294. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
6910. From Under Secretary Newsom. Subject: Under Secretary Newsom Final Meeting With Gen. Zia.
1. Summary. In my 75-minute final session with him on July 16,2 Chief Martial Law Administrator General Zia-ul-Haq insisted on inability of any Government of Pakistan to agree to stop reprocessing project, explained again GOP conclusions that even if they did, they would not get sufficient economic and military support for their needs, described some aspects of their proposed feelers to Soviets, and assured us that he would not cause detriment to USG position with respect to Soviets. End summary.
2. I began final session with Gen. Zia (Amb. Hummel, Agha Shahi, Shahnawaz present) with brief summary of my conversations with other GOP officials during the day (septels)3 and expressing appreciation for full and frank discussions.
3. Zia reiterated inability of any government in Pakistan to cancel the reprocessing plant. Bhutto had blown the issue out of all proportion, and now the people are convinced not only that the plant is a symbol [Page 696] of independence from foreign pressures but also confuse it with the ability to generate electric power. Zia had consulted political leaders, and they all agreed that it was impossible even to postpone the plant. Public opinion would be outraged, and there is no way to explain why a project considered essential and prestigious has been traded for some military hardware.
4. I asked if explanations that new power generation plants would be built would clear up the confusion and ease public concern. Zia said the issue had become too acute to be explained that way. He said he knows that Shah intends to have seven power plants without any reprocessing, but even that fact would not convince the public that Pakistan does not need one. The Shah had put considerable pressure on the GOP to cancel, but King Khalid had not made any conditions concerning the plant.
5. Zia said that while he “bore no grudge” against the USG, and had appreciated the sincerity and openness with which I and others had discussed US policies, he had to say he thought it morally wrong and unfair for the USG to make its support conditional on cancelling reprocessing. Pakistan faces a clear and new threat and hopes for US support but instead has been given an unacceptable ultimatum. Anyway, it seems that even in the best of circumstances, the combined efforts of USG, PRC (which had given considerable military help), Iran and others, would not produce the large amounts of military aid that Pakistan would need to handle its own security. Basically what is needed is firm USG support with unmistakable guarantees of territorial integrity that would be credible as deterrent against Afghan encroachments. There is no use in relying on Iran; for one thing Iran’s army is new, unbloodied in any way, and the Shah’s attitude does not give confidence. Pakistan is basically Western-oriented, but it has concluded it cannot rely on the West and must seek other means of bolstering security.
6. I asked what he would consider his priority needs, if the reprocessing problem were solved. He said he has no exaggerated ideas such as 500 tanks. His first priority would be warships, then aircraft for the obsolete air force (stipulating he needed no long-range strike aircraft), and then equipment for ground forces (in which field he also hoped to develop indigenous production capabilities for self-reliance). I said the USG could earmark three ships if the major problem disappeared. I asked if he would wish to have F–5s, but he said he would rather have Mirage-Fives. (Comment: This is contrary to what we understand to be Pak Air Force view.) He said he has [garble] of acquiring sufficient arms from traditional friends, had concluded that USG lacks the will to counter the Soviets, and so would have to explore other policies.
7. I asked if he thought some combination of support from Iran, and the Saudis, which we could try to stimulate might meet the immedi [Page 697] ate needs. He said he would be willing to have Saudi help but he would not wish to receive assistance “through Iran”. However, if there was good understanding that there would be no Pak obligation to Iran, perhaps arrangements could be made. His preference, however, would be for direct aid from the US.
8. I asked what price he expected the Soviets to exact in return for a changed attitude toward Pakistan. He said he does not know, but initially the Soviets would ask, as they had before, for Pak withdrawal from CENTO. He said wryly that if the price of Sov support is entanglement as a near-satellite, then it would be better for Pakistan to continue to “argue with the USG”. Pakistan understands the Sovs very well—and the dangers of getting involved—but everything had changed with the Afghan coup.
9. At any rate, Zia assured me, there would be no precipitate action. On CENTO Pakistan would move deliberately. He said forcefully that he would undertake no step that would be detrimental to the US position with the Soviets. I expressed appreciation.
10. I pointed out, as I had before, that many people would fail to see the logic of appeasing the Sovs, who are the cause of the trouble. This is hardly the time to be causing the dissolution of CENTO.
11. I suggested again that the reprocessing plant might be put off as a problem for a later elected government to decide on, but Zia said that even Bhutto, as powerful and dictatorial as he was, did not have the power to turn back the public opinion he had stimulated on this issue. In fact, Bhutto had decided on a full-fledged turn to Soviet support, as Zia discovered to his disgust after reading secret files. Bhutto had gone to Qaddafi of Libya, who in turn had approached Brezhnev, who promised substantial military and economic aid. Zia had questioned Qaddafi, asking what price the Soviets had demanded, but Qaddafi would not say. Bhutto’s plan was interrupted by Zia’s takeover July 5, 1977. At any rate, Zia said he has no intention of entering the close embrace of the Soviets, he has agreement from Pak political leaders, however, to explore alternatives to present policies.
12. I tried to sum up. We all understood that we were not engaged in a bargaining session—of exchanging quids pro quo. What I had said about CENTO and the effect of a Pak withdrawal was not a demand. I could not hold out any hope that US policies on reprocessing would change, but as I understood it, Pakistan felt the following needs, some of which the USG might be willing to consider if there is no reprocessing:
(A) Recognition of its frontiers as inviolable and a pledge of support if the frontier was violated. (I said I had it pointed out to me that it had been soft [some?] time since the USG had reaffirmed its recognition of the Durand Line); (b) US participation in strengthening Pakistan’s defense capabilities with modern equipment for naval, air, and ground [Page 698] forces—(in which, because USG is no longer in the grant military aid business, we could supply some credits but mostly had to do cash sales); (c) USG encouragement of Saudi and Iranian willingness to help bay the bills; and (d) a substantial and meaningful level of economic assistance.
13. Zia agreed this was a good summary, thanked me for giving the opportunity for frank and useful discussions, and reiterated his desire to retain good relations with the US despite the differences that separate our policies.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–2305, P850103–2299. Secret; Priority; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information to Tehran, New Delhi, Kabul, Ankara, Paris, London, Moscow, and Jidda.↩
- For a summary of Newsom and Zia’s first session, see Document 293.↩
- See Document 293.↩