Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

264. Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee¹

Washington, undated

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM:

RHODESIA, NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

I. Introduction

The urgent problems of southern Africa require decisions which will affect not only the possibilities of negotiated solutions to the Rhodesian and Namibian problems, but also our approach to the racial question in South Africa and consequently our relations with that country and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, what choices the Administration makes on these questions will have significant domestic implications.

The United States cannot by itself shape the destiny of the people of southern Africa. We cannot impose blueprints for just societies in any of the southern African countries. But we do have influence which we can apply and which could have an important effect on the immediate and long-term future of that area consistent with US interests.

US Interests: US economic and strategic interests in southern Africa, while not vital to our national security or economic well-being, are nevertheless important, particularly in South Africa. These need to be viewed on a long-term basis as well as from a more immediate perspective: For example, with regard to South Africa, many believe we can best preserve our interests there by doing all we can to help stimulate peaceful progress to racial equality and eventual majority rule rather than taking a relatively passive approach and risk increasing danger of black-white confrontation.

Southern Africa represents a growing market for American products. We enjoy a favorable balance of trade in the region ($460 million with South Africa in 1975). US southern African investments, mainly but not solely in South Africa, now exceed $1.5 billion; it is in our interest that South Africa’s advanced nuclear technology be used for peaceful purposes; Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa are sources of strategically important minerals (e.g., 98% of the known free world reserves of chromium lie in Rhodesia and South Africa); for strategic reasons we have an interest in maintaining landing and overflight privileges for US military aircraft, retaining standby use of US spacetracking capabilities and, if required and politically feasible, having access to ship repair and logistical facilities; we would not want these facilities to pass into unfriendly hands; it is important that the Cape sea route stay open. (Within the Executive Branch, there are differing opinions about the relative importance of these economic and strategic interests. See page 30 below for discussion.)

In a broader context, a major US concern is to help find a peaceful avenue to settlements leading to self-determination and majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, and to see an end to apartheid in South Africa. There are many reasons for this:

—One is humanitarian—to see a) an end to bloodshed and destruction and pervasive racial discrimination, and b) the accordance of equal rights to all the people of the area.

—Intensified violence in Rhodesia would probably have serious political and economic consequences in Zambia and Botswana, adversely affecting the attitude or even the stability and composition of their current moderate governments. It would also add to Zaire’s serious economic problems. And it would prolong the unsettled political and economic conditions in Mozambique.

—Violent resistance by blacks against efforts by whites indefinitely to maintain their domination in Rhodesia, Namibia or South Africa would increase the chances of increased Communist influence, major power confrontation in the area and a kind of involvement on our part which the American people do not want and would not support.

—Our policies for southern Africa, and especially how we deal with South Africa in the coming months and years, will have a major impact on our relations with Africa and will affect our position in the United Nations and other international forums.

—We must bear in mind the serious emotional and political impact that a mass white exodus or, far worse, widespread racial war in southern Africa would have within our own society.

Interconnected Problems: The major problems of southern Africa are closely interrelated. In terms of urgency, the Rhodesian problem is highest priority. The outcome of this question will affect the future of South Africa and is likely to have a bearing on progress toward a Namibian settlement. The way in which self-determination and independence are achieved in Namibia will have significant consequences for South Africa’s domestic situation and its status in the international community. As for South Africa, developments in that country are certain to have a major impact on the future of all the rest of southern Africa. Because these issues are intertwined, in considering possible courses of action this paper, in addition to identifying options for each individual problem, also frames broad options affecting our overall approach to South Africa in the context of the entire southern African situation.

II. Effect of US Southern African Policies on Our Position in the UN and Other North-South Forums

Constituting one-third of the UN membership, the 48 nations of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) can form a formidable voting bloc on issues of importance to them. The primary unifying issues for the Africans are the racial and human rights problems in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia, and the ideological and practical issues of economic development embodied in the “new international economic order.” African attitudes toward the United States are based to a great degree on their perception of US policy and US action on these two issues.

