Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

236. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Belgrade, May 21, 1977, 11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Yugoslavia

  • President Josip Broz Tito
  • Edvard Kardelj, Member, Presidency
  • Stevan Doronjski, Vice President
  • Milos Minic, Vice President, Federal Executive Council
  • Dimce Belovski, Ambassador to the United States

• U.S.

  • Vice President Walter F. Mondale
  • Assistant Secretary of State George Vest
  • David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • A. Denis Clift, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

President Tito greeted the Vice President; the Vice President gave him a letter from President Carter;² Tito read the letter noting the reference to the Kardelj visit; and Tito said it was a very nice letter from the President. The Vice President then gave Tito a letter from Governor Harriman;³ Tito thanked the Vice President and said he would read that letter later.

V.P.: Governor Harriman has sent you his best wishes. All Americans respect you Mr. President, and we respect Yugoslavia’s independence and territorial integrity. We hope this meeting will mark improved relations between our countries. We respect your role as a leader of the non-aligned movement, and we hope that this meeting will be the start of much improved relations.

Tito: Thank you, Mr. Vice President. I believe your visit is of great importance to both our countries. I think this is a good opportunity to exchange views on issues of interest to both sides. I think our relations are, on the whole, good. There are no conflicts between our two countries.

Yugoslavia is entirely independent from both blocs. We are a founding member of the non-aligned movement, and we are deeply interested in the non-aligned. The movement rests on principles of importance, principles we think should be applied throughout the world.

There are hot points in the world, in Africa, for example, that threaten to turn into something bigger. There is, first of all, the Arab-Israeli conflict, then Southern Africa—it is a different category with the problems of South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia. There are conflicts between the non-aligned. India and Egypt have bad relations. There are problems in Ethiopia. I read today of an attack by Rhodesia on Mozambique.

V.P.: One of the points I want to make clear, Mr. President, is our respect for the non-aligned movement. We respect your independence and your foreign policy.

These past two days pressed my country in the forefront of the issues you have mentioned, I met with Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna. I made clear that we expect an independent Rhodesia, with majority rule, with elections by 1978. We want an independent Namibia under the outlines of Resolution 385, with elections by the people and withdrawal of South African forces. I said that we reject their policy in South Africa, and that failure to make progress on all three of these issues would result in deteriorating relations. In that regard, we directly objected to incursions by Rhodesia into Mozambique and Zambia.

Under President Carter, the U.S. has a more direct policy, a policy of clarity and strength on the issues of independence, and we wanted the South Africans to know clearly our views so that they don’t miscalculate.

Tito: What was his answer?

V.P.: He didn’t like it. I think that is why I got sick (laughter). He said he would support independence for Rhodesia in 1978. He also agreed to meet with the Contact Group on Namibia by the end of the month. There may be hope there. The thing we are worried about is the interim arrangement for Namibia.

Within South Africa itself, Prime Minister Vorster gave us the line about how the Africans are happy, the coloreds are happy, the Indians are happy. They all played football together. It is a slow story.

Tito: It is very important about the football.

V.P.: Actually it’s soccer, rather, rugby. What we wanted to do, Mr. President, was to make clear we mean business. If they want to get along there must be progress. There must be true independence. In our country in the past, unfortunately, we have not made this an issue, but we have made it an issue now.

On the Middle East, President Carter is trying to set an environment by having talks leading to a reconvened Geneva Conference. He has met with the Arab leaders, and this week he will meet with Crown Prince Fahd. When the Israelis have organized their new government, he hopes to meet with the new Israeli Prime Minister.⁴ President Carter has had good talks with President Sadat, King Hussein, and President Asad, and I am sure the talks with Fahd will go well.⁵ But, of course, the issues are very difficult.

Tito: Unfortunately, I am a pessimist after the Israeli elections. I am afraid it will be more difficult. The one who has come up in Israel is the one for war.

Only the U.S. can put a brake on it, no one else. We must insist on a peaceful solution. We think the Geneva Conference shouldn’t be convened because of the coming to power of the new leaders in Israel. This will only lead to a worsening of relations with the Arabs. As the Israelis are militarily superior, they might try to take advantage of their military superiority. It would create a difficult situation for the U.S. President Sadat, who has succeeded thus far in appeasing Israel, might find himself in a difficult political situation in Egypt if there is confrontation.

V.P.: You are right.

Tito: Much depends on the Israelis.

V.P.: There is a hope that the parties can get together. We have been pressing for such a result. President Carter is reluctant to reconvene the Geneva Conference until we have essential pieces in place; otherwise, it would fall apart. Secretary Vance will be going back to the Middle East shortly to discuss the situation with each leader, and the President will be meeting next week with Fahd. Our theory is that we have to have action this year if we are going to have positive action at all.

