293. Editorial Note
During his visit to Islamabad July 15–16, 1978, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom had a number of discussions with Pakistani officials. On July 15, Newsom met with Pakistani Foreign Secretary Sardar Shahnawaz at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss regional issues. Citing the situation in Afghanistan, Shahnawaz described Pakistan as “both threatened and friendless.” Shahnawaz also warned Newsom that Pakistan “sees recent events as unprecedented and fulfillment of ‛ancient Russian dream’ of driving toward Indian Ocean. GOP sees developments in Horn, Southern Yemen, and Afghanistan as part of same Soviet plan.” Newsom said that he had recommended that the United States should be “‘cautiously positive’ [Page 694] toward Afghanistan until (and unless) they prove themselves to be other than genuinely non-aligned. He said Afghans are still feeling their way, regime is not solidly in place, and they are moving slowly—whether of their own or Soviet volition.” (Telegram 6914 from Islamabad, July 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780292–0992) Newsom visited Kabul July 13–14 and met with President Taraki and Foreign Minister Amin. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume XII, Afghanistan, Document 26.
On the morning of July 16, Newsom met with Ghulam Ishaq, Pakistani Minister of Finance, Planning, and Coordination, and the “senior-most” Minister in Pakistani Chief Marital Law Administrator Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s Cabinet. Ishaq and Newsom discussed the reprocessing issue. Newsom described U.S. flexibility on this issue as “virtually non-existent.” When asked to explain the purpose and the economics of the reprocessing plant, Ishaq asserted that the plant was tied to Pakistan’s energy needs and he “denied flatly any purpose other than peaceful uses.” Ishaq reminded Newsom that Pakistan had offered “to put the reprocessing plant under whatever safeguards anyone wants in order to prevent a surreptitious diversion of plutonium.” Following a brief discussion regarding the Glenn Amendment and U.S. aid to Pakistan, Ishaq contended that “present US policies do not appear to be conducive to maintaining Pakistan as an independent entity. Speaking personally, he said it seems to him that ‛Pakistan no longer finds a place in the book of US priorities.’” (Telegram 6904 from Islamabad, July 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780292–0865)
On July 16, Newsom also met with Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, who “in a more than usually feisty mood, repeated familiar litany of lack of US support for Pakistan. He noted that in face of new realities, internationally and in the region, only option that now seems open to Pakistan is to withdraw from CENTO,” the Central Treaty Organization. Newsom countered that the United States could help Pakistan after the reprocessing issue was resolved. Shahi “responded brusquely that it is politically impossible to give up reprocessing plant. He implied that even if GOP did do so, the items we could offer, including the F–5E, would be insufficient and not help Pakistan build a modern defensive structure.” (Telegram 6931 from Islamabad, July 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780292–0958)
Later on July 16, Newsom and Zia held the first of two meetings. Zia argued that the U.S. position regarding the planned Pakistani reprocessing plant was clearly discriminatory. After Zia expressed doubts about the value of CENTO, Newsom replied that Pakistan might make “overtures to the Soviets as one means of relieving expected pressures. We are certain that in current situation Pakistan would not wish to give [Page 695] Soviets impression their tactics are successfully turning other countries from the West. A withdrawal form CENTO under these circumstances could give this impression. The central question is how the USG and GOP can restore our previous close relations to our mutual benefit. We know our non-proliferation policies cause problems for the GOP but we are firmly committed to this policy world-wide. In view of immediate defense priorities we suggest the GOP might consider suspension of work on the reprocessing plant or its ultimate cancellation.” Zia then returned to discussing CENTO before he closed the conversation. (Telegram 6874 from Islamabad, July 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780292–0207)