Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

246. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, October 20, 1977

SUBJECT

• Report on Trip to Yugoslavia and Italy

Last week I went to Yugoslavia to begin the process of modestly increasing our military relationship with the GOY, to Bari in southern Italy to attend the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting, to Rome to meet with senior Italian officials, and to the Sixth Fleet at sea in the Mediterranean. I believe we accomplished a number of positive objectives, and also avoided negative effects. Ambassadors Gardner and Eagleburger, as well as our senior military commanders in NATO, contributed substantially to that result.

Yugoslavia. I was warmly treated throughout the visit: the Yugoslavs were clearly interested in promoting a better relationship. I met principally with Defense Minister Ljubicic and a few colleagues, but also paid calls on two other members of the ruling hierarchy (Doronjski and Djuranovic). Tito was in Paris.

Each side’s litany provided the framework for the discussion. On our side, this was an expression of support for the independence, territorial integrity, and non-alignment of Yugoslavia. On their side, it was their desire for improved relations without prejudice to their cherished non-alignment and national unity.

They implied they were more afraid of an attack by Bulgaria² than by the Soviet Union. But if they were overmatched, they were (they said) prepared to retreat to the mountains, as in World War II, and fight on as guerrillas. On the political side, they would not admit that their internal ethnic differences created political instability, but they were at least willing to recognize the potential for such trouble. They noted that Albania and Bulgaria both claimed Yugoslav territory.

They asked about SALT, including cruise missiles, and I gave quite a detailed explanation. Ljubicic remarked that, while a SALT agreement might benefically limit systems by which the US and Russia threaten each other, it would not necessarily make the smaller countries more secure. He asked about reduction of [less than 1 line not declassified]. I responded that that issue was not included in SALT although eventually forward-based and other non-strategic systems would probably be dealt with in SALT or some other forum. Ljubicic asked about the neutron bomb and I explained its military purpose.

As to an enhanced military supply relationship, I outlined our desire to be forthcoming within certain limits (e.g. defensive weapons only, no sensitive technology) and stressed the need for better procedures to avoid the misunderstandings of the past. I gave a few illustrations of weapons which we would be willing to provide and which we would not be willing to provide. By pointing out that you had endorsed enlarging the US-GOY relationship while at the same time ordering a world-wide reduction in our arms transfers, I noted our special interest in them.

While they welcomed the US attitude in general, the Yugoslavs expressed disappointment as to specifics. I believe this concern was somewhat alleviated by my emphasizing that our visit was designed to start a process rather than to result in definitive decisions. They indicated that their principal interests lay in high technology anti-armor, anti-air and anti-landing (helicopter and airborne) weapons. While we can modestly expand our relationship, the process will not be easy because Yugoslavia’s desires will frequently involve systems too sensitive for release. Most of their arms purchases (they say they make 75 percent themselves) are from the USSR. They buy about 550 million a year from the U.K.; our own sales are no more than a couple of million a year.³

I invited Ljubicic to visit the US sometime next year and he quickly accepted. We will use that visit as a target against which to manage plans for improving the military relationship. The next steps will be a visit to the US (now underway) by the Chief of the Yugoslav Air Force and a visit to Belgrade by US experts to explain FMS procedures.

[Omitted here is Brown’s report on the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and his conversations in Rome.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 4, Defense Department: 10–11/77. Secret. Carter wrote at the top of the first page: “Good report J.”
2. Carter underlined “Bulgaria.”
3. Ermarth wrote in the margin next to this paragraph: “10/31 DOD informed NSC that 550 should have read 50.”