Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

41. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

DISCUSSION PAPER

SUBJECT

• The Western Sahara and U.S. Arms Transfer Policy Toward Morocco

THE ISSUE

To decide whether and how to revise our peace strategy and our arms policy toward Morocco in the context of our regional objectives.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

1. U.S. Objectives

—Enough attention to Hassan’s political and security concerns to restore a damaged bilateral relation with a traditionally friendly country, enabling us to discuss with him, among other things, the problems he faces in the western Sahara.

—A negotiated settlement of the western Sahara dispute that will endure and be reasonably congenial to U.S. interests. (We do not want to act toward Morocco in ways that might encourage Moroccan inflexibility on the peace issue.)

—Avoid incurring serious setbacks in our bilateral relations with Algeria.

2. Recent Developments

—Following an upsurge in Polisario attacks within Morocco’s internationally recognized boundaries, I initiated consultations with the Senate and House in late July.²

—In early August Morocco reacted to Mauritania’s decision to make a separate peace with the Polisario and withdraw from the western Sahara by unilaterally annexing the territory’s former Mauritanian sector.³

—Meanwhile the Polisario has the military advantage, even though it cannot oust Morocco from the cities in the western Sahara; internal pressures are increasing on Hassan to find a way out of the impasse (but not one under which Morocco would give up territory); and Morocco finds itself increasingly isolated diplomatically.

3. A Strategy for Peace

We believe we should continue, as in the past, to take no explicit position on the ultimate nature of the settlement; we would go along with any outcome that was agreed to by all principally concerned parties. Also, while we shall probably want to initiate direct talks with the Polisario at some point, we should not try to reach any conclusion on this until we have thought through our peace strategy in more detail (see below).

We should in addition continue to eschew a mediatory role ourselves—on grounds that we are not particularly well-positioned for the role and we already have more than enough U.S. mediating efforts in operation—but we would encourage and support efforts by other interested third parties to bring the principals to the negotiating table. We shall seek to develop a conceptual framework that will strengthen our direct diplomacy, both with the principals and with well-placed third parties, such as Saudi Arabia, France, Spain, and key OAU members.

Finally, any change in our arms transfer policy toward Morocco should be designed among other things to mesh with our peace strategy and strengthen our diplomatic efforts in Rabat, Algiers and third countries to bring the contestants to the negotiating table.

4. U.S. Arms Transfers to Morocco

(a) First Option: Stand Pat

Under this option there would be no change in our present policy of limiting arms transfers to weapons systems that clearly are not suitable for use in the western Sahara. The principal advantages of this course are that (i) the U.S. would be widely seen domestically and internationally as keeping in step with the majority that does not support Moroccan occupation of the western Sahara and has recently been disturbed by Morocco’s move into the Mauritanian sector; (ii) there would be no possible disagreement about the consistency of our policy with our 1960 bilateral agreement and U.S. law; (iii) we would avoid giving Hassan any grounds for hoping—however erroneously—that with our new weapons systems he might achieve a military victory; and (iv) our relations with the new Algerian Government would be at least unjeopardized and possibly improved. In addition, we would avoid a bruising debate in the Congress.

It can be argued, however, that the present policy has ill-served our purposes: (i) although we have tried in recent months to be responsive short of supplying Hassan with weapons systems suitable for use in the Sahara, this limitation has cost us much of our credibility or influence with Hassan, and we have gained no perceptible balancing increment of influence with the Algerians; (ii) even more serious, we have contributed to a growing Moroccan sense of international isolation that, added to other frustrations, could in time either force Hassan to move rashly against Algeria, or lead to his replacement by a possibly less prudent, as well as less pro-Western regime; (iii) significant forces, both domestic (e.g., Senators Javits and Stone) and foreign (particularly Saudi Arabia and France) are urging us to support Morocco more forthrightly.

(b) Second Option: Partial Relaxation

This would involve some relaxation in our policy strictures but stopping short of the OV–10 (third option), at least for the presently foreseeable future. The guiding principle would be that we would be prepared to be forthcoming, on a case-by-case basis, on weapons systems the Moroccans might request which were not primarily intended (as the OV–10 necessarily would be) for anti-Polisario warfare.⁴ Under this policy we would no longer construe Morocco as violating our bilateral if and when it employed such U.S. arms as we were willing to sell it in the western Sahara. Our rationale for this would be based on the need to demonstrate some reaction to recent Polisario attacks within Morocco’s internationally recognized boundaries from Algerian sanctuaries through the western Sahara. We would still not actively help Morocco with its war in the western Sahara, but would indicate to Morocco that, should a negotiated peace settlement be reached, we would then be prepared to cooperate in further strengthening their defense capability in order to ensure their security in a new political environment in the region.

