Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

290. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

Belgrade, May 8, 1980, 0855Z

3621. Subj: Tito Funeral: VP Mondale Bilateral With Kolisevski.

1. S-entire text.

2. Summary: SFRY Presidency President Lazar Kolisevski met for a special bilateral with Vice President Mondale shortly after the Vice President’s arrival in Belgrade on May 7 at the head of the US delegation to the funeral of Yugoslav President Tito.² Accompanying the Vice President were Secretary of the Treasury Miller; Ambassador Eagleburger; Assistant Secretary George Vest; New York Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Anthony Solomon; Deputy Assistant to the President David Aaron; and Assistant to the Vice President Denis Clift. Yugoslavs present in addition to Kolisevski included Foreign Secretary Josip Vrhovec; FEC Vice President Dr. Ivo Margan; and (former) Ambassador Dimce Belovski. Although besieged with the presence of almost 100 high level foreign delegations in Belgrade for the funeral, President Kolisevski alloted an hour to the meeting, which was marked by an extremely friendly and open atmosphere. This memorandum has been cleared by the Vice President’s staff.

3. Subjects covered, on the U.S. side: Great respect and admiration for President Tito and sorrow at his passing; confidence in Yugoslavia’s future; U.S. support for the independence, sovereignty and unity of Yugoslavia, and readiness to assist Yugoslavia if asked; U.S. concern over our hostages in Tehran; U.S. determination to curb anti-Yugoslav terrorism; and our wish to pursue detente but deep concern over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

4. Subjects covered by the Yugoslavs: Genuine appreciation for the expressions of concern from President Carter and the American people during President Tito’s illness; approval of the current excellent state of bilateral relations; a desire to accomplish more in the international struggle against terrorism; an assertion that the Tehran hostage situation will be raised by Foreign Secretary Vrhovec during a planned meeting in Belgrade with Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh;³ apprehension over the deteriorating international situation, especially in Soviet-U.S. relations; and the desire somehow to re-engage the Non-Aligned Movement in putting detente back on the rails. End summary.

5. President Kolisevski opened the meeting by saying that he had just read a message reporting what the President had said about President Tito prior to the Vice President’s departure from Washington.⁴ This is very much appreciated. The Vice President stated that he had been asked by President Carter to convey the deep regret and sorrow of the entire American people at the passing of President Tito, one of the great leaders of this generation and true hero. The Vice President said he had come to Belgrade to represent the President and the American people, to memorialize a great human being. This may be a time of sadness, but “the victory of Tito’s life stands as an example for us all.”

6. The Vice President observed that his personal sorrow is all the greater because of having met President Tito, first in 1977 when the Vice President was the first visitor of this administration to Yugoslavia. Also remembered vividly is his meeting in 1978 in Washington when President Tito last visited the U.S.

7. President Kolisevski wanted the Vice President to know how much the words of friendship and support by President Carter in the last months had been appreciated by President Tito. He recalled that the day that President Tito was first to be operated upon, with Foreign Secretary Vrhovec and LCY Presiding Officer Doronjski he had visited the President in the hospital in Ljubljana. Together they had reviewed the world situation. President Tito had decided to send a message to President Carter.⁵ When he had recovered somewhat, President Tito had insisted on reviewing the draft text of the message to President Carter, because he placed such great importance on their personal relationship. Then, President Tito had received the message from President Carter. Its personal nature had touched him very much, Kolisevski asserted. Tito recalled with particular appreciation the first sentence in that letter, in which President Carter had said that he and his wife Roslyn were praying for his recovery.⁶

8. Turning to our bilateral relationship, President Kolisevski noted that the statements of U.S. support for Yugoslavia from various American leaders since President Tito fell ill “have been positively assessed.” He hoped the Vice President did not think he was exaggerating, but Ambassador Eagleburger could confirm that the Yugoslav people have received President Tito’s death with dignity, calm, and with resolution. Perhaps it would come as a surprise to some, but there has not been the slightest disturbance throughout the country. It is almost as if the Secretary for Internal Affairs has nothing to do.

9. Kolisevski also observed that it is the Yugoslav hope that during these solemn days, Belgrade would become “an oasis of peace”. The current leaders of Yugoslavia had worked together with Tito in the revolution and in building a new political system, and in the struggle for peace. “Therefore, we consider the accomplishments you see as both his and ours.” The Yugoslav people, who suffered 1.7 million casualties in World War II have overcome great tribulations to secure their independence, and will continue to endure further if necessary. “We know how to defend ourselves. As for our independence and sovereignty, we will make no concessions to anyone, at any time.” He added “This is why we approve the public stance you have taken.”

