Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

286. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

Belgrade, March 29, 1980, 0819Z

2514. Military addressees handle as Specat Exclusive. For Under Secretary Nimetz. Please pass DOD/ISA McGiffert and CNO. Subject: Military Relationship With Yugoslavia. Refs: A) Belgrade 2473,² B) Belgrade 2474,³ C) Belgrade 2471,⁴ D) State 6062.⁵

1. S-entire text

2. We appear to be on the verge of a major breakthrough in our military cooperation with the Yugoslavs. We need to grab hold of the moment, because if we let it slip through our fingers this time it is not likely to come soon again.

3. Refs A and B report Yugoslav requests for the sale of MK–46 torpedos and the Harpoon missile system. Ref C indicates that we may soon receive a request for the sale of 6 F5E/F aircraft. And, we today signed an LOA for some 27 million dols worth of AN/TPS–63 radars. In short, we seem to have overcome the Dragon missile setback; the Yugoslav military has, clearly at the highest levels, decided to move—and in some highly visible areas—in our direction.

4. It is, I believe, absolutely essential that we react positively (and hopefully quickly) to the MK–46 and Harpoon requests, and to the F5E/F request should it be forthcoming. The GOY, and particularly General Ljubicic, will be a lost cause if we now say no on either the MK–46 or the F5E/F. Honesty compels me to admit, however, that a no on the Harpoon, while it will not sit well, will probably not repeat not have the adverse impact that a rejection in either of the other two cases would entail particularly in light of ref D. Conversely, an affirmative reply on the Harpoon would be a major statement of our support at a time when such signals will have a substantial and lasting impact on the attitudes and outlook of people of critical importance to us in the years ahead.

5. My earlier experience in the Pentagon leads me to believe that the Navy, for understandable and respectable reasons, will probably question the wisdom of release of either the MK–46 or Harpoon to the Yugoslavs. Unless I miss my guess, they will put forth at least two arguments: A) there can be no guarantee that Yugoslavia will not transfer to the Soviets, or permit them to examine, the weapons systems in question; B) Yugoslavia, as a potential opponent, should not be sold weapons systems that could be used against US forces.

6. These are perfectly legitimate concerns for which there is no completely satisfactory response. As in everything having to do with foreign policy, the balance of pros and cons must be struck in individual cases. The arguments in response to the straw horse I may have created in para 5 are, as I see them, basically three: they are, admittedly, judgmental in character. The first, the political advantage to the US—particularly at a time when Tito is on his deathbed—has been made by me so many times in so many ways that I will not (you will be relieved to learn) burden you with a repetition here. Suffice it to say that on political grounds alone I believe the USG would be well advised to approve release of both the MK–46 and Harpoon to Yugoslavia.

7. As to the question of transfer of the technology, all I can say is that we have no evidence that such has been the case before, nor is there any reason to believe that it would happen now, when Yugoslav-Soviet relations are at a nadir, or in the future. All the evidence we have indicates that the GOY is meticulous in refusing to discuss with any third party its military relationship—much less the intimate details of the weapons involved—with any arms supplier. We have been held at arms length when we have tried to talk about Yugoslav purchases from the USSR or others, and understand that others have encountered a similar attitude. Thus, in my judgment (a judgment fully concurred in by the DATT), an argument that the Yugoslavs might transfer the technology is, at best, a worst case judgment supported by no evidence or experience to date.

8. So far as the question of Yugoslavia as a potential enemy is concerned, I find it hard to envisage a situation in which this would be a likely event. But, again, using a worst case analysis, it would seem to me that any war in which the Yugoslavs would be engaged against us would be one of such magnitude that the Yugoslav contribution would be negligible at best. What seems far more likely is that the Yugoslavs, who have always contended that, if attacked by the Soviets, they will do all they can to drag the West into the struggle, see both the MK–46 and the Harpoon as means for keeping the Adriatic open as a highway for resupply and perhaps reenforcement from the West. While we may not much enjoy contemplating the course of conduct for ourselves that such thinking would imply, we can hardly take issue with the rationale or point of view behind it.

9. One further word on what may be going on in Yugoslav minds right now that has led to the rather startling turn in our direction. As Washington knows, Yugoslav-Soviet relations have been getting steadily worse, especially since the Afghan invasion. The Yugoslavs have been surprisingly open in their condemnation of the Soviets, and in their efforts to lead the Non-Aligned to condemn the Soviet aggression. The Soviets have reacted, as one might expect. But the reaction has been surprisingly harsh, and getting more so. While this is not the place to attempt an analysis of the reasons for the Soviet reaction, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that it is, at least in part, an attempt to cow the post-Tito leadership ab initio, in the belief that over the long haul Moscow will gain more by applying the baseball bat at a time of uncertainty and fear in Belgrade than by a display of patience and forebearance. Equally, we might assume that the GOY, from fear or a desire to show Moscow it cannot be pushed around (or both), has decided to strengthen its military cooperation with the US, knowing that the Soviets will learn of the move. If this is the case, then we have a great deal to lose—and not just in the military sphere—by actions on our part that imply to the new Yugoslav leadership that it had better accommodate while it can because the West is unprepared to offer much more than tea and sympathy.⁶

10. There is a term (which I have now forgotten) in the science of logic for the process of setting up false arguments so that by knocking them down you support your own case. I may have engaged in that practice in this cable. But the facts are nonetheless clear:

—Tito is dying, and Yugoslavia is already moving into the post-Tito period;

—Yugoslav-Soviet relations are in a worse state than at any time since Tito more-or-less patched up his quarrel with Moscow in 1955;

—The GOY has turned to the US for military support on a scale not seen since the closing out of our MAP in the 1950’s.

11. Watersheds are seldom recognized as such at the time. But we may be in the middle of one so far as US-Yugoslav relations are concerned. It would behoove us, therefore, to act with a little imagination, since the payoff could be substantial. And since the Iranians already have both the MK–46 and Harpoon in their inventory, what do we really have to lose?

Eagleburger

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800158–0524. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to USCINCEUR. Larrabee and Kimmitt forwarded the telegram to Brzezinski under a March 31 memorandum, and recommended that a mini-SCC be held to discuss the sale of weapons systems to Yugoslavia. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, Yugoslavia, 1–11/80) On his copy of the telegram, Brzezinski approved the sale of MK–46 and F–5E, and instructed that the sale of the Harpoon missile not be denied outright. He also noted that Congress would have to be informed. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 69, Yugoslavia: Military: 4–9/80)
2. Not found.
3. Not found.
4. Not found.
5. In telegram 6062 to Belgrade, January 9, the Department informed the Embassy in Belgrade that, in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. Government had decided to “adopt a more forthcoming policy of approving sales to Yugoslavia.” The telegram instructed Eagleburger to inform Vrhovec that “this means the USG will be prepared to release more sophisticated weapons systems to Yugoslavia on a case by case basis should the extent and character of the military requirement warrant.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800015–0237)
6. On his copy, Brzezinski highlighted this sentence and wrote in the margin “this is a key p[oin]t.”