Tito: You are right in saying that it is necessary to put some of the pieces in place before reconvening the Geneva Conference. On the other side, what is bad is that we are not witnessing the coming together of the opposing sides. There is an opposite process; they are going further apart.

V.P.: President Carter’s impression, based on his talks with the Arab leaders was that the situation was developing nicely. With the Israeli elections, we don’t know. We are aware of Likud’s previous statements, but we don’t know what position he will take.

Kardelj: The Arabs have been evolving in a positive sense, including Syria and the Palestinians. But what has happened in Israel might turn things upside down.

V.P.: President Carter had an excellent meeting with Asad, and I am sure this will be true with Fahd. Now it will depend on whether progress is possible with Israel. The President has said there has to be a Palestinian territory and that the Arabs have to evolve a process for peace. It is difficult to commence this process considering the ancient animosity of the Arabs and the Jews.

Tito: For Israel, the essential thing is for the Palestinians and the other Arabs to declare that they recognize Israel’s right to exist.

V.P.: Correct, that is a part of it. Setting aside the PLO, we believe the other Arabs would be inclined to do so. We don’t know about the PLO. . . .

Kardelj: After they have something in their hands. . . .

V.P.: Those are the rumors we hear. . . .

Minic: We have been told so by the PLO directly.

V.P.: We are hopeful. President Carter hopes to have progress. As you have observed, it is a hot spot and outside help is needed because of the animosity.

Tito: There is big hatred in the region. It is unstable. Since 1947 Israel has occupied territories and not complied with UN resolutions.

V.P.: We objected to the most recent Israeli settlements.

Kardelj: We assume the US will tell Israel not to continue to lie.

Tito: In 1967, I told the Arabs, I told Nasser that they had to recognize Israel, that they couldn’t throw Israel into the sea. They didn’t like it, but they accepted it.

V.P.: We will press them.

Tito: We don’t know how the situation will develop. That is why I am not optimistic.

V.P.: What do you, Mr. President, think of the situation in Ethiopia and Somalia?

Tito: Ethiopia sent a delegation to Yugoslavia two years ago after the revolution. We had talks and advised them to have a federation with Eritrea. Nothing happened. They came again at a high level. I told them again that federation was the best possible solution. Succession would not be acceptable; it would cut Ethiopia off from the sea.

As far as Somalia is concerned, I had a visit from their President. He said he is ready to have confederation with Ethiopia.

In Djibouti, the situation is dangerous. I sent our Assistant Foreign Minister with messages urging the parties to reach a peaceful solution. In terms of the internal situation, fighting is going on. Both sides are stubborn. We have let the Ethiopians and the Eritreans know that we do not agree with succession. However, I am not optimistic.

Minic: After the Ethiopian revolution, when the Emperor was overthrown,⁶ Ethiopia applied for assistance. We agreed to provide economic and military assistance within the limits of our possibilities. It is a progressive regime and we thought it important to maintain Ethiopia as a non-aligned country. The policy of some Arab countries, supporting the succession of Eritrea, is the wrong policy. The Ethiopian regime is assuring us that they are determined to remain non-aligned. We are of the opinion that we have to support Ethiopia because the government assures they are determined to remain non-aligned. We are trying to encourage the government to find a federal solution for Eritrea, not war. We are trying to press the Arab countries to change their policy and to influence Ethiopia along these same lines. Neither Ethiopia nor the Arabs are ready to accept such suggestions.

Tito: It is difficult to say what consequences there will be if the situation continues on its present course. If such a thing were to develop, we would have to keep the conflict from spreading. We should all try to contribute.

Kardelj: What is in question is the policy of detente itself. All of these conflicts inevitably involve the two world blocs. Africa is possibly a confrontation ground.

V.P.: Mr. Kardelj, our fondest hope is that that will not happen. We want majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia. We want progress in South Africa. Where there is profound social injustice, there is room for caprice. We want the U.S. and the Soviet Union to stay out of there. That is the policy we want to pursue; we do not have designs for hegemony.

Kardelj: But it is possible that this will have to be the result of US-Soviet negotiations. It is in U.S. interests that non-aligned countries remain non-aligned.

V.P.: We have commenced efforts to move forward on detente with the Soviet Union. The talks in Geneva are going very well. We would like to see progress on MBFR. We would like to see a broadening of people-to-people contact. The Russians haven’t included wars of liberation in their definition of detente. I would hope, incidentally, that we could get to the subject of the Belgrade meeting before these talks are over.