In recent years the US has found itself isolated in UN forums from the mainstream of African and Third World opinion on southern Africa. In votes in the UN General Assembly and Security Council we have found ourselves in company primarily with Britain, France and Israel in opposing more drastic measures against South Africa for its apartheid policies and continued illegal occupation of Namibia. Our voting posture has drawn sharp criticism from the Third World and repeated demands that the US:

—support the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on the grounds either that South Africa’s occupation of Namibia or its apartheid policies constitute a threat to international peace and security;

—use our leverage on South Africa to effect internal change; and (ironically at the same time)

—cut off all business and trade with South Africa in order to hasten the demise of the white minority government;

—further tighten sanctions against Rhodesia.

We have reasonably good bilateral relations with most African states. However, faced with their own inability to effect change in South Africa and Namibia, the Africans, particularly the radical states, have used UN forums to portray the US as the major political and economic supporter of South Africa.

A Breathing Spell: The April 1976 Lusaka initiative² by Secretary Kissinger and the subsequent negotiations and Geneva Conference heightened African expectations (especially among our moderate friends) that the US was “at last going to bring about extensive change in southern Africa.” Consequently, these moves on our part to some extent diminished the usual kind of accusations against us at the UN. And in deference to the Geneva Conference on Rhodesia, then at a critical stage, the Africans agreed to a relatively moderate resolution on Rhodesia at the 31st UNGA.

The perception of a new direction in America’s southern African policy contributed, along with other factors, to better results for some of our efforts in international forums. At the UNGA session, the OAU and Non-Aligned meetings preceding it, and the UNESCO General Conference at Nairobi, many African states threw their considerable weight behind moderate positions on many issues of importance to us. For example, they played a major role in preventing the issues of Korea and Puerto Rico from surfacing at the General Assembly, and helped keep Middle East issues in check. In the absence of movement on apartheid and Namibia, however, the Africans intensified their UN rhetoric in resolutions endorsing armed struggle and Chapter VII mandatory sanctions against South Africa on apartheid and Namibia.

The election of President Carter and his designation of Andrew Young as UN Ambassador have raised African expectations at the UN that the US will play an aggressive role in pursuit of majority rule and independence in southern Africa. Our response to the breakdown of the Geneva Conference and our actions at the anticipated Security Council meetings on apartheid and Namibia this spring will be looked on by the Africans as key indicators of the commitment of the US in southern Africa. The attacks on US policies which were relatively subdued in 1976 probably would erupt against the US if the African states concluded that the new Administration had not moved far enough toward their position on southern Africa and international economic matters.

III. Rhodesia

[Omitted here are background information and material on the current status of negotiations.]

B. US Policy

Prior to 1976 the US Government avoided direct involvement in attempts to resolve the Rhodesian issue. The problem was viewed as primarily one of British responsibility to solve. However, the changed political and military situation in southern Africa led Secretary Kissinger to embark on his initiative, which was aimed at the achievement of majority rule with equal rights for all the people of Rhodesia. The primary consideration for this was to forestall increased Soviet and Cuban involvement and the possibility of extensive influence on their part in the region. We have backed the latest British efforts and supported their proposals as a basis for further negotiations. With the encouragement of the Front Line Presidents and other African leaders, we have dealt with South Africa as a key to reaching a settlement.

Because of the importance attached to South African cooperation, the Administration decided that within the basic policy of restraint on our relations with South Africa, we would avoid taking any further restrictive actions which could have had an adverse effect on our relationship with the South African Government. We continued to criticize apartheid, in the UN and elsewhere, and deplored in general terms the recent violence in South Africa. But we did not, as we might have in the past under similar circumstances, condemn the numerous bannings and detentions which accompanied the recent unrest in South Africa.

Our willingness, together with the British, to organize a major international economic assistance program to smooth the transition to majority rule was an important factor in gaining Smith’s acceptance of the original terms for a political settlement. As long as the possibility of a peaceful settlement has not been irrevocably foreclosed, the Zimbabwe Development Fund could still be a factor in encouraging a negotiated solution.

