Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

294. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• European Trip: Belgrade (U)

With Tito’s death, Yugoslavia is entering the most critical period of its postwar history. For three decades Tito’s name was synonymous with Yugoslavia. He was the architect of Yugoslavia’s unique domestic system with its emphasis on self-management and the driving force behind its independent foreign policy. And in times of crisis he was the ultimate guarantor of the country’s unity. (C)

His passing leaves a political and psychological void which will be hard to fill. While we are relatively confident of the ability of the new leadership to handle the problems posed by the transition—at least in the short run—many of the centrifugal forces that have plagued Yugoslavia in the past are likely to reemerge and in the long run they could pose serious threats to the country’s political stability and non-aligned position. Moreover, the transition comes at a time of heightened international tension, prompted in particular by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which the Yugoslavs see as an indication of the Soviets increased willingness to use force to solve international problems. Thus beneath the tranquil facade projected over the last six weeks the new Yugoslav leadership is uneasy and they will be looking for indications of our continued willingness to provide support in this difficult period ahead. (C)

Against this background, your trip to Yugoslavia takes on particular significance. It will be the first visit to Yugoslavia by a head of state, and I recommend you use it to achieve a number of basic objectives:

—To underscore our support for the new Yugoslav leadership and our confidence in their ability to handle the transition.

—To reaffirm the continuity of U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia.

—To establish a personal relationship with some of the key leaders who will guide Yugoslavia’s destiny in the coming years.

—To make clear to the Yugoslav leadership, directly and personally, the basic outlines of your policy on key international issues, particularly arms control and relations with the Soviets. (C)

The memorandum from Ed Muskie at Tab A² effectively sets out the background, setting and issues for your meeting with the new Yugoslav leadership. (C)

Your host for your opening substantive discussions on the morning of June 24 will be Cvijetin Mijatovic, who was elected President of the State Presidency on May 15. Mijatovic, however, will be your counterpart in name only. Under the system of rotating collective leadership set up by Tito, power is dispersed among a number of institutions and personalities in order to assure ethnic balance and representation. Mijatovic will be replaced in less than a year—as will Stefan Doronski the current Chairman of the Presidium (Politburo)—and he lacks the prestige and authority to provide the type of strong leadership which Tito provided. (C)

The real focal point of power is an “inner leadership” composed of Dr. Vladimir Bakaric, head of the Croatian party and one of Tito’s oldest and closest associates; Milos Minic, the former Foreign Minister (whom you met during Tito’s visit to the United States in March 1978); Nikola Ljubicic, the Defense Minister; and Stane Dolanc, the former Secretary of the Presidium. These men formed the real locus of decision-making during Tito’s illness, and it is they more than Mijatovic or Doronski who will determine Yugoslavia’s destiny in the initial transition period. For this reason they have been brought into the substantive discussions, and your remarks should be addressed as much, if not more, to them as to Mijatovic and Doronski.³ (C)

Bilateral Issues

I suggest you begin any discussion of bilateral relations by noting the progress we have made since Tito’s visit and reiterating your high esteem for Tito as a world leader. You might mention in this connection your extended correspondence with Tito, to which the Yugoslavs attach great importance.

While there are no major bilateral problems between Yugoslavia and the United States, the Yugoslavs are likely to focus on two issues in particular:

—Terrorism: In the wake of Tito’s death the Yugoslavs are understandably nervous about an upsurge of terrorism by emigre groups operating in the U.S. and Western Europe. Their concern has been heightened, moreover, by the bombing of the house of the Yugoslav Charge here in Washington, Vladimir Sindjelic, on June 3. Over the past three years—and particularly recently—we have taken firm efforts to curb terrorist acts by emigre groups in the U.S., but the Yugoslavs will undoubtedly press you to do more. In response to their pleas, I suggest you reaffirm the pledge not to tolerate terrorist acts against Yugoslav personnel and facilities, which you made in your public statement issued on the occasion of Tito’s death. You can also point to the Administration’s good record regarding the arrest and prosecution of emigre terrorists (some 17 arrests and/or prosecutions) as proof of your determination to pursue a toughminded policy against emigre terrorists. (C)

—Economic Assistance: The health of the Yugoslav economy will be a key factor—perhaps the key factor—in determining how successfully the new leadership will be able to manage the challenges it will face in the difficult transition period ahead. At present the economy is beset by major problems, which if not arrested, could seriously undermine political cohesion and stability. Inflation is over 20 percent and the Yugoslav foreign debt is nearly $13 billion. While a stabilization program has been introduced, the Yugoslavs will have to obtain large-scale economic assistance to avoid a further downturn in their economy. (C)

Economic assistance therefore is likely to be high on the list of topics that the Yugoslav leaders will want to discuss with you. They have already approached Bill Miller about U.S. Government assistance in obtaining a large loan from U.S. banks, and they will consider our willingness to be helpful as an important test of the sincerity of our past pledges of support. I recommend that you convey a generally sympathetic attitude to the Yugoslavs without giving the impression that the United States Government can provide large-scale credits. You might mention that you have already personally discussed the Yugoslav financial situation with Bill Miller. He, in turn, has talked to U.S. commercial bankers, particularly David Rockefeller, about putting together a syndicate for a loan.⁴ (C)

In addition, you might make the following points as an indication of our desire to be helpful:

1. The U.S. Executive Director of the IMF supported Yugoslavia’s request to the IMF (on June 6) for second and third tranche drawings totalling $440 million over an 18-month period.

