Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

295. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Belgrade, June 24, 1980, 10:45 a.m.–12:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • The President
  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Under Secretary David Newsom
  • Under Secretary Richard Cooper
  • Ambassador Lawrence Eagleburger
  • Steve Larrabee, NSC Staff Member
  • Victor Jackovich (Interpreter)

• Yugoslav

  • President Cvijetin Mijatovic
  • Lazar Kolisevski
  • Veselin Djuranovic
  • Josip Vrhovec
  • Sinan Hasani
  • Ambassador Budimir Loncar
  • Mirko Zaric

President Mijatovic opened the meeting by welcoming President Carter to Yugoslavia. He thanked him for his message and expressed his appreciation for the high-level delegation which the United States had sent to President Tito’s funeral. The Yugoslav leadership, he said, particularly appreciated the condolences that had been expressed through the President’s mother. The Presidency of Yugoslavia was also grateful for the messages of support for the non-aligned movement transmitted by the Vice President at the funeral. (C)

President Mijatovic reiterated Yugoslavia’s constant commitment to non-alignment and stressed that support for this position in the world was very strong. President Carter’s visit, he said, came at the right time and underscored the deepening of U.S.-Yugoslav bilateral relations. He then suggested that President Carter begin the substantive portion of the conversation, noting that he was eager to hear the President’s assessment of international trends, particularly in areas of the world where these trends could be improved. He also looked forward to hearing the President’s assessment of his discussions in Venice² and of U.S.-Soviet relations and U.S.-Chinese relations. In return, the Yugoslavs would inform the President of issues that concerned them, particularly detente as well as the situation in the Middle East, Iran and Afghanistan. The Yugoslav leaders also looked forward to discussing the situation in the non-aligned movement, especially their own perspective on the situation. Lastly, they looked forward to a discussion of bilateral relations, which President Mijatovic noted were “good.” (C)

President Carter began by noting that he had come in the spirit of peace, friendship and support for the independence and integrity of Yugoslavia. The welcome at the airport, the outpouring of enthusiasm along the way to the Palace and the beauty of the Palace itself were impressive. But even more impressive had been the tomb of President Tito. This was perhaps the most appropriate memorial to a great leader he had ever seen—simple, tasteful and solemn, but not depressing. It well reflected President Tito’s life. (C)

In this connection, President Carter remarked that he was pleased to accept the invitation to come to Yugoslavia even after Tito’s death and was gratified by the warm welcome he had received. President Tito’s own life had exemplified his commitment to freedom and independence, values which were deeply imbedded in the hearts of all the peoples of Yugoslavia. (C)

Turning to his discussions at Venice, President Carter noted that the discussions had reflected a common commitment on the part of the countries represented at the meeting that they stood united in support of the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. He wanted the Yugoslav leadership to know that the United States was Yugoslavia’s friend and that we stood ready to help in any way that the leadership might require. In this connection, he underscored the importance of the non-aligned status of Yugoslavia, noting that Yugoslavia had maintained a position of genuine non-alignment despite efforts by Cuba and others to distort the charter of the NAM. The United States considered the actions of President Tito at Havana to be a triumph for the NAM. (C)

Turning again to the discussions at Venice, President Carter said that one of the most important topics discussed had been the economic problems created by the dramatic increase in the price of oil. All nations needed to face the challenge presented by this increase in the spirit of cooperation and mutual assistance. Unemployment and inflation had been created by the rapid increase in the price of oil. The United States was eager to help Yugoslavia alleviate these problems by pursuing credit through its private banks. Secretary Miller and Under Secretary Cooper were assisting in this effort. (C)

The President noted in this connection that he was aware that David Rockefeller had recently been in Yugoslavia as a representative of the private banks. While the banks were independent of government control, the Administration was eager to work with Yugoslavia on economic matters, both now and in the future. He noted that the developed countries presently had a net deficit of $70 billion per year; the less developed countries had a net deficit of $50 billion per year. OPEC, on the other hand, had a surplus of $120 billion. This created problems both for the United States and for Yugoslavia, and underscored the importance of close consultations. (C)