The next steps in organizing the Fund will depend largely on the degree of progress achieved on the political front: if a political breakthrough is achieved, we should decide whether or not to proceed to the next phase of consultations with other prospective donors. In the absence of significant progress on the political front, further action to organize the Fund probably should be postponed.

C. Options

1. Press actively and immediately, in consultation with all the parties, for a new set of proposals justifying a fresh round of consultations in Africa.

While this would demonstrate our continuing commitment to a negotiated settlement, we would have to consider whether the prospects for success justified the commitment of US influence and prestige.

Now, following Rhodesia’s rejection of the British proposals, the involved black African states might not cooperate actively to get negotiations back on track, but rather would wait to see whether US/South African pressures bring Rhodesia into line. However, they and other African states are not likely to resent strongly an effort on our part for negotiations unless we based this on proposals far at variance with the British proposals.

There are different ways, singly or in combination, to implement this option: primarily through the British; a major effort at persuading the Front Line Presidents and other key African leaders; an attempt to persuade South Africa to put pressures on the Rhodesians; or, if this produces no results, an application of our own pressures on the South Africans. A combination of these steps is probably preferable to employing only one of them.

2. Suspend our efforts and allow for a “cooling-off” period that might last as long as six months.

We would conclude that a breakdown is an indication that none of the parties is ready to negotiate realistically and that more time is needed to permit a new consensus to develop. The Rhodesians must come to the full realization that time is working against them and that greater flexibility will be required. The Front Line Presidents and the Rhodesian nationalists must come to understand that in all likelihood a solution by violence will lead to Rhodesian independence later rather than earlier.

While this might not meet with strong African disapproval, it could lead to the very conditions we have been seeking to avoid—escalating violence and opportunities for exploitation of the situation by the Soviets, and a general hardening of positions.

3. Abandon our current efforts; tell all parties that we can do no more to get negotiations going again.

This has the virtue of getting us out of an impossible situation, given the apparently irreconcilable differences between the Smith regime and the nationalists. It also would dissociate us from any solution, however promising at its outset, which could eventually end in civil war among contending black Rhodesian factions. However, obviously we would be relinquishing any possibility of using our influence to tip the balance in favor of a resumption of negotiations. Assuming this option would end hope for resumption of negotiations in the immediate future, violence could intensify, with increased potential for active Cuban combat involvement and greater Soviet influence.

The Byrd Amendment: This is likely to become a key issue during the First Session of the 95th Congress. Several members have tabled bills in both the Senate and House to repeal the measure. However, an informal sounding in the House by the repeal sponsors indicates now that in the absence of a strong Administration endorsement, their effort may fall short of approval by 20–30 votes. Prospects for repeal are considerably better in the Senate than in the House. Moreover, members of both houses have told us that a vigorous campaign by the Administration would improve prospects in the House substantially. Advocates of repeal indicate that as a temporizing measure (in order to rally support) they would like to have the Senate take the lead in debate. In the interim, Congressional sponsors look to the President for establishment of arrangements for close consultation between Congressional leaders and the Executive Branch.

A Congressional vote against repeal of the Byrd Amendment would encourage the Rhodesian regime to persist in rejection of negotiations, and would tend to confirm suspicions of many African and US critics of our current policy that the USG is really not committed to majority rule. Deferral of an effort to repeal, in anticipation of defeat, would have a similar but lesser effect.

Repeal, on the other hand, would have a psychological impact on Rhodesian whites and provide further evidence to the Smith regime that it cannot expect help from the US. Repeal would also be of significant symbolic importance to Africans, confirming our commitment to majority rule in Rhodesia and indicating that continued US involvement would be positive in terms of their interests during the period of interim government.

Other Steps: In addition to repeal of the Byrd Amendment, there are other non-diplomatic measures to which we might resort in order to help dispel doubts about our opposition to the continuance of white minority rule in Rhodesia and to add to our signals to Smith that we mean business. Any one of these would meet with the approval of African states and would be consistent in varying degrees with each of the options listed above. However, each poses a disadvantage or problem and an interagency group should look into the full consequences of implementation, if a decision is made to move ahead in this regard.

