52. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State1
643. Subj: Namibia Talks. Refs: (A) Cape Town 0632,2 (B) USUN 1167.3
1. Summary. Contact Group met twice with SAG officials April 27. At the morning session, CG presented position of the Five governments as contained in “agreed working paper” prepared in New York last week. Foreign Minister Botha reserved comment on all but one point, viz, that the SAG not proceed to implement the Turnhalle constitution. After implying that Vorster government would be prepared to refrain from introducing legislation to give legal status to the Turnhalle constitution, he declared that Vorster was committed to establishing an interim government in Namibia. If the Five governments were opposed to this, there would be no point in continuing the talks. After morning meeting was adjourned, the CG conveyed to Botha questions [Page 118] aimed at clarifying what he meant. In afternoon session he said SAG did not intend to set up an interim government, but merely intended to implement some “administrative rearrangements” that would be consistent with UN wishes and would facilitate process leading to an internationally acceptable form of independence for Namibia. He then responded to other aspects of the CG presentation. Meeting was adjourned until 10 a.m. April 28 to give both sides time to consider points which had been raised. Although first day’s discussions were basically exploratory, serious differences emerged. Not the least of these is the evident continued desire of SAG to avoid UN supervision and control of elections. Further, it unclear whether “administrative rearrangements” represents a significant concession or is no more than a device by SAG to install an interim government based on the unacceptable Turnhalle constitution. End summary.
2. The first meeting between Contact Group and South African officials took place this morning. At outset, Prime Minister Vorster spoke to CG for a few minutes. He welcomed group and said that “it is not beyond us to find a reasonable and satisfactory solution” to Namibian problem. There were many interested parties to this issue, but, he stressed, people of South West Africa themselves are most directly concerned. Therefore, he had arranged to bring some Turnhalle representatives to Cape Town. He strongly recommended that CG talk to them, as well as to SAG. He then left the meeting, turning SA side of it over to Foreign Minister Botha.
3. After both sides had agreed that neither would make any comment to the media during the course of the talks, Ambassador McHenry, speaking on behalf of the CG, told Botha (Foreign Secretary Brand Fourie also was present) that at some future stage all the interested parties had to be involved. However, we regarded it as premature to talk to Turnhalle people here in Cape Town now.
4. Responding, Botha urged CG to reconsider that decision. He said we had met often with SWAPO, in fact had done so just before coming to Cape Town. Now we had an opportunity to meet with men who “represent the overwhelming majority of the people of South West Africa.”
5. CG replied that we had not met with SWAPO in New York last week, but had merely informed SWAPO that we were going to Cape Town to discuss Namibian problem with SAG. Delegates of the four other governments spoke in support of Ambassador McHenry, sharing the view that it would be premature to meet with Turnhalle representatives now, although at some future time they could be included in a negotiating process.
6. Speaking again on behalf of CG, McHenry, after introductory remarks, presented orally the points contained in the agreed working [Page 119] paper developed in New York by the Five governments (see paras 1 through 7, reftel B).
7. Botha stated that his government would need time to study the points that had been presented. However, there was one point which he wanted to discuss, i.e., our third objective regarding suspension of the implementation of the Turnhalle constitution. He said that the SAG was “firmly, irrevocably committed” to institute an interim government for Namibia. He said that SAG had made concessions by no longer standing in the way of an independent, unitary state, by making a significant start in eliminating discrimination based on color, and by agreeing to an early date for independence. Now, however, SAG was being pushed further—further to a point beyond which it had no control over the course of Turnhalle.
8. Continuing his argument, he referred to talks with Kissinger after the South Africans had presented their Seven Points on Namibia. Botha said, Kissinger had stated that the United States could ask no more of South Africa, that South Africa had been most reasonable, and that the United States would not push South Africa beyond the Seven Points.4 Now, however, Botha continued, the new American administration was not honoring those views and South Africa was indeed being pushed further. At some length, he described the development of Turnhalle over the past two years. It was the blacks, not the whites, represented in Turnhalle who had decided that [what?] they wanted to do. A “foundation was laid for a new era” in SWA. He lamented that “not only do we get no credit, but now we are confronted with a demand that the work of Turnhalle not be implemented.”
9. He went on to say that he was prepared to discuss with the Prime Minister postponement of the introduction in Parliament of the formal detailed constitution, as SAG was prepared to do on May 20. But if CG was to tell him that it would object to an interim government, then there would be no point in continuing the talks.
10. During ensuing discussions, CG delegates pointed out that implementation of an interim government would be an element that would further complicate the problem of Namibia. An interim government would not be, as Botha had termed it, “just an administrative rearrangement”. With agreement to study the matter and discuss it further in the afternoon, the meeting was adjourned. CG subsequently decided to have British Ambassador ask Botha to explain with [what?] precisely he had meant when he referred to the possibility of postponing the legislation to introduce a new interim constitution for Namibia [Page 120] in the South African Parliament, and whether the interim government or administrative rearrangement to which Botha referred simply meant the implementation of the Turnhalle interim constitution by another name.
11. During afternoon session, in response to those questions, Botha explained that what SAG had in mind was to avoid the irrevocable step of putting into law the Turnhalle constitution, upon which “all future arrangements would have been based.” Clearly implying that Vorster would agree, he said he was prepared to ask Vorster and the Cabinet not to introduce legislation to implement the constitution.
