43. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco1
256045. Subject: Secretary’s Bilateral With Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta.
1. (S) Entire text.
2. Summary: In September 26 discussion with the Secretary, Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta asked for U.S. support, asserting that threat to Morocco was broadening. International Communism, he said, is now actively seeking to penetrate region, exploiting Western Sahara dispute to destabilize Morocco. The Secretary informed Boucetta that he was consulting with countries interested in Western Sahara dispute. During October we hoped to conclude our military supply policy review, and would let the Moroccans know the results. He noted that we had received congressional views, with the House of Representatives coming down less positively than the Senate. Under Secretary Newsom added that our policy review is not exclusively concerned with arms supply policy but also with issue of how U.S. and others can contribute to long term stability in region. End summary.
3. Moroccan Foreign Minister called on Secretary Vance in New York September 26 for annual bilateral consultation. Ambassador to the U.S. Ali Bengelloun attended from Moroccan side; Under Secretary Newsom, AFN Director Coon and interpreter, from U.S. side. After initial courtesies, Boucetta said he wanted to talk about the serious problem Morocco faces. Morocco regards U.S. as a friend and ally it can rely on. There must continue to be a special relationship between the two countries. Morocco is being tested in the Sahara and the scope [Page 113] of the danger has increased. It is no longer Algeria versus Morocco, but more a matter of a policy designed elsewhere and being carried out in the region through Communist penetration. Morocco is defending the same values as its ally and neighbor America. Morocco wants the Secretary and President Carter to know how serious the situation has recently become. Morocco must know that it can count on U.S. support. Our relations are good but “we sense a hesitation or reticence and we would like to dispel your hesitation”. Morocco has made some proposals for purchase of certain equipment and hopes that all differences will be set aside.
4. Secretary Vance replied that the U.S. has been and remains Morocco’s staunch friend and ally. We have been following events with care, especially Morocco’s relations with Algeria and the situation in the Western Sahara. The U.S. has noted action by Mauritania and the Moroccan action that followed. We would like the Foreign Minister’s assessment: How do you view the current situation? What are Algeria’s current objectives? What is the situation on the ground in the Sahara? And how do you see the situation developing in the period immediately ahead?
5. Boucetta, in reply, said that situation at present is that the Algerian factor is being overtaken. A couple of days ago Boucetta sent a letter to the Secretary2 noting that Secretaries General of the Communist Parties of France, Spain, and Italy are meeting in Madrid. The other side gets Soviet arms “to the limit”. Meanwhile, Algeria still maintains publicly that the problem only concerns the Sahara people, not Algeria. This is not true. The question is whether Morocco will resist, or become “destabilized”, as Mauritania was. The Moroccan people stand firmly around the King and will resist Communist efforts to destabilize the region to the end.
6. Secretary Vance asked how the Foreign Minister saw this tendency manifesting itself on the ground. Boucetta replied that beginning in June there was a significant escalation of sneak attacks within Morocco’s former boundaries. Morocco was adapting to the new situation. The arms that it had were not suited for this kind of task. However, the Moroccan Army was becoming more “operational”. It was also getting more “weight” now that 10,000 soldiers formerly positioned in Mauritania, and the troops it had had in Zaire, had returned to Morocco. However, there remains the question of supply. The question of military equipment was vital.
7. In Mauritania, Boucetta continued, there are a number of pro-Polisario and pro-Communist activists supported by Algeria, Libya [Page 114] and the Iraqi Baathists. They are trying to influence the Mauritanians who see their country’s interests as requiring constructive relations with Morocco. The Mauritanian Foreign Minister will tell you about this privately, and about the need to help Morocco in order to help Mauritania—even though he can’t say this publicly.
8. The Secretary asked whether Boucetta believed the Algerians were trying to destabilize or overthrow the Government of Morocco or was that perhaps overtaken too. Boucetta replied that as an issue that was overtaken, the Communist attempt through destabilization of Morocco to extend their influence over the whole region was now the issue. Boucetta then mentioned the Tunisian invitation to Hassan and Bendjedid to get together in Tunisia. The Secretary said that the Tunisian Foreign Minister had just told him about the negative Algerian reply.3
9. The Secretary then said he wanted to tell Boucetta where the U.S. stood at present regarding its policy review, which included the subjects of the OV–10 and armed helicopters. The USG had done a great deal of work in connection with its policy review. At present the Secretary was consulting with various interested third parties as well as with the Moroccans and Algerians in talks such as these. After next week there would be another interagency meeting at which all the evidence would be reviewed. Some time in October, therefore, the USG would come to a conclusion. Meanwhile, the House and the Senate have also looked into the situation and provided their views. Boucetta said he hoped that the congressional views were positive. The Secretary said that one House was more positive than the other: the House of Representatives was less positive, though split.
10. Boucetta said Morocco must count on U.S. for physical and moral support. We saw what happened at Monrovia and Havana, where a Communist bloc animated the majority and carried with it many others of different persuasions. In view of these developments, King Hassan has worked out a diplomatic plan which he has embodied in a letter he has sent to the Chairman of the OAU. His proposal would involve all the states bordering on the Sahara, North and South, including Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad. The basic objective would be to convert this Sahara region from zone of conflict to a zone of development and peace—and thereby to oppose the Communist effort to penetrate and occupy it.
[Page 115]11. Newsom noted that our current policy review is not exclusively concerned with arms supply but also with the issue of how the U.S. and others can contribute to long-term stability in the region. The U.S. wants to discuss how the international community can contribute to a peaceful settlement. Boucetta agreed that this aspect was very important and briefly mentioned Spain. Spain, he said, is going through a difficult period. Boucetta saw the Spanish Foreign Minister earlier that day and asked him three questions: (a) Knowing Moroccans as you do, and knowing that all Moroccans support the King’s policy on the Sahara, do you really think that Morocco can be expected to give up the region? (b) Strictly in terms of Spain’s own interests, is a Moroccan presence there better or worse than some other presence? (c) When the development of the region gets into full gear, should it be with the participation of Spain, or of others? Boucetta then told the Secretary he believed firmly that if the Spaniards would cooperate, and also the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, the four together in partnership could do great things with the Western Sahara.
12. The Secretary said he had also talked to the Spanish as well as the French about the Western Sahara.4 He then recapitulated, stating that when our review was completed we would let the Moroccans know.
13. As meeting was ending, Boucetta noted that Morocco wanted to improve its relations with certain Sub-Saharan states, particularly Nigeria and Liberia. He hoped the U.S. could put in a good word to help this process along, especially with Liberia. He noted that Tolbert had made a moderate and conciliatory speech in the General Assembly shortly before.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790445–0586. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Jidda, Algiers, Nouakchott, Tunis, Cairo, Paris, Madrid, USUN, and Dakar. Sent for information Priority to Bamako, Niamey, Ndjamena, Baghdad, and Rome.↩
- Not found.↩
- No record of Vance’s meeting with Tunisian Foreign Minister Chatty was found. The Algerian reply was reported in telegram 7304 from Tunis, September 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790424–1010)↩
- See footnote 4, Document 42.↩