Kardelj: It is not a good position to consider wars of national liberation outside the framework of detente.

V.P.: We want to get along with the Russians, but we found they are not perfect. Mr. President, your interpreter is great. She never takes a note. I think if we put her in charge we could solve all our problems; she is always perfect.

Mr. President, would you please give me your views on CSCE?

Tito: If I have a suggestion to give, it is that you don’t introduce matters that lead to confrontation—one is human rights. It is a question that is discussed too much. If the debate on human rights were to be confined to the US and USSR that would be okay, but other countries are being drawn in.

Yugoslavia is an open country. Millions of our people work outside of Yugoslavia; there are many tourists. We have a few people in jail; this is held as a human rights violation. There are just a few people who work against us. We have our laws and we must apply them. We don’t want this held against us in Belgrade. We want to go forward, not backward, after Helsinki. Yugoslavia has signed an agreement with Italy and we have solved other problems with our neighbors. I know there are injustices, but what is injustice? We should try to move along the lines set in Helsinki. I would hope you will convey these views to President Carter.

V.P.: I will do so, we want to consider all three baskets to the fullest extent possible and in a non-confrontational manner. We want to keep the dialogue on a firm track, a non-confrontation track.

Turning to another issue, because of your leadership in the non-aligned movement, I wanted you to know we will try to get North-South dialogue going through CIEC⁷ on a constructive, hopeful basis. At the London Summit, we pressed for a hopeful dialogue permitting progress by the poorer countries of the world. We are proposing case-by-case commodity agreements; a common fund to keep commodities in a normal market range. We have proposed increasing contributions to the World Bank. Our hope is that the CIEC Conference in Paris will provide the basis for a much more constructive discussion.

Tito: The question of assistance to the LDCs is important; unfortunately, the progress is slow.

V.P.: We are increasing our assistance from $2.4 billion to $8 billion over three years. Mr. President, some of the demands of the poorer countries we don’t find possible to accept.

Tito: I feel the greatest obstacle is that of the international companies which contribute to fluctuations in prices—copper and other raw materials.

V.P.: It is terrible.

Tito: I think a great responsibility lies with the international companies.

Minic: We have studied the positions taken at London carefully. Some are positive, but still the positions of the group of 19 and the group of 8 at Paris are far apart. It is difficult to know whether the Paris conference will be successful. We shall try to do whatever we can in order to achieve at least partial results. You know the group of 19 has to be careful so as not to be denounced by the group of 77—which is actually 110 nations. If the group of 8 comes closer to the group of 19, success will be achieved in raw materials, investment and financial matters.

V.P.: On another issue, Mr. President, I am aware of the fact that we have had an irritating delay with regard to the Krsko reactor. Our Nuclear Regulatory Commission has now approved the license, and I hope you will find this a helpful step.

Tito: We are satisfied with this solution. It would have been unpleasant for a small country like Yugoslavia to have invested so much and not to have it work out.

V.P.: Absolutely. I hope that this will be a symbol of cooperation between our countries across the whole range of issues.

Tito: As far as bilateral relations are concerned, we had some agreements with Ford and Kissinger, certain agreements on some kinds of arms. Now military purchases have stopped. I must tell you openly and frankly that the discussion about the TOW missile did not please us. There was a great fuss about this, propaganda and the suggestion that Yugoslavia was being armed by the U.S. We produce 85 percent of our own arms. We want to avoid a big fuss. We aren’t asking for sophisticated weapons, but we don’t want obsolete equipment. I would hope we could avoid misunderstandings.

V.P.: I know Admiral Holloway has just visited and met with your military leaders.⁸ We will look into this aspect of our relations.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Mondale: 5/77–6/79. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place at the White Palace. Clift forwarded the memorandum to Dodson on June 1 for distribution to Brzezinski and Vance. (Ibid.)
2. In a letter dated May 11, Carter assured Tito of his administration’s commitment to resolving the outstanding issues surrounding the building of the Krsko Nuclear Reactor, reaffirmed U.S. support for Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity, and invited Yugoslav Presidency member Edvard Kardelj to Washington. (Carter Library, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 21, Yugoslavia: President Josip Broz Tito, 5/77–5/79)
3. Not found.
4. Menachem Begin’s party, the Likud, won the May 17 elections in Israel. Begin was confirmed as Prime Minister on June 21, 1977.
5. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat traveled to Washington April 3–6. King Hussein of Jordan traveled to Washington April 24–27. Carter met with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in Geneva May 9.
6. Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed on September 12, 1974.
7. The Conference on International Economic Cooperation, also known as the North-South Conference, met in Paris from December 1975 until June 3, 1977.
8. See footnote 6, Document 235.