267. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State1
6799. Military handle as Specat Exclusive. State for Under Secretary Newsom. ASD/ISA for Asst Secretary McGiffert. Subject: (S) The US-Yugoslav Military Relationship. Ref: 78 Belgrade 9176.2
1. S-entire text
2. I have, since returning from the US last month, reviewed the progress (or better, the lack thereof) in the US-Yugoslav military relationship. It is not a pretty picture, as the case studies detailed later in this cable will show. In fact, we have done so badly that I have come to doubt that the USG is capable of managing the program we set for ourselves several years ago; instead, I fear that we are on the way to convincing the Yugoslav military either that we were never serious or that we are incompetent. In either case, we risk damage not only to [Page 877] our effort to develop a relationship with the Yugoslav military but to our broader bilateral interests as well. Either we take steps now to get our act together or we should withdraw from the effort before further damage is done.
3. What has upset me most is our consistent failure to handle the potential Dragon purchase with even a modicum of competence. Paragraph 9, et. seq., details this sad story. Suffice it to say here that we have quoted wildly different prices to the Yugoslavs at least twice, offered Dragons that we then found were faulty, emphasized that we needed a GOY decision soon so that we would not have to reopen the production line (and thereby charge a substantially higher price), and then told them we would have to restart production (at a substantially higher price). The tragedy is that the Dragon buy was the first major opportunity for us to put our money where our mouth was and so far we have messed it up to a fare-thee-well.
4. The Dragon case is not the only mess we have made of things. In addition we have now lost, after more than two years of screwing around, a sale of dollars 1.7 million worth of 155 mm illuminating rounds. And—at least so it appears from here—we and the Yugoslavs seem to be well on the way to substantial misunderstanding about an air defense radar system that has been under discussion for some months. Just who—we or the Yugoslavs—has been most responsible for the confusion is not clear.
5. I do not contend that we know all the facts on any of these cases. There may well be extenuating circumstances that will explain why we have performed so miserably. But that is really beside the point: What is important to the GOY is that we are unable or unprepared to respond to Yugoslav requests in a timely and effective manner. We are flunking the reliability test, and for the Yugoslavs—in terms of their concerns about the future—a passing grade is a sine qua non.
6. Nor will I argue that the Yugoslavs have been without blame for the sad state in which we now find ourselves. They too have been less than efficient, as the air defense radar system case shows but it takes substantial ingenuity for a nation of 220 million people that prides itself on its tradition of efficiency to match the ineptitude of a Balkan nation of 22 million. We, alas, have succeeded.
7. The next meeting of the joint military working group is now tentatively scheduled for mid-October in Washington. So it is time to face up to some hard choices. Unless I can be assured that steps have been taken to get a firm grip on the management of our military program with Yugoslavia it is time to call off the noble but so far unsuccessful experiment. Either we tell the Yugoslavs at the October meeting that we are distressed at the way things have been going, that we know much of the fault lies on our side, that we will not permit [Page 878] things to continue as they are, and that steps have been taken at an appropriately high level in Washington to ensure that we do in fact do better, or we tell them frankly that we are simply not equipped to handle the kind of sales program they want, that they would do better to look to our NATO Allies for the equipment they seek, and that we will do what we can to encourage our Allies to respond positively.3
8. The following are summaries of the histories of several of our less than successful sales efforts, they are based on the facts as we know them here, and thus may be less than complete. I hope that Washington will not waste time drawing up defensive briefs on each, as has sometimes been the case when we earlier leveled complaints. The time is past when such efforts are of any use.
[Omitted here is the summary of the negotiation of the sale of the Dragon Missile System to Yugoslavia up to September 1979.]
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790418–0416. Secret; Priority; Exdis, Noforn. Also sent Priority to DODASD/ISA. Sent for information to CNO, CDA, CSAF, USCINCEUR, CDRUSASAC, CJCS, and USNMRSHAPE.↩
- In telegram 9176 from Belgrade, December 20, 1978, Eagleburger detailed several instances in which the costs of military equipment quoted to Yugoslav officials ended up being significantly higher. Eagleburger wrote that “the evolving US-Yugoslav military relationships are not at a point where ‘mini-shocks’” like the ones described in the telegram “can be absorbed with no set-backs.” “The Yugoslavs have a healthy case of paranoia” he continued, and “I fail to see why we have to try to prove to them that we are both malicious and incompetent.” Continuation of the FMS programs with Yugoslavia, the Ambassador concluded, would hinge on minimizing any more mistakes. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780528–1027)↩
- In her September 19 reply, Benson informed Eagleburger that she was convening an interagency meeting to review the status of the Yugoslav program and would draw up an action program and time table for the ongoing programs. Benson also requested suggestions for the agenda by September 21 as well as Eagleburger’s further views on the issue. (Telegram 244365 to Belgrade, September 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790437–0659) In telegram 7015 from Belgrade, September 19, Eagleburger wrote that “our major problem is management” and that “the services, in particular the Army, need to put someone at the helm who has not only the responsibility, but also the authority to oversee and manage security assistance for Yugoslavia.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790434–0173)↩