Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

42. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, September 21, 1979, 10–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• PRC on North Africa (C)

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Ms. Lucy Benson, Under Secretary for Security Assistance
  • Mr. David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
  • Mr. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

• OSD

  • Deputy Secretary of Defense Graham Claytor
  • Mr. Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs

• JCS

  • Lt. General John Pustay

• DCI

  • Mr. Bruce Clarke, Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
  • Mr. Robert Ames, NIO for Near East and South Asia

• ACDA

  • Mr. Spurgeon Keeny
  • Dr. Barry Blechman, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau

• White House

  • Mr. David Aaron

• NSC

  • Mr. James M. Rentschler (Notetaker)
  • Major Robert Kimmitt

MINUTES

At Chairman Newsom’s request, Mr. Saunders briefly reviewed the context in which the PRC discussion was taking place, emphasizing the two-year deterioration in our bilateral relationship with Morocco and the centrality of the military supply issue. He noted in addition the changed situation produced by Polisario attacks inside Morocco proper which helped precipitate mid-summer consultations with Congress on whether and to what extent we should change our present arms supply policy. Five options—later refined to three—had been discussed at that time, and Congress had warmly welcomed the consultative spirit with which the Department had presented them. At present we face a fourfold problem:

1. King Hassan, a friend, has staked his future on the Sahara situation.

2. We do not wish to jeopardize our interests in Algeria.

3. We face a stalemate so far as progress toward a negotiated solution is concerned.

4. The issue of self-determination for the Sahraoui people is gaining prominence. (C)

Mr. Saunders also reviewed the status of Congressional sentiment on North Africa, noting that on the House side there appeared to be support primarily for “Option 1 (standpat) with maybe a little bit more”; the House favored maintenance of an essentially restrictive policy on arms sales. On the Senate side, the SFRC voted 7–3 on September 20 in favor of three points:²

1. The U.S. should undertake a concerted diplomatic effort toward a negotiated solution.

2. We should move rapidly to send a new Ambassador to Rabat who can maintain an effective dialogue with the King.

3. We should provide increased military assistance for Morocco but avoid selling weapons designed primarily for counterinsurgency warfare in the desert. (C)

In response to Mr. Newsom’s request, Mr. Ames provided a CIA assessment of Hassan’s position: a) he generally supported Mr. Saunders’ presentation; b) the Agency had reviewed pertinent earlier judgments and found them unchanged; c) although there had been serious deterioration in Hassan’s position since the first of the year, he was not yet on a slippery slope (his difficulties derived largely from his unwillingness to address possible solutions); d) the Western Sahara does not mean much to 65 percent of Hassan’s people. (C)

Mr. Aaron questioned this analysis and stated that it runs counter to historical experience. He wanted to know if the CIA had a reading from the Moroccan military on our arms policy. (C)

Mr. Ames replied that he had no reading. (C)

Mr. Aaron then asked if there was any evidence that the Moroccan military favored a negotiated solution or a Polisario takeover of the Western Sahara. (C)

Mr. Ames replied [less than 1 line not declassified] that the military wanted either to “get in or get out”. (C)

Mr. Newsom requested information concerning two other factors: 1) what do we know about the magnitude of the Egyptian supply effort? (C)

Mr. Ames: Two planeloads of small arms. (C)

Mr. Newsom: And 2) what do we know about Saudi attitudes, both financial and toward the Sahara situation in general? (C)

Mr. Ames: The Saudis have decided that more money won’t help; they prefer more active mediation. Khalid, coming from Geneva, will stop in both Rabat and Algiers for this purpose. (C)

Additional questioning then ensued along the following lines:

Mr. Newsom: What is the impact of all this on Hassan’s ability to purchase more equipment? (C)

Mr. Ames: Little. (C)

Mr. Newsom: Could use of OV–10s decide the war in Hassan’s favor? (C)

Mr. Ames: No. Hassan’s main problem lies in command-and-control. (C)

Mr. Murray interjected that while the OV–10s would not win the war, militarily they can make a difference. (C)

Mr. Newsom: Do the Polisario have any validity as a Saharan movement without Algeria? (C)

Mr. Ames: Yes; if Algerian sanctuaries did not exist, the Polisario could come from Mauritania. (C)

Mr. Newsom: On Polisario, is it the CIA judgment that any other valid claimants speak for the Sahraoui people? (C)

Mr. Ames: Polisario remains the most important tribal element in the Western Sahara. (C)

Mr. Newsom then asked participants to comment on the three arms supply policy options before the PRC: (U)

