274. Editorial Note
On January 12, 1980, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski informed President Jimmy Carter that the basic contingency plan for Allied support for Yugoslavia following Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito’s death had been completed. (See Document 275.) Tito’s advanced age and deteriorating health had set the stage for planning for his death for several years, with a first National Security Council contingency plan produced and adopted [Page 905] in April 1976. (See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976, Document 82.) On December 1, 1978, an interagency committee met to discuss updating the 1976 plan. A December 4 Central Intelligence Agency memorandum reported that the interagency committee decided a rewrite of the 1976 plan was required. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00634A, Production Case Files (1978), Box 5, Folder 19, Meeting on Post-Tito Yugoslavia [12/4/78]) On April 12, 1979, another meeting of the interagency committee produced a first draft of an updated contingency plan, which included a list of possible U.S. actions in the wake of Tito’s death and a memorandum for President Carter concerning the effect of Tito’s death on Yugoslavia. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 82T00150R, Production Case Files, Box 6, Folder 143, Meeting on Post-Tito Yugoslavia [4/16/79])
On November 2, 1979, the Department requested that the Embassy in Belgrade provide its own recommendation for the public statements President Carter would make at the time President Tito died. (Telegram 286331 to Belgrade, November 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790501–0739) In a November 2 response, the Embassy wrote that U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Lawrence Eagleburger “is nonetheless prepared to live with what you have [drafted] with one exception. He feels that the last paragraph, which reaffirms our support for independence, territorial integrity and unity is too weak and should be strengthened. What he suggests (which follows) he suspects will be too strong for your liking but points out that State ought to be pushing for as strong a commitment as possible, leaving it to the others, if they feel they must, to soften it.” (Telegram 8224 from Belgrade, November 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790503–0859)
Tito’s health continued to deteriorate throughout November and December 1979. By January 1980, the sclerosis of his veins and arteries and the developing gangrene in his left leg forced his doctors to amputate it as a last resort measure to save his life. A January 19, 1980, “Special Analysis” in the CIA’s National Intelligence Daily concluded that a smooth transfer of power from Tito to the collegial system of leadership established since the 1974 constitution would take place. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of December 1979 had heightened the perceived Soviet threat and would “serve to hold the new Yugoslav leader together during the first few months.” The Agency believed that in the short term, “the Soviets will not intervene militarily” and that “other forms of Soviet meddling or pressure during this period would only reinforce Yugoslav unity.” It acknowledged that in the long term “we are less sanguine about the prospects of Yugoslav unity—and Soviet restraint.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 82T00466R, Intelligence Publication Files (1980), Box 1, Folder 1, National Intelligence Daily)