265. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State1
4053. For the Acting Secretary Christopher from Ambassador Eagleburger. Subj: Yugoslav Earthquake: Reconstruction Assistance. Ref: A) Belgrade 3453;2 B) Belgrade 3521;3 C) Belgrade 3697.4
1. (C-entire text)
2. In ref A I argued as persuasively as I could—but apparently not persuasively enough—for a favorable USG decision on reconstruction assistance for Yugoslavia in the wake of the Montenegrin earthquake. In ref B we listed specific schools, hospitals and other public facilities identified by the GOY as in need of assistance.
3. In ref C I reported that Yugoslav Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs Pesic had come as close to begging for help as a Yugoslav will ever come. He also asked whether a Montenegrin parliamentary delegation visit to Washington would be “helpful” in assisting the USG to make a decision. I have received no response to the Pesic appeal or question, and still owe him an answer.
4. I have spent two years here trying to build a sense of confidence and trust in the US so that when the inevitable crisis occurs we will not be considered irrelevant or impotent, but rather be able to play a stabilizing role and protect our very considerable political and economic interests. Frankly, a decision to provide no assistance—or continued silence in the face of the Yugoslav appeal—will go a long way to undercut the psychological progress we have made. Some may think [Page 873] that 20 million dollars is too high a price to pay to avoid that, but I do not.
5. The Pesic conversation introduced an additional consideration: The GOY fear that if we fail to do anything it will have a major impact on what others are willing to do. Nor are the Yugoslavs far wrong, the Canadian Embassy, for example has told us that Ottawa is waiting to see what “other Western countries” do before it decides whether to give any economic reconstruction assistance. So, our decision will have an impact beyond the narrow parameters of what we ourselves are prepared to do.
6. The forthcoming visit of Mrs. Mondale is yet another new factor. She is scheduled to visit Montenegro June 14 to meet with senior Republican officials and tour the coastal region hardest hit by the earthquake.5 I do not see how she can visit the area and remain totally silent on what we plan to contribute to economic relief efforts. If it is not possible for Mrs. Mondale to announce that the administration is prepared to support a specific appropriation, then the next best course would be a statement that the administration accepts the principle of long-term reconstruction assistance to Yugoslavia but is currently evaluating the appropriate level (this, of course, commits us to something, and to working with the Yugoslavs in deciding how much that something is). Should even that be impossible, then I strongly urge that the Yugoslavs be told we can do nothing before Mrs. Mondale arrives, to wait until after her departure would be insulting to the Yugoslavs and unfair to Mrs. Mondale.
7. So, in my view, we can avoid a decision for only a little while longer. And as the decision is thought about I hope two factors will be kept in mind.
A) If the USG decides it cannot assist it should be remembered that the Yugoslavs will—since they know about the Kennedy Amendment—view it a negative administration decision in the face of congressional willingness to help.
B) When Tito dies, and for some time thereafter, we will surely be searching for ways to show our support for those Yugoslavs who want to stand against: 1) Soviet pressures; 2) those who would return the country to a more repressive and centralized internal system acceptable to [Page 874] the East; 3) nationalist forces ready to tear the country apart. And when that time comes we will, I predict, regret any earlier lost opportunities—such as the one now before us—to demonstrate that we can be counted upon.6
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 86, Yugoslavia: 1–12/79. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. The telegram was forwarded by Rentschler to Brzezinski and Aaron on June 2. In his covering memorandum, Rentschler wrote that “this ‘Eaglegram’ provides eloquent (nay, de profundis) point to the substance of our own pitch on behalf of U.S. reconstruction assistance. I think we will be making a bad mistake if we do not take Eagleburger’s counsel to heart.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 1–8/79) On June 6, the Department of State informed the White House that the ExIm Bank would be approving a $90 million credit to Yugoslavia for reconstruction. (Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 72, Foreign Countries–Yugoslavia, (1979))↩
- See Document 264.↩
- In telegram 3521 from Belgrade, May 11, the Embassy sent the Department a Yugoslav-provided list of schools and hospitals damaged by the earthquake and in need of reconstruction assistance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790217–0879)↩
- See footnote 4, Document 264.↩
- Joan Mondale visited Yugoslavia June 11–15 for the opening of the America Now art exhibit in Belgrade and a tour of the areas affected by the earthquake in Montenegro. In telegram 152031 to Belgrade, June 13, the Department provided talking points for Mrs. Mondale on U.S. policy toward reconstruction aid. Mrs. Mondale was to stress that the administration was working actively with Congress to find a way to participate in the reconstruction efforts in Montenegro, on the basis of the “broad base of friendship between the Yugoslav and American peoples.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790266–1018)↩
- On June 4, Aaron wrote on Rentschler’s covering memorandum forwarding the telegram to him and Brzezinski (see footnote 1 above), that “Christopher will try to get the dough from the cots and blankets fund. SSA, AID, and supplementals are out.” Brzezinski asked if a memorandum from him to Vance would be necessary. Aaron’s response is illegible. On September 13, Carter signed Presidential Determination 79–16, providing $10 million for economic assistance. The justification for the decision noted that the assistance “would help the Yugoslavs overcome the economic difficulties caused by the earthquake.” The justification also noted that “in so doing, it would support Yugoslavia’s continued political independence. Of equal importance, such assistance would demonstrate that the United States can be relied upon in time of need.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 1–8/79)↩