Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

268. Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, September 18, 1979

SUBJECT

• Military Sales to Yugoslavia (U)

Attached is a blistering cable from Larry Eagleburger, our Ambassador in Belgrade, regarding our inept handling of our Yugoslav military relationship and its serious political implications.² I feel it deserves your attention. Even allowing for Eagleburger’s non-diplomatic style, the message is unmistakably clear and well-documented: we have seriously mismanaged military sales to Yugoslavia to the point where we risk damage not only to the ties to the Yugoslav military, which we have so carefully sought to nurture over the past two years, but to our broader bilateral interests as well. Indeed, Eagleburger feels that the point has been reached where we have to get our act together or withdraw from the relationship entirely. (C)

While slightly, but only slightly, overdramatized, Eagleburger’s analysis is basically valid. Much of the problem lies in cost overruns, some of which could (and should) have been avoided, others of which could not have been. Be that as it may, the fundamental point is that we have given the appearance of incompetence and ineptitude, which has seriously undermined Yugoslav confidence in our ability to respond to their needs in a timely and effective manner. As Eagleburger rightly points out, this is bound to have important consequences not only for our carefully nurtured attempts to develop a relationship with the Yugoslav military, but for our broader political relationship as well. (C)

The next meeting of the joint military working group is in mid-October. This is an important—perhaps the last—chance to show the Yugoslavs that we are serious about our commitments, and we simply have got to get our act together. I have talked to George Vest about this. He feels we should give Jim Siena at ISA a chance to get DOD into shape (Siena is away and returns tomorrow). However, time is running out, and DOD is so hopelessly mired down in bureaucratic red tape and inter-service rivalry that I despair that the issue can successfully be resolved in time for the joint military meeting in October without a push from you or Brown. (C)

I suggest that the topic be raised at the VBB luncheon, either this week or, at the latest, next week. Given the time constraints, this week would be better but if, after reading Eagleburger’s cable, you feel (as Vest does) that we should give Siena more time to get DOD’s act together, Kimmitt and I will postpone preparations of material until next week. But the issue does need urgent top-level attention and your active intervention. Otherwise we risk jeopardizing much of the careful work we have done to develop the military relationship—and conceivably a lot more. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you raise the issue at the VBB luncheon.³ (U)

APPROVE⁴ DISAPPROVE

THIS WEEKNEXT WEEK

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, Yugoslavia: Military: 1/79–1/80. Confidential. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Kimmitt and Brement.
2. See Document 267.
3. Gates wrote in the margin: “Sounds like a suitable agenda item.”
4. Brzezinski approved the recommendation and wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “Tell me concretely what needs to be done. I need a good-tough memo, with quotes from Eagleburger, to both V[ance]-B[rown]—and a DR. ZB.” In a September 19 memorandum, Kimmitt and Larrabee recommended that Brzezinski raise the issue of military sales to Yugoslavia at the next VBB lunch, and stress that “both Departments need to give higher-level attention to issues that arise and decisions that are made.” On the sale of Dragon missiles to Yugoslavia, Kimmitt and Larrabee, suggested that Brzezinski ask Brown “personally to look into the current status of this case in an effort to rescue it.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, Yugoslavia: Military: 1/79–1/80) On September 20, Gates notified Larrabee and Kimmitt that at the VBB “it was decided that Brown would expedite resolution of the problem and would report as soon as possible.” (Ibid.)