Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

46. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

DISCUSSION PAPER

SUBJECT

• The Western Sahara and U.S. Arms Transfer Policy Toward Morocco

THE ISSUE

Building on the discussion at the PRC meeting held on September 21, we need to decide whether and how to revise our arms policy toward Morocco in the context of our western Saharan peace strategy, our regional objectives, and the latest Saudi request that we supply arms to Morocco on an emergency basis.²

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

The basic choices we face are the same as those presented in the discussion paper for the September 21 PRC meeting. (Tab A is a record of that meeting plus its discussion paper, without annexes.)³ However, since that meeting we have obtained more precise statements of policy from Algeria and Morocco and from certain interested third parties.

1. U.S. Strategy for Peace

The Secretary’s bilateral talks with the Foreign Ministers of various concerned governments, summarized at Tab B,⁴ suggested widespread agreement that a military solution of the western Sahara conflict is not in the cards, the present situation is becoming increasingly dangerous, and a need for a peaceful resolution of the dispute is becoming correspondingly more urgent. Some of the most concerned parties (France, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia) insisted that the first priority was to strengthen Morocco’s military position vis-a-vis the Polisario; only after that would meaningful negotiations become possible.⁵ Spain and the Ivory Coast favored a negotiated solution or referendum as a means of addressing the problem. While Mali and Liberia have a neutral policy, they have asked us to influence Hassan to be more flexible, and they would both oppose any liberalization of our military supply policy.

Neither Morocco nor Algeria has signaled to us that they are willing to change their negotiating postures significantly enough to open the way to meaningful negotiations.⁶ And Algeria has warned that increased U.S. arms supply to Morocco will further complicate efforts aimed at finding a negotiated solution, and also hurt U.S.-Algerian bilateral relations. Algerian President Bendjedid has told us (and says he has told the Saudis and Tunisians as well) that he is willing to discuss peace personally with Hassan only if the Polisario is involved, and that he will meet with Hassan on bilateral issues only if some agreed agenda or working paper has been developed in advance to serve as a basis for the discussions.⁷ Given his previous position on these issues, the Algerian proposal is not deemed likely to be accepted by Hassan.

The principal recent development on the military front was that Morocco turned back a major Polisario attack on Smara, the second largest town in the western Sahara, October 6–7. Both sides took casualties, but the battle was probably a psychological victory for the Polisario.⁸

Nothing has happened to alter our earlier view that the U.S. should continue to stay out of any direct mediatory role,⁹ and should not take any explicit position on the ultimate nature of a settlement, at least at this time. We are, however, increasingly disposed to ease our policy on direct substantive contact with Polisario leaders and to further relax restrictions on official travel to the western Sahara.

2. U.S. Arms Transfers to Morocco

The most significant development in the past several weeks on this front has been the extent to which the Saudis have made clear to us that the degree of our support for Hassan is a matter of intense concern to them.¹⁰ In two demarches they made several days ago (Tab C)¹¹ they stressed the urgent Moroccan need for arms and ammunition and took the unusual step of offering to bankroll our arms transfers to Morocco on the condition that they have an early impact on Morocco’s military capabilities against the Polisario. The Saudi proposal demands an early substantive response. That response need not be confined to the military supply issue but can presumably also be designed to encourage economic cooperation and in particular further Saudi initiatives with both Algeria and Morocco to bring about negotiations.¹² We would also wish to convey our decision on military supply policy to Algeria, Morocco, and third parties in ways which would encourage negotiations.

DOD/ISA Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Murray leaves October 16 for Jidda, where he can discuss seriously with the Saudis our assessment of the military situation in Morocco and the Sahara. The Saudis will expect him to discuss also what we are prepared to do for Morocco. The outcome of the present PRC meeting could constitute the basis for this brief,¹³ which we shall cable him as soon as possible after the meeting.

The Congressional situation has changed slightly. The SFRC still favors by a close margin a partial relaxation of our policy, perhaps up to but clearly not including sale of OV–10 aircraft.¹⁴ However, Senator Muskie, who voted for relaxation, now appears to be between options one and two. HFAC Africa Subcommittee Chairman Solarz maintains he will fight any relaxation, and will, if necessary, introduce legislation to this effect.¹⁵ HFAC Mid-East Subcommittee Chairman Hamilton will agree to only a very slight shift, one his staff characterizes as option 1½. Thus a move to the OV–10 or to explicit support of Morocco in the Sahara war would generate resolutions of disapproval in both responsible committees and a major floor fight.¹⁶

OPTIONS BEFORE THE PRC

The immediate questions are whether we should do something in concert with the Saudis to show support for Hassan, and whether we should openly support Hassan in the Sahara.

1. First Option: Continuation of Existing Policy

While we have not supported Hassan’s objectives in the Sahara, we have over the past year acted positively on several Moroccan requests for equipment not precluded under the existing, restrictive policy. There are other items we could sell, such as additional tanks, which would enhance Morocco’s ability to defend itself against a conventional attack from Algeria, but these are not high on Morocco’s list of priorities when it is so heavily engaged against the Polisario. Moreover, Saudi financing could be necessary for some purchases, and the Saudis would probably not be interested if Hassan was not. In short, there is more we could do under this option to show support for Morocco, but we might have to finance it ourselves, and neither Morocco nor the Saudis would consider it particularly helpful.¹⁷ Other arguments for and against this option remain as described in Tab A.