1. Cut off the remaining legitimate US financial inflow into Rhodesia. (This would deny funds to missionary and certain charitable organizations in Rhodesia.)

2. Cut communications with Rhodesia. (Would meet with strong domestic and some international resistance.)

3. Close the Rhodesian Information Office. (Would be opposed by conservatives in Congress and would pose a First Amendment problem.)

4. Tighten even further the travel of Rhodesians to the US. (Conservatives would oppose.)

5. Examine ways to block diversions of US products into Rhodesia.

6. If the Byrd Amendment is repealed, pursue internationally a tightening of sanctions with nations that have been lax in their enforcement.

IV. Namibia

[Omitted here are background information and material on the current status of negotiations.]

B. US Policy

Over the years the United States has consistently opposed South Africa’s illegal administration of Namibia and the imposition of apartheid to the territory. Since May 1970, the USG has officially discouraged American investment in Namibia. Ex-Im Bank guarantees and other facilities are not available for trade with Namibia. We maintain no permanent diplomatic or consular representation in the territory. And we have repeatedly pressed the South Africans to accede to the United Nations’ position on Namibia. But we have vetoed supporting UN resolutions calling for Chapter VII action against South Africa.

As part of our 1976 initiatives on Southern Africa, we have pressed South Africa to accept proposals for the negotiation of a Namibian settlement which, if accepted by SWAPO and the front line states, would lead to Namibian independence. In our discussions with the South Africans they have agreed to confirm a date of independence (December 31, 1978). They have also agreed to the convening of a conference under UN auspices at a neutral site, the inclusion of SWAPO in the discussions, and acceptance of whatever conclusions the Namibian parties negotiate at the conference. They have also indicated their willingness to assign a South African representative to negotiate at the conference bilateral issues affecting Namibia’s relationship with South Africa (troop withdrawals, financial arrangements, the status of Walvis Bay). In addition, the South Africans have said they would send only a small representative delegation from the Turnhalle Conference, thereby meeting SWAPO’s concern that its voice would be lost in a multitude of Namibian parties. South Africa also has agreed to release a substantial number of political prisoners prior to the convening of a conference.

However, as noted above, SWAPO does not appear disposed to move forward toward a Geneva conference on Namibia on the basis of the proposals offered, which they regard as incompatible with their expressed positions of favoring direct talks with South Africa under UN chairmanship and rejection of participation by the Turnhalle parties. With progress toward a conference stalled, the South Africans have given increased priority to a possible “internal solution” through the Turnhalle framework.

C. Options

The following are not mutually exclusive.

1. After determining where the South African Government stands on its seven points for negotiations on Namibia, explore carefully with the Front Line Presidents, Nigeria and SWAPO whether they are willing to consider the seven points as a basis for negotiations. In this process we would reaffirm our willingness to extend our good offices to develop a negotiating framework suitable to all the parties. At the same time, to prepare ourselves for the possibility of an impasse, we should study the alternative of pressing for a settlement along the lines of UN Security Council Resolution 385.³

A negotiated settlement is still highly desirable and, according to available evidence, possible. Thus we should persist in exploring fully any avenues open to us in this regard. Our continued involvement would demonstrate that the Carter Administration is committed to an active role, which the Africans favor, in the effort to resolve the Namibian issue. A disadvantage of this approach is that it continues to commit US prestige and influence to what might be a futile task, if either the SAG or SWAPO, or both, are unwilling to bend at all from their stated positions. Consequently, we need to look into the ramifications of pursuing a solution much closer to the substance of UNSC 385.

2. Acknowledge that we have gone about as far as we can go and withdraw from active participation in the diplomatic effort in a manner suggesting our willingness to re-enter the scene should a change in the situation warrant it.

