Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

266. Memorandum From Robert Kimmitt, Marshall Brement, and Steve Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 11, 1979

SUBJECT

• VBB: Arms Sales to Yugoslavia (S)

We recommended that this issue be discussed at the luncheon because of our belief that our emerging military supply relationship with Yugoslavia is at a critical juncture, and because State and Defense appear to be handling this issue in much too routine a fashion. Our hope is that your raising the issue will be a signal to Vance and Brown that careful attention should be paid to decisions that they will face shortly.² (S)

The basic policy guidance on this issue is that we wish to enhance our military supply relationship with Yugoslavia, with emphasis on the political impact. Since that policy was articulated in 1977, wide-ranging discussions have been held with the Yugoslavians. The results of those discussions—proposed arms sales—are now upon us. The two most pressing sales are (1) DRAGON shoulder-fired anti-tank missiles and (2) MAVERICK air-to-ground missiles. (S)

DRAGON: We have agreed to provide 1000 of these missiles, and discussions are continuing concerning cost, test sets, and other technical details. Apparently, however, the 1000 missiles earmarked for Yugoslavia have recently been discovered to be defective, and the Army is looking at whether it would be willing to provide 1000 functional missiles from its already depleted stocks. The Army may say no to this idea, but Harold³ can overrule them. We believe that not providing the Yugoslavians with 1000 functional missiles could do irreparable damage to our emerging relationship, and we recommend that you ask Harold to look into this issue, with an eye toward nipping in the bud any suggestion that we transfer the defective missiles instead.⁴ (S)

MAVERICK: The interagency consideration of this sale is nearing completion, and State is preparing to go to Congress for appropriate consultations. While we believe that such consultations are necessary because of congressional interest in both Yugoslavia and MAVERICKs, we strongly believe that only Church and Zablocki should be contacted because the potential for a leak would be exacerbated by wider discussions (a proposed sale of TOW anti-tank missiles fell through recently because of premature disclosure of the sale).⁵ We recommend that you ask Vance to limit the congressional consultations. (S)

Also, although our State and Defense counterparts do not all agree with us on this point, we believe that the President should be apprised of the fact that his policy guidance has resulted in a program that is at a significant stage of development. You might want to discuss with Vance and Brown how the President might be informed.⁶ (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, Yugoslavia: Military: 1/79–1/80. Secret. David Aaron wrote at the top of the memorandum: “Not such a big deal.”
2. The issue was discussed at the VBB lunch on July 12. In a memorandum later that day, Robert Gates informed Larrabee, Brement, and Kimmitt that Brzezinski tasked Larrabee to clarify what decisions were needed by the principals. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 1–8/79)
3. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.
4. In a July 13 memorandum to Brzezinski, Larrabee recommended that Brown ensure that the 1,000 Dragon missiles committed to Yugoslavia “should be functional, not defective, even if this means taking them out of the Army inventory.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, Yugoslavia: 8/78–12/79)
5. In his July 13 memorandum to Brzezinski, Larrabee noted that “Vance should be aware that Lucy Benson is prepared to go ahead with the sale of Mavericks.” Larrabee also recommended that “Vance should formally inform the President” and that “we should limit consultations with Congress as much as possible in order to prevent leaks which could seriously damage relations with Yugoslavia.” Brzezinski asked for draft memoranda to Brown and Vance with White House guidance. (Ibid.)
6. Carter was informed of the decision in an Evening Report from Vance. In a July 18 memorandum from Larrabee and Kimmitt to Brzezinski recommending that no guidance for Brown and Vance was necessary, Robert Hunter commented that the President “Noted OK in the margin” of the Evening Report. (Ibid.)