—Option 1. (Defended by Mr. Keeny.) ACDA feels that additional equipment won’t win the war for Hassan, would merely involve us more intimately with Morocco’s sagging leadership. Weakening our ability to maintain relations with a successor regime is a central concern. ACDA has no problem with the present level of arms transfers but wants to make sure that whatever we do does not have greater negative symbolic value vis-à-vis the other side. Mr. Blechman added that ACDA is concerned over the possibility that more equipment might encourage Hassan to be intransigent, thereby protracting the conflict. (C)

—Option 2. (Defended by Mrs. Benson.) State feels that Option 1, standing pat on our present policy, does not serve our interests. State favors a more forthright response to Morocco’s requests while maintaining some restraint. We should seek a balance between Algeria and Morocco, though we would not ourselves want to play a mediatory role. We are interested in Moroccan defense and would consider supplying additional systems. This means that: we would furnish more spare parts and maintenance for the F–5s; we would view the presence of F–5s in the Sahara as only a technical violation of our bilateral; we would inform Algeria that we are not indifferent to Morocco’s need and would urge Algerian restraint on the Polisario; we would urge Saudi Arabia to play a more active role; we would institute no contacts with the Polisario; we would tell the Moroccans that we do not see a military solution in the Sahara (we would consult with France, Spain, and others). (C)

—Option 3. (Defended by Mr. Claytor.) DOD’s view is that Option 2 does not do enough to strengthen Hassan for negotiations. Mr. Murray stated that Option 3 would help turn around the military deterioration. He added that Options 1 and 2 contain good points, and the issue involves a very close judgment call. On balance, however, DOD sees danger in our winding up with the worst of both worlds: linked in symbolic support for Hassan while he goes down the drain. General Pustay noted that the JCS also supports Option 3 because of the added leverage it would give us with Hassan. He described the technical advantages of the OV–10 aircraft, including recce and night-flying capabilities. The OV–10 would not be a decisive factor militarily, but at the same time it is important not to diminish its potential. (C)

Mr. Aaron stated his view that with no prospect of a negotiated solution and with little likelihood of military assistance changing the outcome, we really have only two options: either we stick with our present policy, or even less—taking the heat while hoping that this high-risk course might convince Hassan to negotiate—or we move to Option 3. (C)

Following some discussion of OV–10 delivery time (a question of months, not years) and possible restrictions which might accompany a decision to make the OV–10 available, Mr. Saunders stated that restrictions are not enforceable. We have a situation where a loyal ally is under attack. How are we going to retain a decent relationship with that country under these circumstances? At some point in this ambiguous situation we have to ask ourselves if we are going to support our friends. (C)

In light of the Secretary’s imminent meetings in New York with both the Moroccan and Algerian Foreign Ministers,³ and given the communication problem with the King, Mr. Aaron agreed it would make sense to conduct a round of consultations, including with the Saudis, the French, and the Spanish.⁴ Mr. Aaron said he would be willing to try that out but we should have a plan ready to implement as soon as the round is over. (C)

Summarizing general points of agreement, Mr. Newsom noted 1) continued support to Morocco with the F–5 is both desirable and Congressionally sustainable; 2) we should not at this point seek to meet with the Polisario in any overt, significant way [1 line not declassified]; 3) we will immediately undertake consultations in New York and capitals with the Moroccans, Algerians, Saudis, French, and Spanish; 4) the U.S. should not seek to be a primary actor in the mediating process. (S)

There was also general agreement that the issue boiled down to the symbolic importance of the sale of OV–10 aircraft, i.e., for or against support to the King. (C)

The participants then exchanged views on whether there were any other significant items of equipment which we could offer which might be less conspicuously identified with the Sahara conflict. (General answer: no.) (C)

Concluding the PRC, Mr. Newsom stated that we would defer a decision on a desired U.S. arms supply policy pending results of the diplomatic consultations to be undertaken in New York and capitals. We would prepare talking points for use with the Moroccans, Algerians, Saudis, French, and Spanish which would stress the following:

—Our concern for Morocco’s security.

—We are reexamining our present arms supply policy.

—We feel that a peaceful settlement is in everyone’s interest.

—We cannot be expected to exercise restraint indefinitely when the future of a friend is at stake.

—We want to know what possible paths the parties see to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. (C)

Mr. Newsom directed that the consultations be completed within two weeks, at which time the PRC will consider the responses and decide what specific recommendations to make to the President. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 77, PRC 124, 9/21/79, North Africa. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. A summary of conclusions is attached but not printed.
2. See Document 177.
3. See Documents 43 and 45.
4. In telegram 4183 from USUN, October 6, the Mission reported on Vance’s discussion with Crown Prince Fahd. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790458–0198) In telegram 258424 to Paris, October 2, the Department reported on Vance’s meeting with Foreign Minister François-Poncet. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790451–0743) In telegram 254089 to Madrid, September 27, the Department reported on Vance’s meeting with Foreign Minister Oreja. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790441–0767)