43. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State1
12334. Subject: Poland: Post-Intervention U.S. Policy.
1. (C-entire text.)
2. Summary: In considering the U.S. response to Russian/Warsaw Pact intervention in Poland, the guiding principle should be to distinguish between the Russians and the EE’s. The former, not the latter, [Page 149] should be made to bear the brunt of the negative consequences of intervention, in continuation of our goal of dividing the East, not driving it together. The basic reality, arguing for differentiation, is that the entire EE area is in a permanent, low-grade crisis in which Russian interests and the interests of the client states tend to diverge. As regards the Polish regime, our approach should be that it was forced against its inclination and better judgement by the Russians to do their bidding. The alternative to differentiation, a general anathema on Russians, EE’s and Polish Party people of every stripe is the easier option, but experience shows it will not carry very far before counter-pressures develop. The West [as] a whole, and the U.S. in particular, will be faced with tough decisions in the economic aid field in a post-intervention situation. I would not rule out carefully conditioned offers of assistance, or short-term food relief measures, as a way of looking—and being—constructive, re-entering the Polish scene and retaining flexibility from which to acquire marginal area of influence. End summary.
3. I know the Department has under consideration the question of our response to Soviet intervention in Poland.2 This is a many faceted issue. I submit some thoughts on how we might deal with the Polish authorities and the other EE’s, in distinction to the Russians.
4. Much will depend on the circumstances, and several scenarios can be envisaged. The Russians will, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, claim that they and other Warsaw Pact forces have responded to a Polish invitation. They may actually be able to provide some substantiation of the claim or, as in 1968, they may simply declare an invitation as a fact and proceed from there.
5. The main consideration is that, whatever the Russian stage management turns out to be, it is they who are responsible. The others go along, more or less willingly. We should be guided accordingly. The Russians should be made to bear the negative consequences of intervention, so far as the U.S. reaction goes. We should distinguish between them and their Warsaw Pact allies to the extent possible. The objective should continue to be, as in our post-Afghanistan policy, to seek to divide, not to unite the Eastern group.
6. There are difficulties in this suggested approach. It would not be easy, for example, to operate on the premise that the East German and Czechoslovak regimes have been dragged into intervention in Poland, in light of their anti-Polish actions and statements in the past several weeks. Hungary and Romania have been fairly restrained by comparison, and I judge Bulgaria too. In the event of intervention they [Page 150] will all be subject to heavy Russian pressure to support the action, if not actually participate in it. There may be shading of tone, but I suspect they will be fine ones in the general chorus.
7. Nevertheless, it is important in our long term interests to proceed on the assumption of distinction between the Russians and the others. The reason, in my view, is that it is demonstrable that the whole Eastern Europe empire is in a permanent, low grade crisis in which Russian interests and those of its clients tend to diverge on many points. It is a crisis the central feature of which is economic mismanagement. It is not a crisis which is bound to drive people to the barricades, though it will, I suspect, keep them in a constant state of disaffection. The Polish trouble, even if it is liquidated, will on this view reappear at some future point in other places in other forms—just as 1956 and 1968 were unable to exorcize the demon.
8. Our approach to the Polish authorities in a post-intervention situation will be particularly important. Again, much will depend on the actual circumstances. Perhaps there will be an invitation from some Polish quarters for Warsaw Pact “fraternal assistance.” Perhaps Polish security or military forces will act to put down worker resistance by force. I suggest our basic approach should be that the Poles, specifically the Polish Party, were forced into such actions against their better judgement through massive Russian pressure and intimidation. Such a line has a basis in fact. The Party, up to this point, has shown notable readiness to try to find compromises with the new union movement. Admittedly, it has had few options, but the fact remains that is has not had recourse in the past months to massive repressive methods. We would certainly not wish to endorse in any way Polish figures sharply identified with intervention or repression, but rather put the stress on “healthy forces” in the party which have tried to devise Polish solutions for Polish problems.
