Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

245. Letter From Representative Lee Hamilton to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, September 19, 1979

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I would like to offer you some comments and thoughts on how U.S. policy might help move the situation in the Western Sahara toward a peaceful solution. I appreciate the way in which the State Department has consulted with Congress on this issue and I trust you will find our input helpful.

Recent information from press reports and our intelligence community indicate to me that the situation in the Western Sahara is evolving:

—Mauritania has signed a peace agreement with the Polisario and several thousand Moroccan troops have apparently been withdrawn from Mauritania;

—The war is not a stalemate, it is not now going in Morocco’s favor;

—Morocco is now using a defensive “garrison” strategy, the offensive “hot pursuit” strategy appears to have failed;

—The costs to Morocco of the war are increasing financially and politically and in terms of losses of military equipment and men;

—Middle and low-level military seem to want out of the war;

—What started as a popular movement for Moroccans and the King in late 1975 has now turned into a risky venture in which many, including perhaps the King himself, perceive the monarchy to be in trouble, and under attack;

—King Hassan has been angered by American refusal of arms for the Sahara war but at the same time he seems to appreciate the fact that U.S. arms cannot turn the war around in his favor;

—The U.S. has not had close or frank relations with the King [illegible].

—Polisario attacks into southern Morocco have shaken an awareness of the war into the Moroccan people and changed their attitude toward accepting a settlement.

The conclusion that I draw from this information is that the war is now a grave political liability for King Hassan and U.S. policy, while it should be supportive of the King personally, should not be supportive of his efforts in the Sahara. We need the confidence of the King to persuade him to modify a disastrous policy.

It is part of my assessment of the situations in Iran and Nicaragua, situations which eroded so quickly, that we failed to deal firmly and frankly with long time friends: we were often prisoners of their whims and policies. I was dismayed to learn from others who attended the July 24th hearing of Assistant Secretary Hal Saunders before the Solarz subcommittee that we have not discussed the Western Sahara problem with King Hassan for over a year.² If that report is correct then I would urge you to begin talks with him as soon as possible.

I do feel that we can urge King Hassan to accept a peaceful solution as a way of maintaining our support and friendship. King Hassan must now have some understanding of the multiplying political risks to him of not resolving peacefully the Western Sahara issue. His recent press conference indicating that chances were now more favorable for talks with Algeria on the Western Sahara certainly should be taken as an encouraging sign and we should follow up on it with an active, positive policy posture supporting a negotiated settlement.³ If we reassure King Hassan that we can continue strong military support to Morocco for defensive purposes if the Western Sahara situation is resolved then I think we use positive leverage to achieve objectives that we should want:

—self-determination for the people of the Western Sahara achievable as outlined by the recent OAU resolution for a Western Sahara referendum;⁴

—support for and good relations with a strong, moderate Morocco free of its conflict in the Western Sahara and thereby free to play a more active role in the peace process;

—improvement in relations with Algeria;

—reassurance to African states and Middle East states that the United States is sincere in seeking peaceful solutions to regional conflicts and that the United States is willing to make a great effort to play this facilitating role.

Therefore, I would suggest a policy strategy composed of the following elements:

A. Publicly reject the sale of equipment such as the OV–10 and state why we will not sell it. We should follow a policy of modest arms sales for Morocco. Our immediate goals in our arms sales policies should be three-fold: 1.) be partially responsive to the King’s need for defensive equipment for Morocco; 2.) disassociate ourselves from his Saharan policies in strong terms but leave us with the ability to try to influence him privately; and 3.) seek to build a new confidence relationship with the King to enable us to help him out of his disastrous course in the Western Sahara;

B. Convince Morocco that self-determination of the Saharan people has not occurred but will have to occur if a settlement is to be reached. Support and explore all possible ways of achieving a settlement which guarantees self-determination for the Western Sahara but also allows King Hassan to save face in accepting it. Additional measures should be taken to try to involve third parties, particularly Spain, which have some responsibility for the existing problem and give them the support required to play a constructive role. The efforts that have been made so far are inadequate to exclude this as a possibility;

C. Seize this problem as an opportunity to work more closely with the new leadership in Algeria, establish new rapport and set our relations on a positive footing for the future. While we should not expect Algeria to be able to deliver Polisario agreement in a settlement Algeria can and should be involved in a positive way with encouragement from us;

D. Don’t ignore Mauritania. The new leadership there has chosen a difficult course in terms of its relations with Morocco by signing a peace agreement with the Polisario. The government has little leverage in the present situation. While not seeking to anger Morocco more, there must be some concrete things we could do to show some support to Mauritania;

E. Deal with the Polisario directly and involve them in any settlement plans or preparations from the outset. At a minimum our contacts and communications with the Polisario directly and through third parties,—France, Spain, U.N.,—should be sustained and more accurate;

F. Give new priority to the problem by assigning a special ambassador and team to work on the issue and as soon as possible designate a new ambassador for Morocco.

King Hassan’s Saharan dilemma has reached a critical phase. Any encouragement we give him to pursue the war against the Polisario could spell disaster for him and for our policy in the region.

I hope these suggestions and thoughts will be useful in your policy planning. Please keep me informed of developments in the Western Sahara and of any new developments in our policy.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Lee H. Hamilton
Chairman
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 127, 10/16/79, North Africa. Unclassified.
2. In telegram 196360 to Rabat, Algiers, and Nouakchott, July 28, the Department summarized the July 20 and July 24 Senate and House hearings on the Western Sahara: “Department has used these hearings to test possible congressional receptivity to a relaxation of present USG policy of not selling Morocco arms for use in Western Sahara.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790344–0085) For text of Saunders’s testimony and statement, see U.S. Policy and the Conflict in the Western Sahara: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, First Session, July 23 and 24, 1979, pp. 77–116. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979)
3. In telegram 5380 from Rabat, August 20, the Embassy reported on Hassan’s August 19 press conference. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790379–0787)
4. See footnote 4, Document 45.