10. Vice President Mondale said that when he first came to Yugoslavia in 1977 he had occasion to express American support for Yugoslav sovereignty and unity, and also approval for Yugoslavia’s role as leader in the Non-Aligned Movement. We continue “to stand ready, as your friend, to be of assistance in ways you might think proper and appropriate, to achieve your objectives.” He added, “I come here today, expressly at the direction of the President, to repeat these assurances of our friendship and our confidence in your leaders.”

11. The Vice President continued that in the past three years our bilateral relationship has become as good as it had ever been. The relationship between our two Presidents had gone beyond that which usually develops between Chiefs of State. President Carter greatly relied on President Tito’s judgment as a statesman and on his vast knowledge of the world. We are prepared, the Vice President continued, further to develop and broaden that relationship through future high level political meetings or discussions at a technical level, on economic assistance or in the military area. He noted that Secretary of the Treasury Miller and Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Solomon were present. President Kolisevski suggested that separate discussions be held between Messrs. Miller and Solomon with Federal Executive Council Vice President Ikonic and with Minister of Finance Kostic. As for the military area, Kolisevski said that he thought both sides are adequately in touch. Vice President Mondale agreed, observing that General Graves had recently visited Belgrade.

12. Turning to the subject of anti-Yugoslav violence in the U.S., Vice President Mondale noted there are now 17 criminals in U.S. prisons. The Carter administration is bitterly opposed to terrorism. He could assure President Kolisevski that at this particularly sensitive time, U.S. security authorities all over the country have been alerted to increase protection of Yugoslav establishments. Mr. Aaron added that as a member of the National Security Council he had taken part in several meetings with the Department of Justice and could add his assurances that our police are as alert as they could be.

13. Kolisevski was glad to hear this. Similar assurances had been received from several countries in Western Europe. This is a very important subject. Acts of terror can only hinder relationships between countries. The holding of U.S. hostages in Tehran is a good example of this. Relations between two countries can be harmed even if the acts of terror are carried out between agents of other countries. Interference by intelligence services of third countries can do great harm by fomenting violence, Kolisevski continued.

14. Vice President Mondale thanked President Kolisevski for his remark about our hostages. This has been a terrible experience for Americans. Every successful act of terrorism enhances what the terrorists seek, which is the very antithesis of civilization. Kolisevski said that the GOY has tried to do what it could in the hostage situation but it had not been much. He noted that Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh will be meeting Foreign Secretary Vrhovec in Belgrade and will raise the hostage situation. We will tell them “Keeping the hostages only shows that the revolution is still unstable, and that this undermines the stability of the region.”

15. Kolisevski asked whether the American side is interested in meeting with Ghotbzadeh in Belgrade. Vice President Mondale replied that he thought this would be inappropriate. Mr. Aaron said that it would be particularly appreciated if the Yugoslavs could learn anything at all about the physical condition of our hostages, who have now been moved out of our Embassy compound. The Vice President added that it is all the more important now that regular visits to the hostages by the Red Cross or other agencies be allowed.

16. The Vice President said that he believes Ghotbzadeh has tried to be as helpful as any Iranian leader during this situation, as to some extent has Bani-Sadr. Kolisevski observed that the pressure from the religious conservatives “on progressive and democratic elements” is enormous. Foreign Secretary Vrhovec plans to discuss with Ghotzbadeh “the entire complex of questions” in the area, and would let us know what transpires. The Vice President said that would be much appreciated.

17. Secretary Vhrovec said that he would like to add a few words more about the general subject of international terrorism. It is perhaps correct to say that we do not always mean the same thing when we use this term. Americans, he said, take the word terrorism in a narrow sense, a particular act or event, and the Yugoslavs take a broader view. Perhaps it would be good to seek a common definition of terrorism after which we could address the situation more efficiently. Vrhovec wanted to emphasize however that cooperation between the two countries in this area has gone very far indeed. He recalled discussions in Washington in 1978 between Presidents Carter and Tito, and also what the Vice President said himself personally on this subject. Former visits to the U.S. by Tito had in some sense been marred by unpleasant moments, but the last visit to Washington President Tito had cherished. Tito frequently recalled that in discussing the visit with his colleagues he felt that real progress had been made on the key issue of violence.

18. President Kolisevski observed that Yugoslavia for years has one of the world’s best records for lack of terrorist activity on its soil. But, he added, Yugoslav Ambassadors and diplomats have been attacked abroad and killed. Their Ambassador to Sweden had been brutally murdered in 1971 and “his murderers have been roaming around free.” In this the U.S. shares a common, sad experience.