To temporarily pull back might give all parties time to reassess their positions and conceivably recognize the worth of the role we have attempted to play. It would also indicate that we are not willing to accept a Namibian settlement at any price, but only one which will create a truly independent and united Namibia; we do not want another Angola. The disadvantages of this option are that, as time passes, positions on all sides may harden, events within Namibia, e.g., the creation of an interim government, may proceed to the point that further negotiations become more difficult, and more opportunity is provided to the Soviets and Cubans to gain greater influence over SWAPO.

3. Accept SWAPO’s insistence on direct negotiations with the SAG and its other negotiation preconditions.

4. Adopt a harsher line toward the SAG in our bilateral relations and in the United Nations to try to produce SAG compliance with the terms of the Security Council requirements.

These third and fourth options offer the advantages of presenting an image of American policy toward South Africa which will be applauded and accepted by most African states and important US domestic and Congressional elements. The disadvantages of adopting SWAPO’s position and/or attempting to exert pressure upon the South Africans is that our influence with the SAG could diminish rather than increase. The South African tendency to go-it-alone and impose their own solution upon Namibia (which would undoubtedly be rejected by most of the international community) could be heightened. And a tougher US stance with the South African Government would be opposed by significant elements of public and Congressional opinion in this country.

5. Conclude that the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference⁴ currently meeting in Windhoek might, if not unduly rigged by the SAG, offer the best opportunity for Namibian independence and attempt to influence its deliberations.

Accepting the Turnhalle Conference action, which has been rejected by SWAPO and the African states as an instrument of South African manipulation, has the advantage of giving us a ground floor position on influence in whatever Namibian government might evolve from it. Further, South African appreciation of our acceptance of the Turnhalle might translate into more forthcoming South African attitudes leading to the creation of a truly multiracial and moderate Namibian state. The negative implications of this option are that we would associate ourselves with an enterprise which has little chance of creating a truly independent state and which has excluded SWAPO, Namibia’s dominant political force, from its deliberations. We would become in the eyes of many, both within and outside Namibia, accomplices in South Africa’s designs for the territory.

6. Take no position on the Turnhalle talks.

Taking no position on the Turnhalle would allow us to keep our options open in the admittedly unlikely event that the Conference in Windhoek does produce a government which is ultimately acceptable to world opinion. Conversely, not voicing a position on the Conference opens us to the charge that our noncommittal posture on an almost universally condemned endeavor would be tantamount to acceptance.

7. Under any of the foregoing options, directly warn the Soviets that whatever policy the Administration adopts does not encompass acceptance of wider incremented Soviet or Cuban influence or activity in the area.

A direct and unmistakable warning to the Soviets presents the advantage of possibly impressing upon Soviet policy makers a need for caution for themselves and their Cuban clients. On the other hand, a formal approach might encourage the Soviets to test our resolve by choosing a relatively remote area of the world in which to confront us. Such a direct warning might also lead to negative results should we be unwilling to or incapable of following through our implicit threats of some form of retaliatory action.

Other Steps: Regardless of which approach we take regarding Namibia (but most consistent with Option 4), we could resort to any of several measures to demonstrate our opposition to the continuance of South African control over Namibia. An interagency group could be convoked to consider the desirability and feasibility of taking such steps, which include:

—legislation to deny tax credits to US firms which have investments in Namibia;

—participation in the Council for Namibia;

—support for efforts by the Council to restrict South African exploitation of Namibian resources.

V. South Africa

A. Major Alternatives for the US

Whatever we do on all the southern African issues, our relationship with South Africa has primary focus. A key element in this regard is the relative importance we attach, on the one hand, to our interests in South Africa, now especially including the Vorster Government’s cooperation in the Rhodesian and Namibian problems; and on the other hand, the effects any relationship we have with South Africa will have on our dealings with the rest of Africa and also on the US domestic situation. The moral issue of apartheid must figure into this along with economic and strategic considerations.

Decisions regarding specific approaches to our relationship with South Africa in connection with the totality of southern African issues should be made within a framework of one of the following three basic options. (More specific options regarding South Africa are presented and discussed in Section V.–E.)

