Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

238. Memorandum From Gregory F. Treverton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 4, 1977

SUBJECT

• Summary of Your Meeting with Yugoslav Ambassador Belovski, August 3, 1977

For your information, the following is a summary of the main points made in the meeting:

Tito’s Trip

Belovski said that Tito would be gone for nearly a month; he was uncertain whether the Soviet Union portion was an official visit or a vacation. In any case, he said it was important for the Yugoslavs to “normalize” their relations with Moscow. In the last year the Soviet approach has included many “old” aspects—talk of “brotherhood,” invitations to bloc meetings despite clear Yugoslav indications that it will not participate, military approaches—and a persistent tendency to retain Yugoslavia as a member of the “family.” You agreed that Yugoslavia was doing just what a country that wanted to retain its independence and territorial integrity should do.

Korea

In response to your question why Tito was going to North Korea, the Ambassador said: (1) the Yugoslavs had been frankly impressed by the sincerity of the North Korean desire for peace on the peninsula (an argument he repeated); and (2) North Korea had opted for non-alignment, which was important to Yugoslavia not because of the U.S. but because of the Soviet Union and the PRC. When you asked why Belgrade did not recognize Seoul, the Ambassador evaded, with vague talk of their original cease-fire proposal and their desire to see the UN force withdrawn.

You indicated that there had been no change in our plans for withdrawal from Korea. You indicated that we would be prepared to open communications with the North, provided the South Koreans were involved. There are two Koreas and the North must recognize that; the way to proceed would be to get both admitted to the UN and begin to involve them in an international framework which might lead to peace on the peninsula.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

You referred to the Charleston speech on U.S.-Soviet relations² reiterating that those relations cover a wide front, comprising many different negotiations in different phases. That is normal for countries that are in many respects rivals but which recognize their global responsibility to cooperate. You described the relations as “steady, stable and evolving,” with SALT the only substantial disagreement. You agreed with the Ambassador that a breakthrough in one set of negotiations—for instance, CTB—might help across the board, but you also suggested that the effect should not be exaggerated. Differences on other issues are real, not atmospherics or a reflection of our approach to human rights.

You suggested to the Ambassador that it is important that the Soviets understand that we want cooperation on a broad front. We do not see separate issues as linked. At the same time, to create a false sense of agreement would be to court the danger of backlash. We are committed to, and speak about, detente, but it cannot be a selective detente.

The Ambassador believed this Administration was more genuine in its commitment to detente than its predecessor, but he wondered how it could escape the current impasse. You said there was no reason to be impatient. We want to move but will not make unilateral concessions, and you suggested that Tito might convey that message to the Soviets.

You indicated that Congressional and public opinion is solidly behind the President and that, if anything, stagnation in U.S.-Soviet relations works to the advantage of those who oppose detente. There is no rush to move forward; quite the contrary, delay may make it harder to do so; a SALT agreement along the lines we proposed four months ago would have passed the Senate easily then, now it will not be so simple. The more impediments the Soviets throw in the relationship, the more anti-SALT sentiment grows in the United States. More generally, the Soviets have been unwise in their SALT strategy; in January 1976 they could have had an agreement they would now regard as good, but not now.

We want a SALT agreement that is real and sustaining. If there is no agreement by October, we will see how the parties behave once the interim accord lapses. If the Soviets take actions that are inconsistent with that accord, the mood in Congress will press the U.S. to respond. The situation could be reminiscent of the early 1960s, and the result might be again to widen the gap between U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities, since the U.S. stands on the verge of a new era of weaponry. Once we plunge into that weaponry it might again take years for a new balance to emerge. We want a SALT agreement that is a wedge for better relations, both political and military. We will not be silent about what we stand for, just as we do not expect the Soviets to abandon their ideology.

Bilateral Relations

The Ambassador said Tito believes that the President is an honest man and that the Mondale visit had laid a very “clean” platform for relations. Tito would convey both impressions to the Soviet Union. In response to your mention of the tank transfer,³ the Ambassador called it an “administrative failure” which his government wanted to correct. Yugoslavia would stand by its commitments; it wants to build a substantive basis for closer cooperation, including in the military field. You indicated your agreement and hoped that the Presidents could meet soon.

China

You responded briefly to the Ambassador’s question by indicating that we are serious about normalizing relations, building on the Shanghai communique. At the same time there are historical and psychological legacies—and domestic factors—that both sides must take into account. The Shanghai communique does that on our part; the Chinese must do likewise.

The Ambassador asked if you would come to Yugoslavia. You responded affirmatively, saying that you were thinking about a trip to Europe in the fall and that it might include Yugoslavia.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 56, Yugoslavia: 1977. Secret. Sent for information. Brzezinski sent a copy of the memorandum to Vance on August 15 and underscored his hope that Tito would “get some of these points across to Brezhnev.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 122, Vance, Misc. Communication with: 7–8/77)
2. For the text of the President’s speech at the 31st Annual Meeting of the Southern Legislative Conference on July 21, in Charleston, South Carolina, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, pp. 1309–1315.
3. See Document 237.