2. Second Option: Partial Relaxation

This would involve an attempt to send political and military signals of support for Hassan and Morocco that would go far enough beyond the present policy to be seen both by the Moroccans and the Saudis as responsive to their most important needs and requirements¹⁸ without associating us openly with Hassan’s objectives in the Sahara. We would still pursue the actions described under option one to strengthen Morocco’s defense against a conventional Algerian attack, mindful that the Saudis do not share our distinction between military supply for use to defend Morocco versus supply for prosecution of the war against the Polisario in the western Sahara. We would exchange with the Saudis assessments of the domestic political and the military situations facing Hassan. We would want to be sure that they understand our concern that the war is not winnable militarily and that additional equipment will have at best only a marginal effect on the fighting. We could emphasize the difference between support for Hassan and support for his Saharan objectives, and we could raise the possibility of increased Saudi economic aid to Morocco. With this assessment as a background we would press for further Saudi efforts to facilitate a negotiated solution, making clear to the Saudis that we believe such a solution will require significant Moroccan as well as Algerian/Polisario concessions. Assuming the Saudis are willing to undertake such an effort, we would consider on a case by case basis proposals that go beyond those in option one but not going as far as to associate ourselves explicitly with Moroccan objectives in the Sahara. We would explain to the Moroccans that our position on the sovereignty issue remained unchanged, that no military solution was possible, and that it was incumbent on all concerned to work for a negotiated settlement. We would also intensify our consultations with Algeria, France, Spain, the OAU and other parties. In this regard we might consider a fresh OAU effort as suggested by Liberian Foreign Minister Dennis.

We would have to discuss with the Saudis and with the Moroccans specific actions to be considered under the case by case approach. These might include supply of items as indicated on pages 4 and 5 of the discussion paper at Tab A. However, both the Moroccans and Saudis would presumably want to give more priority to equipment and training that would have an effect in the Sahara in the short term, i.e. in about six months. Some examples are contained in the upper two thirds of the list at Tab D.¹⁹

Principal arguments for and against this option remain as stated in Tab A, with the added point that we now have an important Saudi interest in a shift in U.S. military supply policy but also recognizing that this option may not go far enough to satisfy the Saudis.

3. Third Option: Explicit Association with Morocco in the Sahara

Under this option we would still not try to assist Hassan achieve a military victory since we all agree this is not possible. We would remain committed to our present position on the sovereignty issue and on the need for a negotiated solution. However, by providing equipment and training primarily suited for the kind of war Morocco is waging against the Polisario, we would associate ourselves more explicitly with Hassan’s objectives in the Sahara in the hope that this a) would strengthen Hassan’s military position and that b) this would lead him to negotiate rather than continuing to seek a military victory. The Saudis would clearly prefer this option.²⁰

Here again, the basic arguments are as stated in the discussion paper at Tab A. For more immediate impact than items such as the OV–10 aircraft would have, we might provide some training and equipment listed at the bottom of the table at Tab D. (While any increase in U.S. presence would be sensitive, counterinsurgency training would be particularly touchy.)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 127, 10/16/79, North Africa. Secret. Prepared for the October 16 PRC meeting; see Document 47.
2. See Document 42. An unknown hand underlined “we need to decide whether and how to revise our arms policy toward Morocco in the context of our western Saharan peace strategy, our regional objectives, and the latest Saudi request that we supply arms to Morocco on an emergency basis.” Telegram 7052 from Jidda, October 8, reported: “Naif stated that in view of the serious situation facing Morocco, Saudi Arabia was prepared on an urgent basis to fund the military assistance Morocco needs to defend itself and to reestablish a military balance in the region. Crown Prince believes this will not be possible without full U.S. assistance. What the Crown Prince wants to know as soon as possible is whether the U.S. is willing in principle to furnish military equipment to Morocco in an expeditious manner (i.e. including from U.S. stocks).” (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 127, 10/16/79, North Africa)
3. Not attached; the discussion paper is printed as Document 41.
4. Tab B, an undated paper entitled “Positions on Western Saharan Conflict Expressed by Concerned Parties During and Since Meeting with Secretary at UNGA,” is attached but not printed.
5. An unknown hand underlined this sentence. See footnote 4, Document 42.
6. An unknown hand underlined this sentence. See Documents 43 and 45.
7. See footnote 3, Document 44.
8. An unknown hand underlined “The principal recent development on the military front was that Morocco turned back a major Polisario attack on Smara” and “the battle was probably a psychological victory for the Polisario.”
9. An unknown hand underlined “Nothing has happened to alter our earlier view that that U.S. should continue to stay out of any direct mediatory role.”
10. An unknown hand underlined this sentence.
11. Tab C, copies of telegrams 7052 and 7118 from Jidda, is not printed. See footnote 2 above. Telegram 7118 from Jidda, October 10, is in the (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 127, 10/16/79, North Africa)
12. An unknown hand underlined this sentence.
13. An unknown hand underlined “DOD/ISA Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Murray leaves October 16 for Jidda” and “The outcome of the present PRC meeting could constitute the basis for this brief.”
14. An unknown hand underlined this sentence.
15. An unknown hand underlined “Solarz maintains he will fight any relaxation, and will, if necessary, introduce legislation to this effect.”
16. An unknown underlined this sentence and wrote beneath it: “unsubstantiated!” The September 21 letter to Carter from Javits and Church, the September 19 letter to Carter from Solarz, and the September 19 letter to Vance from Hamilton are all attached at Tab E. Solarz’s and Hamilton’s letters are printed as Documents 245 and 246.
17. An unknown hand underlined “neither Morocco nor the Saudis would consider it particularly helpful.”
18. An unknown hand underlined this sentence up to this point, placed an asterisk in the left-hand margin, and wrote at the bottom of the page: “* Problem: nothing we have seen or heard suggests that the Moroccans would be happy with anything but the OV–10!”
19. Tab D is attached but not printed.
20. An unknown hand underlined this sentence and wrote “Also the French” in the margin next to it.