247. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Tito Visit: Export License for Nuclear Fuel for Krsko
As before the Vice President’s visit to Belgrade last May, the most serious issue in our relations on the eve of the Tito visit is the dispute over nuclear exports to Yugoslavia. At that time a compromise was worked out permitting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license the export of the Krsko nuclear reactor on the basis of, inter alia, Yugoslav agreement to negotiate with us on the conditions governing use of fuel in Krsko. The current issue involves the precise nature of U.S. approval rights over retransfer and reprocessing.
Yugoslavia, which is a party to the NPT, a cooperating member of the IAEA, and a participant in INFCE, has consistently indicated its willingness to accept universally applicable safeguards which result from new international agreements. The Yugoslavs, however, have resisted what they regard as U.S. attempts to impose additional, unilateral and discriminatory conditions on existing agreements. They have also said they are unwilling to “tie their hands” with regard to a future reprocessing option. (We are aware of no current Yugoslav plans to recycle or reprocess.) Furthermore, the Yugoslavs have been extremely [Page 792] sensitive to any proposed conditions which do not already apply to other recipients of U.S. fuel. They have in particular focused on U.S. willingness to ship fuel to India—a non-NPT party with a “bad record”—and argue that Yugoslavia should in no case be asked to provide more, in the way of assurances, than did India.
Although the existing agreements on Krsko give the U.S. most of the assurances required immediately by our pending nuclear legislation, they fail to provide us with prior approval rights over reprocessing of U.S. fuel and they cover retransfer of only the first fuel core. We have been seeking additional Yugoslav assurances which not only satisfy these immediate criteria but which also would be consistent with the legislative requirements for new agreements, i.e., U.S. approval rights over disposition of any fuel used in a U.S.-supplied reactor. We have explained to the Yugoslav Government that since we expect to continue to cooperate with Yugoslavia in nuclear energy programs, we would prefer to resolve the entire issue now rather than to work out a “quick fix” on U.S. fuel only and then have to renegotiate that agreement within the 18 month time limit of the legislation. Furthermore, an agreement on U.S. fuel only would be more difficult to sell to the NRC. Should the Yugoslavs resist our proposed long-term solution, however, it may be necessary to work out a compromise combining approval rights on U.S. fuel with a provision for exclusive use of U.S. fuel in the Krsko reactor.
Following discussions in Washington in late December, we will resume negotiations in Belgrade February 16–18 in the hope of resolving this issue before Tito’s arrival2. However, the Yugoslavs—who have already indicated that Tito will personally make the final decision on what additional assurances can be given—may decide to raise this problem in the Presidential talks in March.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 15, Yugoslavia: President Tito, 3/6–9/78: Cables and Memos. Confidential. The memorandum was requested during an interagency meeting at the Department of State on February 7 held to discuss the status of preparations for the Tito visit. (Telegram 36703 to Belgrade, February 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780063–0954)↩
- During a meeting in Belgrade February 17–18, the U.S. negotiating team met with the Yugoslav team and reached a tentative understanding on dealing with the nuclear fuel issue for the Krsko reactor. (Telegram 1407 from Belgrade, February 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780079–0755) A final agreement consisted of an exchange of letters among the Department of State, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, and IAEA covering the disposition of spent fuel from the Krsko plant. (Telegram 49293 to Belgrade, February 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780087–0054)↩
- David Anderson signed for Tarnoff above this typed signature.↩