312. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
10882. PACOM and EUCOM for POLADs. Subject: Meeting Between President Zia ul-Haq and Under Sec Benson.
1. Under Secretary Benson, accompanied by Ambassador Hummel and Les Brown, met for over an hour with President Zia evening of 4 November. Meeting was followed by a small dinner. Present at pre-dinner session was Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz, MGen. Arif (Chief of Staff to President) and MFA notetaker Touqir; Arif and Shahnawaz were joined on Pak side by Defense Secretary Jilant and Atomic Energy Chief Munir Khan for dinner.
2. Benson opened discussion by drawing on points contained in scope paper,2 as amended by State 280774,3 emphasizing that the pur [Page 729] pose of her mission was to obtain Pakistani views on security problems in the region and to open a frank dialogue on military supply matters. Benson reviewed items we are prepared to lay before Congress in January and informed Paks of our negative decision on F–16’s and F–18’s in the present circumstances. (The question of A–7’s did not arise, although it did loom up on following day in session with Defense Secretary Jilani (septel).4
3. President Zia’s response was somewhat rambling and unfocused. His major theme was the apparent inability of the U.S. to face its responsibilities to the free world, and particularly to the small countries within it, and Pakistan’s inability to find out exactly how it stood in its relationship with the U.S. He rhetorically asked whether Pakistan could expect a warm handsake or a cold touch. He expressed great concern about events in Iran, and he pointed out that Pakistan should become more important to U.S. interests if the Iranian Government suffers sharp change or becomes weak. He and Shahnawaz outlined in familiar terms Pakistan’s perceptions of future threats to regional stability that they predicted would come in due course from Afghanistan and might also come from India.
4. Among the more interesting specific points made by Zia were the following:
A. Economic development is more important than military strength for Pakistan and Pakistan is interested in acquiring indigenous defense production capabilities as well as military end items. (This subject arose again the following morning with Defense Secretary Jilani but the only production request made by Jilani was for fuses for 106 mm recoilless rifle ammunition; see septel.)
B. The Chinese had provided “billions, not millions, of dollars” of military equipment following 1966 but “haven’t asked for a penny in repayment.” By contrast, Zia noted that in the thirty months since his deputy went to the U.S. in 1975, not very much had been received by Pakistan. He remarked that he finds it difficult to explain this to his troops. Amb Hummel interjected at this point that the General should tell his troops that the United States had provided TOWs, AIM–9 missiles, two destroyers, and a number of other things.
[Page 730]C. The Army, according to Zia, is more important than the Air Force in terms of Pakistan’s defenses, and therefore primary emphasis should be given to ground force equipment.
D. In the context of discussing the limitations of CENTO, Zia stated that Pakistan could not align itself with the Soviets since picking up the Soviet option would “foreclose” all other Pak options. Zia reiterated his previous assurances that the GOP would do nothing quickly in regard to CENTO and, in any event, would do nothing to damage U.S. interests.
E. He stressed, as did others, that Pakistan has no desire to seek parity with Indian power, but only wants to maintain a credible deterrent against Indian or Afghan/Soviet military action.
5. Shahnawaz had little to say in the course of discussion but tended to echo the President’s theme about the uncertainty of the U.S. Pakistani relationship, in the light of regional uncertainties.
6. In response to Benson’s remarks about U.S. interest in human rights and in narcotics control, Zia expressed his comprehension of strong U.S. views. He said his govt is thoroughly mindful of the rights of its citizens and is taking only minimal steps to curtail free debate and action, consistent with the maintenance of public order. He cited his observation of a village called Gupis in the far northern Gilgit area, where many of the inhabitants are opium addicts, and expressed his determination to curtail production and trafficking. He said he had personally refused a recent request by some of the villagers in the NWFP for permission to plant opium.
7. Comment: Zia had obviously been forewarned of negative decision on aircraft more advanced than F–5E’s, and chose to discuss broader issues rather than specific items of military hardware. He was cordial and attentive, but seemed somewhat tired (it was the eve of his departure for a Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca at the invitation of Saudi Prince Fahd.)
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780457–0503. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Ankara, Kabul, Karachi, London, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, CINCPAC, and CINCEUR.↩
- Not found.↩
- In telegram 280774 to Islamabad, November 4, the Department informed Benson and Hummel that authorization to offer Pakistan TOW-mounted helicopters or additional F5–Es beyond the 40 already approved (see Document 292) had not yet been obtained. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780455–0219)↩
- In telegram 10928 from Islamabad, November 7, the Embassy reported on Benson’s November 5 meeting with Jilani. After laying out what types of military hardware the United States was and was not prepared to sell to Pakistan (Benson specifically indicated that the United States was “not prepared to make available” F–16s, F–18s, and A–7s), the discussion centered on the F5–E, which the Pakistani officials regarded as inadequate in light of India’s recent purchase of British Jaguar aircraft. The Pakistanis agreed to create a list of U.S. military equipment that they desired and that complied with U.S. arms sales policy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780459–0098)↩