19. At this point, Kolisevski thought, enough has been said about this unfortunate topic. He inquired about the prospects for relations between the U.S. and USSR. He asked if the Vice President thought detente would survive. In recent discussions with Guinean President Sekou Toure it had been decided to try to “consolidate” efforts within the non-aligned to see if something cannot be done to restore momentum toward detente. However, Kolisevski observed, much more depends on the U.S. and USSR.

20. Vice President Mondale recalled that the Carter administration entered into office profoundly committed to detente, to concluding negotiations for SALT II, Force Reductions in Europe, and the Comprehensive Test Ban. We were prepared to expand our political relationship with the Soviet Union. “I regret to say,” the Vice President stated, “that no other aspect in our administration has proven more disappointing.” SALT II, the centerpiece of our relationship with the Soviet Union, was going to be ratified. As presiding officer of the Senate he had been working on this, and was then confident that it would be ratified. Now, the Soviets had invaded a neighbor. “In my opinion this is one of the worst international acts since World War II.” This has soured feelings greatly in America, as Ambassador Belovski knows.

21. The Vice President said Americans must now ponder the impact of the Soviet action. If the Soviet Union can invade Afghanistan today why not some other country tomorrow? This is profoundly disturbing.

22. The Vice President continued, we nonetheless want to find a solution to world problems, and we have offered that our new Secretary of State, Ed Muskie, meet with Gromyko this month in Vienna. We have not had a response from the Soviets yet.

23. The Vice President observed that the U.S. had found it disappointing, as he supposes it was disappointing to Tito himself, that in this extremely complex situation the Non-Aligned Movement has not been able to assert leadership. Can the principles of international respect and non-intervention be restored? These are fundamental principles for humanity. If these are not observed what are the prospects for peace in the long run?

24. President Kolisevski noted that, since the Afghan invasion, Foreign Secretary Vhrovec has visited India, Bangladesh and Iraq. This question has risen everywhere. The Afghan crisis is not essentially a crisis within the Non-Aligned Movement but its coordinator is Cuba and this complicates matters. Yugoslavia has suggested a Non-Aligned Ministerial meeting to focus on general principles and not on specific events for “we do not wish to see the movement split.” The NAM must focus on reestablishing respect for the vital principles of international conduct. This is still being discussed in Belgrade. It was with Sekou Toure and will be with the Iraqis and also Kaunda.

25. President Kolisevski also recalled that in his last letter to Brezhnev President Tito called for a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and appealed to him to let the Afghan people settle their own affairs according to their own wishes and traditions. Kolisevski said this also had been stated by the Yugoslavs publicly. This position is very much appreciated, Vice President Mondale said.

26. He then thanked President Kolisevski for the time he had taken during a day with such a heavy schedule. Their discussion was a most useful opportunity to review the U.S. commitment to a strong and friendly relationship, and to say again that the U.S. is prepared to assist, as and if the Yugoslavs find appropriate.

27. President Kolisevski asked Vice President Mondale to convey on behalf of all the peoples of Yugoslavia best wishes to President Carter “for his own success and for the well being of your country.”

Eagleburger

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800227–1187. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to the White House. Drafted by Dunlop; cleared by Clift.
2. Lazar Kolisevski had been elected on May 15, 1979, as Vice President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia for a one-year term. Upon Tito’s death on May 4, he assumed the office of the Presidency. He was replaced by Cvijetin Mijatovic on May 15, 1980. See Document 288.
3. See footnote 18, Document 288.
4. See footnote 9, Document 288.
5. On February 21, Eagleburger was asked by Vrhovec to deliver the text of Tito’s letter to Carter. Vrhovec explained that Tito had approved the text of the letter prior to falling gravely ill, and, while he could not sign it at the present time, wished that its contents be delivered to Carter. Kolisevski signed a cover letter to Carter. Tito’s letter dealt extensively with the Yugoslav opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Tito’s concern that détente be preserved by any possible means. (Telegram 1401 from Belgrade, February 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870123–0484)
6. Carter responded to Tito’s February 20 letter on February 25. The text of the letter to President Tito, and the covering note to Vice President Kolisevski were sent to Belgrade and Eagleburger was instructed to deliver them as soon as possible to Kolisevski. In his letter to Tito, Carter emphasized his desire to see détente revived, but blamed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations. Carter also expressed his thanks for the Yugoslav position on the release of U.S. hostages from Iran and assured Tito of his administration’s continued support for Yugoslavia. (Telegram WH80281 to Belgrade, February 25; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 22, Yugoslavia: President Josip Broz Tito, 6/79–2/80)