Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

313. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, November 7, 1978, 0815Z

10929. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Under Secretary Benson’s Meeting With Agha Shahi. Ref: (A) Islamabad 10882;² (B) Islamabad 10928.³

1. Summary: At President Zia’s direction, Agha Shahi met with Under Secretary Benson November 6 (he returned a day early from Paris for the meeting) to continue discussions previously held between Benson and President, and with Defense Secretary General Jilani. Shahi gave impressive, if one-sided, review of US-Pak relations, Pakistan’s security concerns and desire for greater US military assistance, and GOP views on possible restructuring of regional security arrangements including CENTO. New element in Shahi’s presentation, absent from earlier discussions with Zia and Jilani, was Shahi’s assertion that Pakistan has “rightful expectation” of “free” military assistance under terms of 1959 bilateral agreement whose continued validity US has reaffirmed. Under Secretary reiterated US support for Pakistan, explained US position on arms sales (including decision not to sell aircraft more advanced than F–5E and non-availability of grant MAP) and expressed willingness to consider proposals for strengthening CENTO or other regional security arrangements. End summary.

2. GOP view of US-Pak relations—Shahi gave lucid but one-sided review of US-Pak relations since early 60s with heavy emphasis on devastating effects for Pak security of virtual ten year embargo on provision of major military equipment. Shahi noted prolonged period of perplexity on part of GOP as to US intentions toward Pakistan and continued uncertainty. Referring to his March 1978 meeting with National Security Adviser Brzezinski,⁴ Shahi claimed US was placing all its security eggs for this region in Iranian and Indian baskets. GOP had thus concluded US was no longer interested in Pakistan and was prepared to see it “fend for itself”. Under prodding from Amb Hummel, Shahi acknowledged that Under Secretary Newsom’s visit,⁵ his October 18 speech on the region⁶ and Mrs. Benson’s visit were all concrete manifestations of US interest and indicated a positive trend in US policy.

3. Shahi said it is up to US to define US-Pak relations and that Pakistan will have to adjust to US definition, and then see what else it can do to fill security needs not met in context of relations with US. Shahi said that Pakistan was greatly disquieted by developments in Africa, Red Sea area, and more immediately in Afghanistan and Iran. GOP was pleased to see US also disturbed by these developments, but felt that US concern had not yet led to commensurate support for Pakistan. US policy of sole reliance on Iran and India for area security was not viable because (a) Iran is in period of what may be prolonged instability and (b) India will never move to check Soviet expansion in area. In these circumstances Pakistan must have military assistance from US. With our explicit reaffirmation of validity of ’59 bilateral agreement,⁷ which Pakistan believes embodies “rightful expectation” of “free” military assistance from US, he hoped for more forthcoming US posture. Shahi noted congressional problems, said GOP understands them, but urged that administration agree in principle to meet Pak security needs and then work on strategy to achieve congressional support. Shahi noted GOP disappointment over negative US position on aircraft and tanks for Pakistan, and said Pakistan particularly wants US equipment because of relatively low cost for end-items and maintenance, which he contrasted with very high cost French equipment.

4. In response Under Secretary reiterated continuing US support for Pakistan’s independence and security, as most recently expressed in November 3 letter to President Zia⁸ and noted that her purpose in visiting Pakistan was to help establish new and realistic relationship between our governments. She noted she had discussed previous day with Defense Secretary list of military items which could be sold to Pakistan, including our F–5E offer which remains open. In spite of our inability to meet requests for more advanced aircraft such as F–16, Benson noted we would have no objection if Pakistan looked elsewhere and indicated our willingness to try to help Pakistan find financial backing for military purchase from mutual friends such as Saudis. On tanks, Under Secretary noted that US had none to spare from current inventories, and that lead times [garble] very long from production line. In response to query about possible third country transfer of M–48 tanks, Benson noted this hypothetical issue had not been addressed but said USG would be willing to consider specific request if GOP found some available (FRG is apparently potential source for Pakistan, according to Shahi). Responding to Shahi’s points about congressional difficulties on arms sales, Under Secretary emphasized that these are very real at present, particularly with regard to grant and credit assistance, but that President was committed to maintain relations with allies and was prepared to do battle with Congress when required, as was demonstrated with lifting of Turkish arms embargo.

5. CENTO and regional security—Under Secretary urged GOP to look very carefully at CENTO before taking any decisions. She argued that it would be a serious mistake for any of members to weaken it at this time and would give the wrong signal to the Soviets. Benson explained that US is prepared to consider proposals to strengthen CENTO and is willing to cooperate in devising new means to serve purposes members agree they may want. Alternatively, we would be prepared to collaborate on working out regional arrangements acceptable to all.

6. Shahi welcomed indications that US is prepared to consider proposals for strengthening CENTO and said GOP will give intensive thought to this possibility and to evolution of possible substitute for CENTO. GOP will consult with others in area on these points. Following long discussion on attitudes in area towards alliances and pacts (mostly negative in his view), Shahi clearly spelled out fundamental GOP view on CENTO: as long as CENTO fails to deal with contingencies such as arose in the 1971 dismemberment of Pakistan by India, backed by Soviet Union, CENTO can give Pakistan no security. Shahi also spoke about appeal of Non-Aligned Movement for Pakistan in security terms, asserting that NAM solidarity might provide more meaningful political support for Pakistan against Soviet threat than CENTO can. Shahi concluded by noting that “security is our touchstone” in assessing all its relationships with rest of the world.

7. Subsequently at Amb’s dinner for Benson, Agha Shahi made particular point of telling Benson of GOP’s appreciation for US offers responsive, at least in part, to Pak military and security requirements, as well as for Washington efforts to re-examine situation in area, and for Benson’s visit to Pakistan.

Hummel

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780459–0621. Secret; Priority. Sent for information to Ankara, Kabul, London, Karachi, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, CINCPAC, and CINCEUR.
2. See Document 312.
3. See footnote 4, Document 312.
4. See Document 274.
5. See Documents 293 and 294.
6. Newsom gave a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on October 18. Newsom outlined the following six policy objectives vis-à-vis the South Asia region: “to encourage and strengthen independent nations, free from domination by outside powers; to assist, through investment, trade and, where appropriate, aid in the economic and social development of these nations; to encourage regional cooperation in overcoming common economic and security problems and in resolving disputes and conflicts among the states of the region; to respond appropriately to the defense needs of these nations; to insure that the development of peaceful nuclear technology is consistent with nonproliferation; and to encourage the observance of human rights, in all aspects—political, social, and economic.” (Department of State Bulletin, December 1978, pp. 52–55)
7. In a November 3 meeting with Yaqub Khan, Saunders again affirmed that “the 1959 agreement remains in effect.” (Telegram 280861 to Islamabad, November 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780455–0311)
8. See Document 311.