It should be noted that if this option is to be effective as an adjunct to our peace strategy we shall have to maintain a degree of flexibility as to which weapons systems we consider admissible under it. For example, Polisario cessation of attacks within Morocco proper would undercut the rationale on which the option is based and suggest a more restrictive approach; while Moroccan reasonableness matched by Algerian/Polisario intransigence could necessitate moving toward greater flexibility.

The principal advantage to this option is that we would retain credible arguments to support our diplomacy in both Rabat and Algiers, as well as with interested third parties. We would of course stress the positive aspects of our policy shift with Hassan while reaffirming our conviction that in the long run Morocco’s Saharan dilemma could be resolved only through negotiations. We would try to make Algiers see that we cannot remain indifferent to a situation in which Algeria almost without restriction supports, arms, and provides sanctuary to Polisario forces while the U.S. follows a highly restrictive policy damaging to U.S.-Moroccan relations. However, we also would tell the Algerians that despite our historic ties with Morocco we had come down, after intense deliberation, in favor of what was essentially still a policy of considerable restraint. We would ask the Algerians in return to restrain the Polisario and take meaningful steps toward bringing about negotiations; we could also imply that if Algeria failed to take such steps while Morocco did make good faith efforts to negotiate a solution, we might be forced to review our policy again. Similarly, we would indicate to the Moroccans that it was difficult to urge restraint on Algeria unless the Moroccans were displaying convincing signs of flexibility. We would also indicate our support for any reasonable mediation efforts that happened to be underway at the time, consistent of course with our peace strategy as described above.

The principal drawbacks of this option are: (i) It fully satisfies neither of the interested parties, nor those who advocate U.S. actions along the lines of either Option 1 above or Option 3 below. Thus to some extent it could adversely affect U.S. relations with OAU countries, inhibit development of better relations with Algeria, and even, if mishandled, encourage Moroccan intransigence. On the other hand it could be perceived by the Moroccans as an inadequate response and contribute to a further erosion of our position there; (ii) Any liberalization in our policy at this time is complicated by Morocco’s recent takeover of the former Mauritanian sector. It should be noted, however, that this latter issue is more political than legal. L believes that the legal picture has not changed much (Tab 3).⁵ (We did not recognize the legality of the Moroccan-Mauritanian partition and annexation of the territory in the first place.)

(c) Third Option: The OV–10

For better or worse, this armed reconnaissance aircraft has become the litmus test of our policy review in the eyes of Moroccans and Algerians, and to some extent in the international press and even within the Administration. It is seen as a weapons system well designed for anti-Polisario operations in western Sahara, which is only available from U.S. sources.

There is considerable support in certain quarters within the Administration and on the Hill for selling Morocco the OV–10. Internationally, Saudi Arabia, France, and Senegal have strongly urged us to follow this general course. A central concept determining this group’s view is that it is time for the U.S. to demonstrate by actions as well as words that it is willing to help its friends when its help is needed. It has also been argued that the OV–10 could affect the anti-Polisario military effort significantly (though all agree not decisively), thus raising the cost of the war for both the Polisario and Algeria and thereby encouraging them to think in terms of alternatives to total victory.

The principal disadvantages of this option would be: (i) a major battle on the Hill and considerable domestic and international⁶ criticism, augmented by Morocco’s recent takeover of the Mauritanian sector; (ii) Algeria’s leaders would probably take this step as a challenge and our limited ability to reason with them could be further reduced; (iii) Morocco’s position on negotiations might harden because of raised hopes of a military victory; in any case Morocco might stall for the period of months it will take for the first OV–10s to be delivered and deployed, in order to see whether its use might give Morocco a new and significant edge on the battlefield; (iv) the situation on the ground does not indicate that even with the OV–10, military victory would in fact be close for Morocco; and (v) intensification of U.S. military support for Morocco might produce greater Algerian support for the Polisario, an invitation for support from the Cubans (already hinted at by the Polisario), and a broadening of the conflict.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 77, PRC 124, 9/21/79, North Africa. Secret. Drafted by Coon on September 20. Cleared by Saunders. Sent to Brzezinski under an undated covering memorandum from Tarnoff. Prepared for the September 21 PRC meeting; see Document 42.
2. See Document 176.
3. See Document 240.
4. Systems we might consider include the OV–1 reconnaissance plane and either the Hughes 500 or the Cobra helicopter equipped with TOW. If this option is selected, we would plan to send a team to Morocco to discuss possible requirements in detail, prior to policy determinations in Washington. [Footnote is in the original. An unknown hand highlighted and drew an arrow to this footnote.]
5. Tab 3 is not attached.
6. Most Subsaharan African countries, Spain, and to a lesser extent the non-aligned states in general support the Algeria/Polisario position. [Footnote is in the original.]