Turning to the question of the non-aligned movement, the President emphasized the need for strengthening the movement, particularly in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. This had been discussed at Venice. The common position of the countries represented there was that the Soviet troops had to be totally withdrawn from Afghanistan. With this withdrawal, the United States would be willing to cooperate with other countries to help insure the establishment of a non-aligned Afghanistan and a government which corresponded to the will of the Afghan people. (C)

Soviet actions in Afghanistan, the President stressed, posed a serious challenge to detente. The U.S. response had been peaceful and designed to resolve the problems in Afghanistan without further bloodshed. The countries that were represented at Venice were united in demanding that Soviet troops had to be withdrawn from Afghanistan. This was the message that Secretary Muskie had delivered to Foreign Minister Gromyko,³ which Giscard had delivered to President Brezhnev, and which Chancellor Schmidt would take to Moscow in the next few days. They considered the Soviet action to be of great strategic importance and a great concern to all of them. The United States was also deeply concerned about the tone of terrorism, exemplified most vividly by the capture of 53 United States diplomats, an act supported by the Iranian Government. The United States was equally concerned about the terrorist acts against Yugoslav personnel and facilities in the United States. The President stressed that the Administration was determined to bring the perpetrators of these terrorist acts to trial and would do everything possible to prevent such acts in the future. (C)

Turning again to the international situation, President Carter stressed his commitment to see detente improved and to continue to seek better relations with the Soviet Union. He also emphasized his commitment to the reduction and control of nuclear weapons. The same spirit governed U.S. attitudes toward Iran. Once the hostages had been released, the United States would appreciate Yugoslav assistance in normalizing relations with Iran. The United States had no quarrel with the Iranian people but only with the terrorists who were illegally holding 53 U.S. diplomats. (C)

In closing, President Carter asked for President Mijatovic’s comments on the matters he had raised and expressed his willingness to answer any questions he might have. (U)

President Mijatovic began by noting that the Yugoslav leadership was deeply interested in President Carter’s views and grateful for his presentation. He stated that he wanted to discuss international problems from the Yugoslav point of view. Yugoslavia, he emphasized, was deeply concerned about the deterioration of the international situation which had occurred recently in all areas except Zimbabwe. Particularly worrisome was the deterioration of relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China. In the Yugoslav view, it was impossible to improve detente without an improvement in these relationships. Tito had expressed this view and the new Yugoslav leadership had reiterated it both to Brezhnev and to Hua Guofeng. The leadership had the impression that both leaders shared their concern but it was quite apparent that they had different views on how the matters could be resolved. In the Yugoslav view, dialogue between the major powers was important, if only to stop the current deterioration of relations. (C)

Turning to the situation in the non-aligned movement, President Mijatovic said that although the situation today was not entirely comparable with the situation in 1961 when the NAM extended its appeal to the big powers to hold discussions, there were many similarities. Today there was a similar danger of great power confrontation. The situation required frankness. The Yugoslavs had the feeling that they could talk to the United States frankly and openly, which was not the case with some of their other partners. In their view, it was important to stand aside from any attempt to involve other countries in great power conflicts, and they wished to abstain from any act that would complicate problems. On the contrary, they believed they should try to improve the situation. Patience was needed in order to preserve the spirit of dialogue. This was the essence of Tito’s policy. Tito and all of the new Yugoslav leadership recognized the changes introduced in international politics in recent years by President Carter’s Administration and regarded them positively. They expected the United States to persist in this line, and their conviction had been reinforced by the President’s arrival statement and by what he had said in this meeting. They very much appreciated his views. (C)

Turning to the question of blocs, President Mijatovic said that Yugoslavia’s position was well known but Yugoslavia was not a priori against blocs. It evaluated the situation from the standpoint of non-alignment—i.e. to what extent the policy of a particular country contributed to peace in the world. Yugoslavia did not build its relations at the expense of other countries nor on their closeness of views. They insisted on observance of this point. Yugoslavia did not and would not give up that principle. The Yugoslav leadership, he stressed, very much appreciated the fact that the United States accepted Yugoslavia as it was and because it was as it was. (C)