2. The U.S. Department of Agriculture made CCC credits available for Yugoslav imports of wheat in 1980 and is prepared to extend the terms of repayment from the present one year to three years if Yugoslavia wishes. Further, USDA is prepared to provide additional CCC credit guarantees in 1981.

3. The U.S. Social Security Administration will change its payments to annuitants residing in Yugoslavia from dinars to dollars. (C)

International Issues

— U.S.-Soviet Relations/Afghanistan: The Yugoslavs are deeply concerned by the deterioration in the international situation, particularly the downturn in U.S.-Soviet relations and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which has direct implications for their own security. At the same time they worry about the capacity of the U.S. to provide coherent and effective leadership in the troubling times ahead. In your discussion of international topics, therefore, I suggest you devote considerable time to stressing the strategic threat posed by Soviet actions in Afghanistan and your determination to make the Soviets pay a high price for their aggression. You may also wish to encourage the leadership to use their influence in the Non-aligned Movement to obtain a public condemnation of the invasion. (S)

—Arms Control and Detente: The Yugoslavs maintain a strong interest in arms control and a relaxation of international tensions, which they see as enhancing their own security. At the same time, they are concerned that increased tensions among the superpowers will lead to greater Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia. It will be useful therefore to stress your continued commitment to detente—but a detente based on reciprocity and mutual restraint—and to make clear that despite the setback in U.S.-Soviet relations, the U.S. intends to continue to pursue those elements of detente which it considers to be in its own interest, such as SALT, MBFR, CSCE and TNF arms control negotiations. (S)

While it is unlikely that we can convince the Yugoslavs to publicly support our TNF decision, it is important that they understand the rationale behind it and how it bears on their own security. I suggest you make the following points in particular:

—Our December decision was a response to a significant imbalance of nuclear forces accentuated recently by the Soviet TNF build-up.

—Our objective is the restoration of a stable balance of long range theater nuclear forces not an acceleration of the arms race.

—We are committed to TNF arms control negotiations and are ready to start talking now. But to date the Soviets have adamantly refused to negotiate unless the Alliance renounces its December decision. We can not do this because it would legitimate and perpetuate Soviet superiority.

—The continued imbalance of long range theater nuclear forces would have a negative impact not only on the security of the Alliance but on Yugoslavia’s security as well. (S)

—Non-Aligned and Third World: The Yugoslavs are particularly proud of their role in the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) which Tito helped to found. While Belgrade’s influence is likely to diminish somewhat in the wake of Tito’s death, the Yugoslavs can still be quite useful in countering Soviet and Cuban influence in the NAM. Thus I recommend you stress the positive role the NAM could play in world affairs if it is viewed as credible and neutral, and if Yugoslavia continues to play an important role in it. Cuba will continue to try to aim the NAM at the U.S. and at our bilateral problems. You may want to offer a full briefing on U.S.-Cuban relations so that they could be better prepared to respond to Castro’s charges. (S)

—Iran/Iraq: You may also wish to use any discussion with the Yugoslav leadership on the NAM to explore ways in which the Yugoslavs can use their influence with Iran to obtain the release of the hostages, and once they are released, to facilitate a normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations. Similarly, the Yugoslavs have good relations with Iraq, and it would be useful to get them to use their good offices to help us improve our relations with Baghdad. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 12, Europe: 1980. Secret. Sent for information. Printed from an uninitialed copy. On June 6, Rentschler sent the memorandum to Brzezinski along with memoranda for Carter preparing for the stops in Rome, the Vatican, Madrid, and Lisbon. (Ibid.) On June 12, Larrabee sent a memorandum to Brzezinski recommending that he sign the overview memorandum to Carter for inclusion in the briefing book, which he did on June 13. (Ibid.) Eagleburger provided his own background memorandum to the President on June 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Lawrence S. Eagleburger Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Under Secretary of State for Management (1967–1984), Lot 84D204, Box 10, Chron, June, 1980)
2. In an undated copy of Muskie’s memorandum to Carter, the Department noted that the Yugoslav leadership was likely to “urge that more be done to help them with their most serious problem at this time—the need for Western financing to cover their balance of payments and defense needs.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 76, Trip: Box 27)
3. In telegram 4585 from Belgrade, June 10, Eagleburger recommended that the administration consider an additional substantive meeting with Yugoslav Presidency members as well as trying to “pre-cook” the meeting with Mijatovic. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800283–0739) Larrabee reported Eagleburger’s suggestion in a June 12 memorandum to Brzezinski. Brzezinski disapproved the recommendation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 12, Europe: 1980)
4. Eagleburger also detailed the offer made by Rockefeller to the Yugoslav Government in a June 23 memorandum to Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Lawrence S. Eagleburger Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Under Secretary of State for Management (1967–1984), Lot 84D204, Box 10, Chron June, 1980)