41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in All NATO Capitals1
250846. Subject: Poland and Eastern Europe: Analysis and Policy Implications. Ref: State 238732.2
1. (C-entire text)
2. In an effort to analyze the likely effect on the USSR and Eastern Europe of the developments in Poland and to evaluate their implications for U.S. policy, we circulated our initial assessment (reftel) to our posts in Moscow and Eastern Europe for their initial thoughts and [Page 144] comments. This message represents a refinement of our assessment in light of the responses from the field. We have cast paras 3–6 of this message in the form of talking points which the action addressees may share with host governments on a confidential basis. Action addressees may also draw on the substance of paras 7–93 which discuss U.S. policy in light of the recent events in Poland.
3. The present situation in Poland:
—Events in Poland have not yet run their course and the question of whether the workers are ultimately successful in achieving a major liberalization of Polish society will have a significant bearing on the impact of these events on other Eastern European countries.
—Although Polish workers have already won some signal victories, e.g., securing agreement in principle to an independent trade union structure, acknowledgement of the right to strike, access by the church to the media, and apparently some relaxation in censorship, the new Polish leadership seems certain to try over time to pare back some of these concessions. Nevertheless, in the short run, the situation in Poland seems likely to stabilize and the gains of the workers seem likely to be preserved.
4. Impact of Polish developments on Eastern Europe:
—The unique characteristics of the internal situation in Poland reduce the chances of any immediate, direct spillover of Polish developments into other parts of Eastern Europe—let alone the USSR.
—At least some of the other Eastern European Governments are likely to heighten the degree of vigilance toward dissidents and be more alert to the possibility of discontent among workers. At the same time, they are likely to pay more attention to agricultural performance and supplies of foodstuffs and consumer goods.
—Several Eastern European Governments are likely to pay increased attention to the possibility of structural economic reforms—perhaps along Hungarian lines—as a way of dealing with worsening economic problems.
—Over the longer term, developments in Poland are likely to have a significant impact. The workers’ gains, especially if they are to some degree consolidated and institutionalized, will serve as an example of the kinds of evolutionary change which may some day be possible elsewhere in the area.
5. Reaction from Moscow:
[Page 145]—Poland’s reforms, if implemented, could threaten the party’s monopoly on political power, and Moscow is concerned that elements in other Eastern European countries might emulate Poland. Therefore, the Soviets are likely to press the Poles to roll back—to the degree possible—the concessions made to workers on the right to form independent trade unions and the right to strike.
—While the Soviets seem certain to heighten their efforts on ideological vigilance, they are unlikely, at least for the present, to pressure the Poles or the other Eastern European countries to curtail their economic ties with the West.
—The Soviets are able and ready to provide Poland with some economic assistance, as the recently announced agreements indicate. Soviet hard currency balances are up, and so long as Polish developments remain within bounds acceptable to Moscow, the Soviets are likely to provide carefully measured assistance. It is unclear at this point how far Soviet leaders will find it possible or desirable to go.
—The Soviets also seem prepared to tolerate a degree of economic experimentation, perhaps along the lines of Hungary’s new economic mechanism, although they will caution against reforms which affect the political structure of the state.
—Polish events point up particularly clearly the increasing difficulties of the Soviet Union in resolving the problems in its economic and political relationships with Eastern European countries.
—Domestically, the Soviets have taken steps such as the jamming of VOA, BBC and Deutsche Welle to insulate their population from information on developments in Poland.4 Although there are certain parallels between Soviet and Polish economic problems, we see little prospect of Soviet workers raising demands for fundamental reform of the Soviet system.
6. Impact of Polish events on Europe as a whole:
—Detente and CSCE. In view of the low key posture of Western European Governments with regard to the Polish crisis and Soviet hopes of preserving the structure of detente in Europe, it seems unlikely that the Polish developments will lead to a more pugnacious Soviet stance at Madrid.
—It would be shortsighted, however, to attribute the “successful” outcome in Poland as evidence of Soviet restraint in Europe or as a triumph of detente.
[Page 146]—The Soviets will be at great pains to avoid weakening the position they gained in post-1945 Europe, and they will not exclude the use of armed force as a means of preserving their “alliance” in extremis.
7. U.S. policy:
It is clear, based on our assessment of the Eastern European reaction to events in Poland, that the principal implication for the United States in the future is to continue our policy of differentiation. With each Eastern European Government our policy actions must take into account that government’s policies toward us; at the same time we must tailor our policy initiatives to the peculiar situation found in each of these countries. We should be alert to the needs of the Eastern Europeans and prepared to respond to them rapidly and concretely, and with appropriate subtlety, in view of the sensitivity of the USSR.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800453–1198. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Gilmore; cleared by Bridges, Parris, and Barry; approved by Ridgway. Sent for information Priority to Belgrade, East Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Helsinki, Madrid, Stockholm, and Vienna.↩
- In telegram 238732 to multiple posts, September 8, the Department provided a draft of the paper and requested comments on the analytical section as well as policy recommendations for each individual Eastern European country. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800428–0391)↩
- In telegram 253501, September 22, the Department corrected this sentence to read “draw from substance of para 7.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800453–1198)↩
- See Document 79.↩