Returning to the question of blocs, President Mijatovic posed a few questions. What were President Carter’s expectations regarding future U.S.-Soviet relations, SALT II and SALT III? He also wanted to know President Carter’s view about the triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union and China and the Soviet contention that China was a dangerous superpower. (C)

President Carter replied that he had listened with interest to President Mijatovic’s presentation about the prospects for peace, which he had characterized as disappointing. He had thought that the U.S. and Soviet Union had been making good progress leading up to the meeting with President Brezhnev in Vienna last year. He had believed, and continued to believe, that SALT II was in the interest of the people of the world. The American people had accepted the agreement with approval and gratitude, and the Administration had been making good progress toward the treaty’s ratification. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had approved the treaty without any amendments that posed major problems. The Administration had cleared the Senate calendar for the first part of the year so that it could devote top priority to the ratification of the SALT agreement. The unexpected Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, had greatly upset the American people and dealt a severe blow to trust in the Soviet Union. With the invasion of Afghanistan, it had been impossible to ratify the treaty. He wanted to stress, however, that the United States was continuing to observe the terms of the treaty and would continue to do so as long as the Soviets did. (C)

Even without prior Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States was willing to discuss TNF with the Soviet Union, including SS–20’s and was willing to discuss also issues such as SALT III. Chancellor Schmidt would repeat the same message to the Soviets next week when he went to Moscow. But the Soviets so far had been unwilling to discuss TNF or SALT III. (C)

Continuing, President Carter emphasized that the United States recognized the clear danger to detente presented by any worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations. He was determined that this would not happen. But this did not mean we would accept the invasion as an accomplished fact. We would do all we could to obtain the withdrawal of Soviet troops. (C)

Turning to China, the President noted that more than a year ago the United States had normalized its relations with China. Since then, relations had deepened; indeed they were better than the United States anticipated they would be at this time. The President stressed that we did not intend to use our relationship against the USSR and that we would not sell weapons to the PRC. The United States had a long-standing commitment to stability in Southeast Asia, and believed that its new relationship with China would be a stabilizing factor in the area. (C)

Responding to President Mijatovic’s question about the buildup of China as a superpower, President Carter stated that the United States did not see this as happening in the near future. China had no weapons that could threaten Japan. As far as the United States could determine, its land forces were aimed at the Soviet Union. China had made an incursion into Vietnam, an action which the United States had opposed and condemned. The United States shared the concern of many of the nations regarding Vietnam’s occupation of Kampuchea. From Ankara,⁴ Secretary Muskie would go on to Kuala Lumpur to meet with the ASEAN leaders to discuss the prospects for stability in Asia.⁵ This was in line with the basic desire of the United States to see stability in Asia and other areas strengthened. (C)

Turning to the Arab-Israeli dispute, the President said that the Palestinian question and the question of Jerusalem had not yet been resolved, and he could not predict when success would come. However, the United States saw no alternative to the Camp David process which would be acceptable to both parties involved. The United States would continue to assist Egypt and Israel as long as they believed progress could be achieved. If, however, this proved unfeasible, the United States would be willing to join with other countries to look at other alternatives. (C)

President Mijatovic thanked President Carter for his presentation. He said that he could fairly say that the Yugoslav leadership was satisfied with the viewpoints that President Carter had outlined and with his constructive efforts in the international area. Stating that he wished to elaborate on some of the points which President Carter had mentioned, he noted that the schedule would have to be expedited somewhat in order to leave time for a discussion of bilateral relations. (C)

Turning first to the Middle East, he said that according to their information, neither the efforts of the United States nor the efforts of others had succeeded in solving the main problem of the Arab-Israeli dispute: the Palestinian problem. President Tito had reiterated that Yugoslavia supports any action which leads to progress toward resolving the Middle East crisis. Yugoslavia feared that the present stagnation reduced any prospect for resolving the crisis. (C)

