Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

47. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, October 16, 1979, 4–5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• North Africa

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
  • Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

• OSD

  • W. Graham Claytor, Deputy Secretary
  • Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East, Africa and South Asian Affairs

• JCS

  • Admiral Thomas Hayward, Acting Chairman
  • Vice Admiral Thor Hanson, Director, Joint Staff

• ACDA

  • Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director
  • Barry Blechman, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • [name not declassified], Assistant NIO for Near East and South Asia

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski

• NSC

  • James M. Rentschler (Notetaker)
  • Robert M. Kimmitt

Secretary Vance opened the meeting by noting that the participants were essentially down to three choices, continuance of our present policy, or going all the way to help Morocco, including the sale of OV–10 aircraft and Cobra helicopters, or some step in between. He briefly reviewed his UNGA consultations in New York and noted the Saudi demarche calling for bilateral cooperation with us on assisting Morocco militarily, a recent and significant development. Whatever we did, we would have to tell King Hassan that we saw no prospect of a military solution and that he should get on with a negotiated settlement. The Secretary then solicited views around the table and asked Dr. Brzezinski to lead off. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said he leaned to the view that continued deterioration in Morocco’s military situation will not improve conditions for a negotiated settlement. Our experience with the Egyptians and the Israelis had demonstrated that we were more likely to move disputants to a negotiating process if both sides felt confident in their strength and stability. This was not now the case for Morocco. Moreover, our record in supporting our friends, or the perception of that record—which is what counts in foreign affairs—is ambiguous. All things considered, he favored cutting the Gordian knot and supplying Morocco with what it needed to bolster its military position, which would in turn enable Morocco to negotiate from strength. As far as Algeria is concerned, we should not be shy in telling them that we do not believe a weak, unstable Morocco is in our interest. At the same time, we can honestly tell them that we favor a negotiated settlement and are putting pressure on Hassan for that purpose. We should, in sum, act like a big and strong country should act. (S)

Speaking for the DOD, Deputy Secretary Claytor said that he had discussed the situation with Secretary Brown and both believed that we had to strengthen Hassan’s position. Defense was in essential agreement with Dr. Brzezinski’s view and felt that any other course would risk destabilization in a strategic part of North Africa. Defense also agreed with the need to tell Hassan that he had to negotiate. One way to ensure that he did might be to give him part of an arms supply package now and withhold the rest until we had evidence that he was actively pursuing a negotiated settlement. (S)

Admiral Hayward noted that the JCS fully shared the views expressed by Deputy Secretary Claytor and Dr. Brzezinski. (C)

Following some discussion about the merits of the OV–1 as a possible substitute for the OV–10 (which Admiral Hayward believed would be a substantial letdown psychologically to the Moroccans), Director Turner expressed pessimism about inducing Hassan to negotiate, a) because the King thinks he has to have military success, and b) because there is a “wave of enthusiasm” among loyalist officers for improving command-and-control and in general achieving greater fighting effectiveness. Director Turner added that we ought not to overlook the Polisario; in other words, we may want to try to play both sides of the street. (S)

Summarizing ACDA’s preference for sticking to our present policy, Mr. Keeny said that liberalization risked protracting and perhaps escalating the conflict. It would send a wrong signal to Morocco and complicate our life with both Algeria and Congress. In response to Dr. Brzezinski’s query concerning the source of Congressional opposition to a changed policy, Mr. Keeny noted that Steve Solarz was out in front. Losing a confrontation with him and other members of Congress would not help us with our friends.² (C)

Under Secretary Newsom then recapitulated State’s point of view which favored a partial relaxation of our present policy to include items which would not incur Congressional opposition (replacements, for example, for all eight F–5s lost by Morocco). Supporting Secretary Vance’s contention that Congressional sentiment was a key factor which had to be put on the table, Mr. Newsom said that we faced a real fight in the House and no strong endorsement in the Senate. The OV–10 had become a symbol and as such could give us trouble not only with Congress but with Algeria. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski replied that it would be nice if we could please everybody; yet in the real world we cannot. We must choose, and if it is a question between pleasing Algeria and pleasing Saudi Arabia, there was no doubt in his mind where the US national interest lay. Moreover, we have to ask ourselves how we will look in that part of the world if Hassan falls. Hassan may not be our favorite person, as a human being or otherwise. Yet he has been our friend. And our track record in support of our friends is not reassuring. (S)

Secretary Vance then summed up his own position, emphasizing that we have to support Hassan but that we would have great trouble getting the OV–10 through Congress. In those circumstances he recommended seeing if we can put together a decent package with items that would not be as Congressionally sensitive as the OV–10. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski asserted that we have an overriding national interest which is worth the effort of arguing. The problem with the option favored by State is that it is a typical halfway measure which gets everybody mad. When the stakes are high, as they are in North Africa, the US has an obligation to support its friends. He reiterated his belief that we should fight Solarz on this; he had seen the latter on television knocking the President over Cambodia. Solarz is not the Secretary of State. We had done him a lot of favors and we can play hardball politics, too. He agreed that we should certainly flag the possibility of Congressional opposition for the President, but in response to Assistant Secretary Saunders’ emphasis on the “rare occurrence” of detailed State-Hill consultations on North Africa, expressed concern that such consultations could become abdication. (C)

In concluding the substantive deliberations, Secretary Vance said there was now a need to submit three differing options for Presidential decision, defined as follows:

Option 1:	maintenance of our present policy, with no liberalized supply relationship, i.e., the status quo; (C)
Option 2:	a liberalized arms supply “package” which would include F–5s, Hughes helicopters, and OV–1s (if the JCS determined that the latter would be something more than mere “make-weight); (C)
Option 3:	a liberalized arms supply “package” which would include F–5s plus OV–10s and Cobra TOWs. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski stipulated that to ensure the greatest possible fairness and accuracy in the presentation of these options, respective “sponsors” should submit their own language, not to exceed a half-page in length and to reach the White House by noon on October 17.³ He added that should the President favor Option 3, Dr. Brzezinski would recommend this contingent upon a more thorough canvassing of Congress. Dr. Brzezinski then cautioned the participants to keep the PRC proceedings leak-free; an unfortunate piece had already appeared in the New York Times on this subject,⁴ and it was in no one’s interest to divulge any of this sensitive material before the President had had a chance to make his decision. (C)

Secretary Vance seconded Dr. Brzezinski and emphasized the difficulty such leaks could cause. (C)

In response to Dr. Brzezinski’s question concerning what we might be able to do with the Algerians, Secretary Vance agreed with Under Secretary Newsom that it would in principle be a good idea to field a high-level US delegation for the 25th anniversary of the Algerian revolution scheduled for November 1. (C)

After agreeing to cable appropriate follow-up instructions to OSD/ISA Deputy Assistant Secretary Murray (who was leaving for Saudi Arabia that evening), the PRC adjourned. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 127, 10/16/79, North Africa. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. A summary of conclusions is attached but not printed.
2. An unknown hand placed a question mark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
3. See Document 48.
4. Presumably Bernard Gwertzman’s October 12 article, “U.S., in Shift, May Sell Arms to Morocco for Sahara War,” New York Times, October 12, 1979, p. A6.