12. He then explained that “interim government” was not the correct terminology; what he had meant to convey to the CG was that SAG would turn over to local authorities in Namibia some of the governmental functions now being carried out by the SAG. This, he said, would “make your task easier,” for it would involve a rearrangement to eliminate some of the control that South Africa exerted over the territory. Moreover through this arrangement, some aspects of discrimination could be eliminated without reference to legislation by the South Africa Parliament. He added that Vorster had made a commitment to the Turnhalle people to make these administrative changes. He could not tell the people of Namibia that not only would the Turnhalle constitution not be introduced, but also that there would be no “administrative rearrangements”. He then went on to say that the authority for the administrative rearrangements could be provided by means of a decree by the State President.
13. Questioned about what would be the basis of authority for the running of those departments which would be taken over by the Namibians, and just how this would work, Botha was vague. He did not know what would be the juridical basis of the new government, since SAG had not had time to consider this. He said that adaptations would have to be made. He emphasized that the workings of these new administrative arrangements would not be based on the proposed Turnhalle constitution, and he noted that he was not talking about an interim government, for these administrative rearrangements would not include substantial attibutes of a government. What was involved would be a continuation of the present administrative situation in the territory but with a devolution of some administrative functions to local people, some of whom could be Turnhalle representatives.
14. After being asked whether he would want to discuss other aspects of the CG presentation, Botha said that, after talking to Vorster and to Turnhalle people, he had prepared a summary of what he believed Turnhalle group would accept. He then read the following:
(A) “We accept that all the inhabitants of the territory have the right to participate in a fully democratic process in the exercise of their right to self determination.
[Page 121](B) “We further accept that before independence, elections will be held in terms of a constitution.
(C) “We have not been hammering out constitutional proposals over a long period for nothing. On the other hand, we do however fully accept that a constitution cannot be imposed on the inhabitants. In circumstances where some organizations allege that the Turnhalle Conference was not constituted in such a manner as to truly represent the majority of the inhabitants, we are prepared to test the draft constitution on a country-wide basis before elections in terms of the constitution are held.
(D) “We are prepared to allow and would welcome international observation in respect of such testing of the acceptability of the final constitution. We are not prepared, however, to submit to outside supervision and control. It will be a further condition that the Five powers now involved will be represented during such observation. It must further be clearly understood that such powers will grant recognition to an independent South West Africa in the event of such draft constitution being accepted by the majority of the inhabitants and independence then being obtained based on such a constitution.
(E) “There is not objection to peaceful participation by all political parties and groups in (1) testing of the draft constitution or (2) the elections to be held in terms of the draft constitution. The term ‘peaceful’ is of paramount importance. There could be no question of peaceful participation if any individual, party or group involved has a gun in hand, or is directly involved with associates outside the territory with guns in their hands.
(F) “It is obvious that South African administration will come to an end at independence.
(G) “Regarding returnees, there is no objection as long as returnees come in peace.”
15. Botha stated that he believed that the foregoing points constitute dramatic progress and comply with the basic elements of UN demands over the years. He claimed that he had extracted concessions from the Turnhalle people after a “blunt presentation” by him of what the CG had told him in the morning.
16. It was agreed to adjourn until tomorrow in order to give Botha more time to discuss the matter with the Turnhalle people and to allow the CG to study the points he had made before making any comment about them.
17. Although both sides put a lot on the table, we believe that the two sessions were essentially exploratory. During the morning Botha was aggressive and truculent. However, by the afternoon, when it apparently had become clear to him that his reference to installing an [Page 122] “interim government” was a serious stumbling block, and after he was able to offer the possibly somewhat more acceptable idea of an “administrative rearrangement”, he put on a different face.
18. These first two sessions show that despite some concessions, we have a long way to go to achieve an acceptable basis for negotiations between the parties directly involved. South Africans have, at least initially, rejected UN supervision and control of elections. Although accepting the idea of some form of elections, they continue to think in terms of referendum regarding the constitutional proposal by the Turnhalle Conference. They did not address the question of political prisoners. They have injected a rider that the Five Powers will grant recognition if Turnhalle constitution is accepted by voters.
19. Moreover, despite Botha’s attempted explanation, at this point we do not know the substantive difference between an “interim government” and “administrative rearrangements”. It may be that there is no real difference.
20. On the basis of our assessment of Botha’s presentation, we expect that after we consult with our Contact Group colleagues, together we and they will iron out the unresolved differences that still exist between us and the SAG. Having done that, we will see what they have to say. However, we do not, of course, intend to get involved in negotiations and will make that clear to them.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770156–0501. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, London, Ottawa, Paris, and USUN. Sent for information to Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lagos, Lusaka, Maputo, and Pretoria.↩
- In telegram 632 from Cape Town, April 26, Bowdler summarized the Contact Group’s preparations for the meeting with the South Africans: “Group agreed that no delegation would comment to media during talks, and that upon completion of talks, we would prepare a joint statement. At the same time it was recognized that developments during the talks might make statement necessary although this would be avoided if possible. Group also agreed that it would not rpt not meet with representatives of Turnhalle Conference whom SAG has brought to Cape Town to be available for discussions with us.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770148–0378)↩
- See Document 51.↩
- Not further identified. The Seven Points (South African Basis for a Proposal 9/19/76) are printed as Tab 2, Document 264.↩