President Carter interjected that the United States would appreciate any assistance which Yugoslavia could give in resolving the present problems in the Middle East. (C)

President Mijatovic replied that in May 1948 in the United Nations Yugoslavia had proposed the formation of a Palestinian state. If this had been done, it was conceivable that there would be no Palestinian problem today. Yugoslavia did not say that it was almighty or that the NAM could solve everything. However, there was utility in working jointly to try to resolve the problem and to look for solutions that would bring the parties more closely together. Yugoslavia feared that if the present stagnation persisted the policy of the Rejectionist Front⁶ would take a negative direction and find support on the other side. This could lead to a very serious problem in a part of the world that was very vulnerable. In Yugoslavia’s opinion, it would be worthwhile if the United States showed patience in order to build up confidence and trust within the Rejectionist Front. He suggested that the U.S. should listen to the suggestions of the Rejectionist Front, at least as a sort of gesture. At some point, this might pay off. (C)

President Carter replied that there were two key points to any resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict:

• —Commitment to Israel’s security and
• —Resolution of Palestinian rights.

He noted that it would be helpful if the PLO would change its avowed position on the destruction of Israel and accept UN Resolution 242. Their failure to do this was an important obstacle to any settlement. He again stressed that the United States would welcome and appreciate any help Yugoslavia could give to help it improve relations with countries of the Rejectionist Front, especially Iraq. In this connection, he mentioned Dr. Brzezinski’s visit to Algeria which had been aimed at improving relations with that country.⁷ In conclusion, he noted that U.S. and Yugoslav views coincided but that the PLO had to accept UN Resolution 242. (C)

Foreign Minister Vrhovec interjected that Yugoslavia had already discussed these matters with Iraq. In principle, Iraq was ready to normalize relations but they posed some restrictions. He also noted that President Qadhafi had recently contacted Yugoslavia and expressed his interest in meeting with President Carter to resolve U.S.-Libyan problems and had signaled his desire for a normalization of U.S.-Libyan relations. (C)

President Mijatovic then turned to the question of Iran. He noted that Yugoslavia didn’t agree with the holding of the hostages. The leadership was aware that this was a sensitive problem for the American people and others, and they had made this clear to Iran. He stressed, however, that actions which made Iran nervous could have the opposite effect. The forces in Iran were not united and any action which increased their nervousness could push Iran in the wrong direction and compel it to lean more heavily on the other side. (C)

President Mijatovic then stated he wished to say a few words about Afghanistan. There was no need to repeat Yugoslavia’s basic position on Afghanistan, which was well known. Yugoslavia understood the views and approach of the United States but felt both countries should move in the same direction—toward a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Yugoslavia, he stressed, could never accept occupation of Afghanistan. There was no way this could be justified on any grounds. Yugoslavia had a very firm and principled view on this. (C)

The reestablishment of a genuine non-aligned and independent Afghanistan was an essential element of Yugoslavia’s approach. This included, however, withdrawal of Soviet troops. In recent months, Yugoslavia had held consultations with the NAM on this question. It felt that the NAM should consider this as well as other crises of instability in the world. The meeting in New Delhi in January would have to condemn all invasions, including Afghanistan. The Soviets knew this, and this is why they were worried. (C)

President Carter interjected to ask Yugoslavia’s view on the Muslim delegation and if they had any relations with the freedom fighters in Afghanistan, who were struggling for self-determination. (C)

Turning to the second part of the President’s question first, Foreign Minister Vrhovec stated that Yugoslavia did not have contacts with the freedom fighters. Their knowledge was based on reports they received through their Ambassador in Kabul. Based on these reports, their impression was that the Soviets were having, and were likely to have for some time to come, a difficult time in Afghanistan. (S)

