Office of the Historian

287. Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1

Washington, April 3, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Military Sales to Yugoslavia (C)

In preparation for a mini-SCC I met with Barry and Siena to discuss where we stand on release of the items in the Kimmitt/Larrabee memo of March 31, (Tab A).2 Siena reiterated what Kimmitt and I had noted in our memo: that we will need to notify Congress of any sales of the MK–46, HARPOON, and AN/TPS–63 radars. Current thinking in DOD is to treat each item individually and make a request for an exception through the National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) channel—a process that could take several weeks. (S)

Siena predicted that there will be opposition from the Navy on the sale of the MK–46 and HARPOON, though he thought the opposition to the MK–46 could probably be overcome. However, because of the danger of leaks he felt it very important that we go though the NDPC channel and not run roughshod over the Navy. If we attempted to circumvent the NDPC process, he felt sure there would be a leak, which would be extremely damaging to our military relationship with the Yugoslavs. He recommended postponing any mini-SCC until both the MK–46 and HARPOON had been discussed in the NDPC channel. Bob Barry concurred. (S)

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At the same time the group agreed that we should try to accelerate the release of the AN/TPS–63 radars. The problem is that the Yugoslavs have requested a custom-made radar, and the manufacture of such a radar takes time. However, Siena is looking into the possibility of arranging for the leasing of a similar radar on a stop-gap basis. (S)

We are also going back to Larry to get his views on whether a delay of several weeks will create problems with the Yugoslavs.3 (C)

In light of the fact that moving through the NDPC channel may take couple of weeks, there are two options:

  • 1. Hold a mini-SCC only on State’s political-military paper.
  • 2. Postpone the mini-SCC until the request for an exception for the HARPOON and MK–46 has gone through the NDPC channel and we have a clearer view of the attitude of the services. (S)

Under the circumstances I think it would be better to hold a mini-SCC on State’s Political-Military paper, and then hold a second mini-SCC on the bilateral/QUAD issues after the NDPC has had a chance to meet. In the meantime Kimmitt and I will have Komer, who has jurisdiction over the NDPC process, push the process as much as possible, and have Siena do what he can to accelerate release of the AN/TPS–63 radars. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: That we hold a mini-SCC on State’s paper only early next week and a second mini-SCC after the NDPC has met. Kimmitt and Brement concur.

_____ Mini-SCC on State Paper only.

_____ Mini-SCC on Bilateral/QUAD issues and State paper after NDPC process has been concluded.4

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 121, SCM 106, 1/18/80 Mini SCC, Yugoslavia. Secret; Sent for action.↩
  2. See Document 286 and footnote 1 thereto.↩
  3. On April 2, the Department informed the Embassy that the Department of Defense was not interested in holding an SCC meeting until the MK–46 and Harpoon issues had been decided. (Telegram 87420 to Belgrade, April 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800168–1123) On April 14, the Department informed Eagleburger that the two systems were being considered through the National Disclosure Policy Committee process. (Telegram 98480 to Belgrade, April 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800187–0739)↩
  4. Dodson wrote on the memorandum: “David—Let’s wait; do them together. Save yourself a meeting.” Aaron approved the second option. Dodson noted on the document: “OK to do together but push for fast resolution. Per DA”↩