9. I would not pretend that this suggested course is easy or likely to produce quick results. The easier way in fact is to lump everyone together, Russians, EE’s, Polish Party people of every stripe, in one general anathema, draw the ideological battle lines sharply and settle down to a long, cold winter in the trenches. The difficulty with this course is that experience tells us it does not last long. Usually sooner than later, counter-pressures develop. Allies will begin to get itchy about selling large diameter steel pipe. Joint projects for Siberian development will start dancing like sugar plum fairies. The Ostpolitiker will start sighing for the German nation. Our farmers will want to sell their grain again. And, on other levels, we will all gradually wend our way [Page 151] back to the reality that we need the Russians pretty badly, chiefly in arms control.
10. If that is where we are headed in the post-Polish intervention period, be it in one, two or however many years, we should be sure we do not make it tougher for the EE’s than we do for the Russians. I and, I suspect, others who have been involved in US-Czechoslovak affairs feel that we transferred some [of] our policy rage at the Russians over 1968 to the injured party, Czechoslovakia. We should try to avoid that policy pothole in a Polish 1980, or 1981.
11. I realize that history cannot be telescoped. We could not have adopted the attitude to Kadar in 1956 that we did in 1966, or even more in 1976. Polich [Poland] has to take its natural course, and it is often inevitably slow. I would not go so far as to suggest that we should be on the alert for Kadar equivalents in any Polish variation on the Russian intervention theme, but we should be careful not to paint ourselves too firmly into too many corners too quickly. Before anyone yells “quisling,” it would be well to reflect on the irony that Kadar, of all people, would be the last best hope left in EE of a mildly progressive internal regime if the present Polish strivings collapse.
12. I have pointed to economic mismanagement as the root cause of low-grade crisis through EE, and it is in the economic area that we and others would face particularly sensitive decisions in a post-intervention scene. That is, assuming that the Russians/EE’s do not retreat into the bunker of strict autarky but continue to be interested, as I tend to think they must be, in developing economic relations and limited cooperation with the West.
13. It would not be easy for a USG, or other Western countries, to extend economic assistance to a post-intervention Polish regime, yet Poland in the aftermath of intervention would need economic assistance even more desperately than it does now. We could adopt the position that that is a Russian affair, and let it go at that, but I hardly think that simply washing our hands of it will satisfy public opinion, particularly American Polonia. I would not exclude our making carefully conditioned offers of assistance as a way of re-entering the Polish situation and making our presence felt. This leaves it up to the other side, Polish or Russian, to turn us down, and the onus would be on them while we would look—and actually be—constructive.
14. Immediate food aid, as distinct from broader economic assistance, would become particularly acute in a post-intervention situation. I believe we would find ourselves under public pressure, on broad humanitarian grounds, to try to help the Polish people in what would doubtless be a time of distress. Although I have reservations about [Page 152] short-term CCC aid under current conditions (Warsaw 11704)3, I doubt that we would have any alternative but to grant some kind of food assistance post-intervention, either bilaterally or through multilateral programs and channels.
15. The guiding thought in all the above is simply, to repeat, we should work to divide the East, not drive it together. It is not always easy to translate that principle into practical action courses. But in general it reduces itself, even—one might say especially—in highly charged situations such as post-intervention Poland would be, to retaining flexibility and continuing to seek marginal areas of influence.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800586–1050. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Belgrade, East Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, London, Moscow, Paris, Prague, Sofia, Vienna, USMission West Berlin, Munich, and USNATO.↩
- See Document 44.↩
- In telegram 11704 from Warsaw, November 19, Meehan discussed the evolving situation and Poland and addressed the Polish request for CCC credits: “Granting additional CCC assistance might be justifiable on humanitarian grounds, but I find it difficult to produce a convincing foreign policy rationale—and the humanitarian case does not demand immediate decision.” Meehan concluded that any short-term CCC credits “would be marginal to the great mass of the problem” and suggested that a decision on offering the credits be held in reserve. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800554–0379)↩