Concerning the Committee of Three formed at the last Islamic Conference, there was some concern about the size of the Committee and whether or not the Committee should be broadened. It was important that Algeria gave complete support to the second meeting. In this regard, Foreign Minister Vrhovec noted that Yugoslavia had contact with all the Ministers, including Ghotbzadeh, Foreign Minister of Iran. The Yugoslavs believed that the orientation and approach of Pakistan was sounder than Iran’s, and Yugoslavia had suggested that the Pakistanis should persist in their political initiatives. The Yugoslavs believed that their constructive political action contributed to pressure for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. (S)

Turning to Iran, Mr. Kolisevski noted that Foreign Minister Vrhovec had been in contact with Ghotbzadeh and that he himself had also talked with Bani-Sadr in Algiers at the time that Dr. Brzezinski had been there. He had gotten the impression at that time that the Iranians wanted to solve the hostage issue but there was a problem of their internal situation. The U.S. had been informed about Foreign Minister Vrhovec’s discussions with Ghotbzadeh through its Ambassador. The Yugoslavs had told Iran that they could not support the holding of the hostages. (C)

President Mijatovic said he would like to make a point about disarmament. It was important to do something to halt the futile situation regarding disarmament, and he felt it would be worthwhile to take an initiative at Madrid. He also felt that a well prepared conference on disarmament in Europe would be useful. He praised President Carter’s readiness to observe the SALT II treaty, which he claimed would be an important contribution to arms control. (C)

He then turned to a discussion of international economic relations and expressed Yugoslavia’s disappointment at the current state of North-South negotiations. In Yugoslavia’s view, this was one of the reasons for the current economic situation. If this continued, conflicts were bound to increase. Yugoslavia advocated the greatest possible flexibility on the part of the developed and the developing countries, even though there was a lack of equality. The Yugoslavs believed that a more flexible attitude on the part of the United States would be of immense importance. They recognized that it would not be possible to make a radical change, but some new initiative was needed to demonstrate forward progress and that the process was not totally dead. In Yugoslavia’s view, U.S. prestige would be enhanced in the NAM and the world at large by such an initiative. Such an initiative would also have a positive influence on Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union, he stressed, had an unreasonable attitude toward relations between the developing and the developed world. (C)

President Carter replied that North-South relations had been a matter of considerable discussion in Venice. The heads of state represented there had directed their Ministers to develop better ways and means to aid the developing countries. The United States itself had undertaken a number of measures in this regard, including reducing trade barriers to imports from the developing world. The Soviet Union, however, had done very little, except helping Cuba. Similarly, the OPEC countries had done very little except with other Arab countries. The President stressed his strong commitment to improve relations between the developed and the developing world. In addition to what the countries represented in Venice were already doing, they would make an intense analysis of the situation in the coming months. (C)

President Carter then suggested that the discussions could be continued at the State dinner that evening and at the breakfast the next morning, joking that he did not want his first action in Yugoslavia to make all of the Yugoslav leadership late for lunch. (U)

President Mijatovic agreed, saying that they could reserve bilateral relations for breakfast. (U)

As the meeting was about to break up, Mr. Kolisevski asked if it would be possible to get satellite shots of mineral and water resources in Yugoslavia, especially since the United States had given such photographs to Bulgaria. (U)

President Carter agreed, noting that he had given a book of photographs to President Tito during his visit in March 1978 and told him that if he needed more, the United States could supply them. The President said it would be easy for us to supply such photographs, and we would be glad to do it. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 6/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Palace of the Federation.
2. President Carter traveled to Venice to take part in the G–7 Economic Summit June 21–24.
3. Muskie met Gromyko in Vienna May 15–16 on the occasion of the Anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty.
4. Muskie traveled to Ankara for the NATO Ministerial meeting June 25–26.
5. June 27–29.
6. Front of the Palestinian Forces Rejecting Solutions of Surrender. The group formed in 1974 and rejected the Palestinian Liberation Organization “Ten Point” Program adopted that year, which called for the establishment of a Palestinian state over any piece of Palestinian territory under PLO control.
7. Brzezinski traveled to Algeria October 31–November 3 on the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the Algerian Revolution.