day, President Jimmy Carter sent Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev a Hot Line message assuring the Soviet leader that the United States was not intent on taking advantage of the Polish crisis to change the balance of power in Europe. The White House also issued a public statement warning of “unprecedented building of Soviet forces along the Polish border” and Soviet statements of “alleged ‘anti-Socialist’ forces within Poland.” The White House warned: “We know from postwar history that such allegations have sometimes preceded military intervention.” They continued: “Foreign military intervention [Page 147] in Poland would have most negative consequences for East-West relations in general and U.S.-Soviet relations in particular.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–1981, Book III, pages 2771–2772)
On December 4, the CIA received an urgent message from a highly valuable and well placed source in the Polish General Staff, Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski. Kuklinski informed the CIA that the Soviets had decided to invade Poland with 15 divisions, 2 Czechoslovak divisions, and 1 East German division on December 8. (Benjamin Weiser, A Secret Life, pages 219–221) Despite Kuklinski’s information, the final decision on Soviet intervention had been delayed until after a special meeting of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact scheduled to take place in Moscow on December 5. At the meeting, Polish First Secretary Stanislaw Kania, informed the other Eastern European leaders that the Polish leadership had instituted a group working on imposing martial law in Poland, arresting the leadership of Solidarity, and creating an armed militia of party functionaries. While the Warsaw Pact leaders cautioned Kania of the danger of having the situation further deteriorate, it was agreed that the Polish leadership should still attempt to resolve the situation on its own. (From Solidarity to Martial Law, pages 141–161)
On December 7, the National Security Council met to discuss the situation in Poland and U.S. reactions. President Carter approved the text of cables to be sent to the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and other U.S. allies, as well as the United Nations Secretary General and NATO Secretary General. Following the meeting, the White House issued a statement: “Preparations for possible Soviet intervention in Poland appear to have been completed. It is our hope that no such intervention will take place. The United States Government reiterates its statement of December 3, regarding the very adverse consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations of Soviet military intervention in Poland.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–1981, Book III, page 2785)
On December 8, Bureau of Intelligence and Research Director Ronald I. Spiers briefed Western Ambassadors in Washington on the U.S. assessment of the Polish situation. In telegram 326216 to multiple posts December 9, the Department of State informed all NATO capitals that Spiers told the Ambassadors that the Soviets had completed preparations and military intervention could happen without further notice. Spiers reported: “Military signs are sufficiently ominous that whatever steps can be taken to affect Soviet decision making should be taken now.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800587–1069)
By December 11, the Soviet leadership had decided to wait for a Polish solution to the crisis. In a meeting of the Soviet Politburo, chief [Page 148] Soviet ideologue and chairman of the special Soviet Politburo commission on the Polish events Mikhail Suslov reported on the December 5 PCC meeting: “Most importantly, the Polish comrades understand the great danger that hangs over Poland, and they recognize the great harm of the actions of the anti-socialist elements who represent a great threat to the socialist gains of the Polish people.” Kania, concluded Suslov, “noted that the Polish United Workers’ Party, the Polish people, its healthy forces, its armed forces, the organs of State Security and police, which support the PUWP, will be able to deal with and normalize the situation by their own means.” Brezhnev’s speech at the meeting, Suslov told the Politburo, “contained all the necessary instructions for the PUWP and the Polish comrades.” (From Solidarity to Martial Law, pages 167–168)
In his December 19 NSC Weekly Report to the President, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski reported: “The same Soviet clandestine source who provided the report detailing Soviet invasion plans now reports that the invasion has been postponed for the ‘indefinite future.’ The principal reason for the postponement, according to the sources, was the effectiveness of the Western counter propaganda campaign which convinced the Kremlin the West would retaliate ‘massively’ with political and economic sanctions.” (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 30, NSC Weekly Reports, 6–12/80)