237. Editorial Note
On May 31, 1977, the Central Intelligence Agency confirmed that U.S.-manufactured M–47 (Patton) tanks were present in Ethiopia. Further circumstantial evidence suggested that the tank shipment to Ethiopia originated in Yugoslavia. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance reported the evidence to President Jimmy Carter in an Evening Report dated June 22. Noting that the tanks had been delivered to Yugoslavia in the 1950s under a Military Assistance Program (MAP) grant, Vance added that the Export Control Act required congressional notification in cases of unauthorized transfers of military equipment. “If the intelligence is confirmed,” Vance reported, “we will approach the Yugoslavs and make the required report to the Congress in a timely fashion.” Carter wrote in the margin “Why not simply ask the Yugoslavs?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 6/77) The next day Vance reported to Carter that the Department of State had authorized U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Lawrence Eagleburger to broach the subject with the Yugoslav Government. (Ibid.)
Although the Military Assistance Program with Yugoslavia was terminated in 1959, the Yugoslavs had agreed not to transfer “to any other nation, title or possession of any military equipment, materials, information, or services” acquired from the United States “without the prior consent of the Government of the United States of America.” (Telegram 145552 to Belgrade, June 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770223–0965) Eagleburger, who arrived in Belgrade on June 16 and presented his credentials on June 21, requested permission to deliver a strongly worded démarche suggesting that Yugoslav actions cast doubt on “stated GOY desire to expand military-to-military cooperation, and particularly military sales. More fundamentally, it raises serious questions about GOY credibility on a range of existing bilateral undertakings with the USG, as well as future agreements.” (Telegram 4238 from Belgrade, June 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770225–0333)
On June 24, Eagleburger informed Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Milos Minic that the U.S. Government had information that M–47 tanks supplied to Yugoslavia may have been transferred to Ethiopia in violation of U.S.-Yugoslav agreements. Eagleburger requested that the Yugoslav Government confirm if U.S. tanks had indeed been transferred to Ethiopia. (Telegram 4263 from Belgrade, June 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770226–0826) While waiting for Minic’s response, the Embassy reported its own analysis of the reasons for Belgrade’s transfer of weapons to Ethiopia. The most likely explanation, the Embassy wrote, was that Yugoslav “enthusiasm [Page 761] for a socialist brother got the best of them.” Yugoslav position in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) offered Belgrade the opportunity to expand “non-Soviet, ‘progressive’ influence” to Ethiopia. Another probable reason was the low state of relations between the United States and Yugoslavia prior to Vice President Walter Mondale’s visit in May. Eagleburger wrote: “Given their obligation to a non-aligned and socialist state, their irritation with us, and an estimate that they had little to lose” as military sales from the West were not forthcoming, Belgrade probably decided to transfer the tanks without regard if the transfer was discovered. (Telegram 4316 from Belgrade, June 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770229–0316)
Minic met with Eagleburger on July 8 to confirm that the Yugoslav Government had, indeed, transferred 70 M–47 tanks to Ethiopia. Minic suggested that the equipment had been decommissioned by the Yugoslav military and was about to be sent to scrap yards when a decision was made to provide it to Ethiopia. He stressed that the Yugoslav and U.S. military authorities should establish direct contact to clarify responsibilities arising from the old agreements. According to Eagleburger, “Minic appealed for USG’s understanding,” expressed his government’s hope that Washington not allow the incident “to have a negative impact on all fields, including military cooperation,” and stressed that Yugoslavia takes very seriously its obligations under international agreements and has always lived up to them. (Telegram 4603 from Belgrade, July 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770243–0661) On a copy of the cable forwarded to him by Brzezinski, Carter noted “My inclination is not to embarrass the Yugoslavs.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 86, Yugoslavia: 1–9/1977)
Visiting Belgrade in mid-July, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher told Minic that U.S. law required the administration to notify Congress of the equipment diversion matter. However, Christopher informed the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, the administration had decided to do so in a classified letter so as to minimize the chances of the instance leaking to the press: “We attempting to handle problem with restraint, not because we do not consider it a very serious matter—as we do—but because we set great store by our relationship.” (Telegram 4930 from Belgrade, July 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770260–0639) Christopher informed Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Frank Church (Democrat-Idaho) and Speaker of the House Thomas O’Neill (Democrat-Massachusetts) of the Yugoslav diversion on August 6. (Telegram 184571 to Belgrade, August 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770282–0535)