293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia1

154447. Subject: Vice President’s June 11 Meeting With Yugoslav Ambassador Loncar.

1. (C-entire text).

2. Begin summary: The Vice President met with Yugoslav Ambassador Loncar for half an hour on June 11. Loncar, who had just come from a meeting with Treasury Secretary Miller where the Yugoslav [Page 959] balance of payments problem was discussed (septel),2 asked for the meeting in order to follow up on the Vice President’s attendance at the Tito funeral.3 The Vice President stressed how impressed he was at the way the new leadership is handling Yugoslavia’s problems and expressed concern about the Yugoslav financial situation and anti-Yugoslav terrorism. Loncar expressed pleasure with the unprecedented progress in US-Yugoslav relations and discussed the President’s visit and dynamics of the Nonaligned Movement. The Vice President said he would like to meet periodically with Loncar to discuss Yugoslav developments. End summary.

3. The Vice President opened the discussion by saying how impressed he had been during the Tito funeral at the sense of confidence of the new leadership and the Yugoslav people. Paraphrasing Mark Twain, he said that press reports of the problems of post-Tito Yugoslavia were grossly exaggerated. Tito had used the years well in preparing for the transition to a new leadership. Post-Tito Yugoslavia certainly faces problems but the prospects for success in dealing with them are good. The Vice President noted that Loncar had just come from a meeting with Secretary Miller at which Yugoslavia’s financial problems were discussed. This was a matter of concern to all of us and we hope we could be helpful. The Vice President referred to the bombing of Yugoslav DCM Sindjelic’s house as an outrage and pointed to the difficulties we had in educating other countries about US law. US law enforcement authorities are making a major effort to find those responsible for this crime. The Vice President referred to the “full court press” the FBI had instituted at the time of the Tito funeral to prevent terrorist incidents.

4. Loncar expressed gratitude for being received by the Vice President and said that he was glad that he had been in Yugoslavia for the funeral—not only to pay condolences to Tito but also to see the country during a unique period in its history where self-confidence and complete unity were reflected. He said his meeting with Secretary Miller had been useful and that the GOY hoped that the USG and the Secretary of the Treasury would be able to help with Yugoslavia’s [Page 960] financial problems. Loncar said that Miller had expressed gratification with Yugoslavia’s stabilization program.

5. The Vice President pointed out that he had brought Secretary Miller along on his delegation to the funeral because of our desire to be helpful.

6. Loncar continued that through its efforts to help Yugoslavia over this financial problem the US had an opportunity to broaden ties with Yugoslavia in all fields—military, economic and political. On the terrorism issue he said that the most important fact was that progress was being made. He had told Attorney General Civiletti what he thought was good and what needed improvement in US efforts to control terrorism and he did not want to go over the same ground again but that the arrest of only a few more terrorists would do much to control the problem.

7. Turning to the President’s visit, Loncar referred to the pioneering role which the Vice President had had in his 1977 visit to Yugoslavia which came after four bad years in US-Yugoslav relations. This is the perfect time for President Carter to come, capping the remarkable progress made in the last three years. Loncar referred to the great popularity which President Carter enjoys in Yugoslavia particularly after the statements he made concerning US policy toward Yugoslavia in February of this year and at the time of Tito’s death. Loncar said that the visit was taking place at a time of tension in international affairs and that the Yugoslav leadership would be ready to discuss these problems forthrightly. The very solid US-Yugoslav relationship is one which has a wider impact which Yugoslavia can use. However, Loncar cautioned that it would be important not to sound confrontational notes about US-Soviet relations during the President’s visit since this would create problems for Yugoslavia and diminish the importance of the visit. The Vice President assured Loncar of the President’s understanding on this point.

8. Loncar continued with the description of the dynamics of the nonaligned movement leading up to the Havana Summit and beyond. Discussing Yugoslav and Cuban proposals for a NAM Ministerial, Loncar said there were two issues. One issue was the location of the conference and here Yugoslavia and others had been insisting that the conference must be in Sri Lanka, Tanzania or Indonesia or there would be no conference. More important than the form was the substance and here Yugoslavia was very active to insure the proper focus. The Vice President assured Loncar of our appreciation of the constructive role which Yugoslavia played in the nonaligned movement.

9. In closing the Vice President told Loncar he would welcome the opportunity to continue this kind of exchange in the future.

Muskie
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800286–0874. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Barry; cleared by Clift and Larrabee; approved by Barry.
  2. The meeting on June 11 between Miller and Loncar was reported in telegram 155726 to Belgrade, June 12. In the meeting, Loncar informed Miller that the Yugoslav Government found Rockefeller’s suggestion of a $500 million syndicated loan as insufficient, and that the Yugoslav Government hoped to keep U.S. and Canadian loans separate from European loans. Miller told Loncar that, if the Yugoslav Government presented its case well and prepared the groundwork, it might be able to get more than Rockefeller suggested initially, if indeed its case was strong. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800288–0545)
  3. Mondale was in Belgrade May 5–8. For the Embassy’s report on his conversation with Yugoslav leaders, see Document 290.