Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

274. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 23, 1978, 9:35–10:10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• DR. BRZEZINSKI
• TOM THORNTON (Note Taker)
• AGHA SHAHI—de facto Foreign Minister of Pakistan
• AMBASSADOR YAQUB KHAN
• MINISTER HAYAT MEHDI

SUBJECT

• Call By Agha Shahi

Agha Shahi opened with compliments to the United States on the Middle East policy—for taking Israel head on despite domestic problems. He said everyone was impressed by this but he was becoming despondent because of lack of results.

Brzezinski said one should not be despondent since we are aiming for an overall achievement not simply piecemeal steps. This meant that there would not be short term results. The step-by-step process under Kissinger had been appropriate for its time although perhaps some additional movement after 1973 would have been possible. Brzezinski had in fact just left a meeting between the President and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at which the President said frankly there is now a basic disagreement between the United States and Israel. One of the Senators there, a super supporter of Israel, had told the President he thought we were on the verge of something major. Remember that President Carter likes to tackle big problems head on like Panama and the Arab-Israeli issue. The whole world stands to gain from the settlement.

Shahi then moved to his main topic of concern; matters relating to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Pakistan is deeply concerned over India’s capability and has repeatedly raised the question of getting better guarantees from the nuclear weapons states. The question of positive guarantees is very difficult, including under Article 51,² and Security Council statements are not binding. Pakistan is looking for a way to strengthen these and find means that would prevent nuclear weapons states from threatening non-nuclear weapons states. It recognizes that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is able to accept a simple formulation because of the situation in Western Europe. Pakistan therefore developed a formula year before last that nuclear weapons states would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states not allied with super powers. It welcomed our abstention on this. Shahi pointed out that we should realize the alternative formula favored by the non-aligned (nuclear weapons states should not threaten non-nuclear weapons states that do not have nuclear weapons stationed on their territory) would get overwhelming support in the UN. Therefore we should favor the Pakistani formulation. Pakistan believes that our formula should now be pursued at the SSOD.

Brzezinski asked how this would affect a North Korean attack on South Korea.

Shahi was obviously not prepared to answer and said the formulation might have to be altered to take this kind of circumstance into consideration. He offered to discuss this with us bilaterally. At Brzezinski’s request he then restated the formulation as follows:

Nuclear weapons states undertake not to threaten the use of or to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states who are not parties to a security arrangement of a nuclear weapons state.

Brzezinski pointed out that the DPRK is actually covered by a Soviet Treaty.

Shahi reiterated Pakistan’s serious concern in the matter and pointed out it would be the first meaningful step taken in the UN in 30 years in this area.

Brzezinski said that last year at the UN the President had undertaken not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons unless we were first attacked.³ He said that the Pakistani formula sounds ingenuous and we will want to explore it further and very seriously.

Shahi then moved to the question of the nuclear weapons free zone, pointing out that India opposes this but did abstain last year while the US and UK voted in favor.⁴ Pakistan does not however expect to succeed in this area. It had proposed to India as a first step that all South Asian countries should commit themselves multilaterally not to acquire nuclear weapons. Even though India had said as much unilaterally it refused to do this. Shahi was deeply concerned about India’s un-safeguarded nuclear facilities and estimated that India has some 12 to 36 nuclear weapons. Therefore they are very interested in the formula they will propose at the SSOD. Brzezinski again undertook to explore it and said it sounded promising.

Shahi turned to a third point; Pakistan’s concern at the tilting balance in favor of the Soviet Union. Pakistan feels defenseless and is under great Soviet pressure, for instance, not to reinvigorate CENTO. India is virtually a super power and is now going to acquire deep penetration strike aircraft.⁵

Brzezinski pointed out that India, not without encouragement, has marginally moderated its relations with the Soviets. We understand Pakistan’s deep concern but believe that the situation is now better balanced with a more non-aligned India, a stronger Iran, and, potentially, development towards a stronger internal situation in Pakistan. We will of course help matters along from the outside as best we can. Ours is however a world of regional powers and it’s diversity and nationalism that keeps the Soviets in check. Military strength is of course also important.

Shahi contested Brzezinski’s view that there has been a shift in India but at that point the meeting broke up because Brzezinski had to go to the President.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 95, Pakistan: 4/77–12/78. Confidential. Copies were sent to Brzezinski, Aaron, Huntington, Matthews, and Armacost. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office.
2. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter safeguards a state’s right of individual or collective self-defense in the event of armed aggression.
3. In his October 4, 1977, address to the 32nd United Nations General Assembly, Carter pledged: “In order to reduce the reliance of nations on nuclear weaponry, I hereby solemnly declare on behalf of the United States that we will not use nuclear weapons except in self-defense; that is in circumstances of an actual nuclear or conventional attack on the United States, our territories, or Armed Forces, or such an attack on our allies.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, p. 1722)
4. See Document 4.
5. See footnotes 8 and 9, Document 96.