1. Peaceful solutions to the Rhodesian and Namibian problems are of such immediate and fundamental importance to US national interests that our first priority must be to achieve them. South Africa is crucial to progress in this regard. The best way to encourage the South African Government to assume to the fullest its necessary role is for the US to work closely with it and to avoid actions which could drive the South Africans to a posture of non-cooperation, while maintaining the essential elements of our current policy of restraints on our relations with South Africa.

The advantage of this option is that it might provide the best avenue to get South Africa to put the kinds of pressures on Smith that would bring him back to the negotiating table, and to get South Africa itself to agree to compromises which could lead to an agreeable negotiating framework for Namibia. The major disadvantage is that it would force us to temper our approach to apartheid and leave us open to increased criticism from Africans and others who feel that if we do not move more firmly against South Africa’s racial policies, we will be aiding and abetting those very policies. Moreover, although South Africa has been generally cooperative on Rhodesia and Namibia, as yet our effort to deal through them has not produced sufficiently strong pressures on Smith.

Once it perceived its own advantage in doing so, South Africa cooperated in producing proposals for a Namibian settlement and in getting Smith to Geneva on the basis of the five points. It is too early to know how cooperative they will be in coming to final resolutions of these two issues. As yet, South Africa remains the major support for the status quo in Rhodesia.

2. Recent events in Rhodesia and lack of progress on Namibia show that some way has to be found to get South Africa to push the Rhodesians harder as well as to be more flexible itself on Namibia. As in option 1, our first priority would be to solve the Rhodesian and Namibian problems. However, our tactical approach to getting the fullest measure of South African cooperation would differ, involving initially the offer of a limited inducement: we would tell the South Africans that they should move more firmly to bring Smith into line and do more to act in accordance with UN demands to accord self-government to Namibia. If they did this, we would continue our close consultative relationship and, moreover, let them know we would refrain from acceding to the mounting pressures on us to take certain actions to manifest more unequivocally our opposition to apartheid. (If this strategy were adopted, it would be important that whatever we do or avoid doing on South Africa’s behalf be confined to situations that would have only short-term effects—e.g., our position on resolutions that could come up in the UN. That is, we make sure we do not get locked into any position that could be construed as having a long-term favorable effect on the continuance of apartheid.)

If, however, the South Africans did not respond with pressure on the Smith regime, we would take more vigorous action along the lines of option 3 (below).

This option would serve the same purpose as option 1 but would have the advantage of, while possibly producing some South African movement on Rhodesia and Namibia, not involving ourselves in any action, or inaction, that could commit or appear to commit us to long-term support for South Africa. This option could be explained to the Front Line States and thereby avoid any misperceptions they might have about our attitude toward apartheid.

Nevertheless, in taking this general approach toward South Africa, if they took us up on our inducement we would continue to be subjected to criticism and pressures from some Africans and some in this country who want us to take measures now against South Africa. With respect to the South Africans, it could elicit either one of two different unfavorable reactions: a) they could believe that our expressed concern about apartheid is not serious and therefore not feel any greater need to make really significant changes in their racial policies, or b) even this relatively soft-glove nudge by us could produce a refractory response on their part.

3. We would come to grips at the same time with each of the problems of Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa, treating each one separately on its own merits. We would state to the Vorster Government that the future of our relations would be determined not only by what they do regarding Rhodesia and Namibia, but also by how they handle race relations in their own country. We would tell them that we are taking this stance because of our principles, and our foreign and domestic imperatives. We could give them a short time to demonstrate clearly that they are moving away from apartheid, or instead of waiting we could begin immediately to take some steps to demonstrate to them and the rest of the world that we mean what we say when we express abhorrence of apartheid.

This option would provide to the world and to the American people a clear exposition of our commitment to human rights and our determined opposition to apartheid. It would, once underway, win approval of black African and many other countries, and defuse some strong criticisms we have been receiving here at home. It could help convince the South Africans that they cannot have the kind of relationship they want with us or count on our support, when or if they need it, unless they begin to dismantle apartheid. Our position in international forums would likely be improved. Since the SAG has not really moved decisively to end the Rhodesian and Namibian crises, it can be argued that stronger words and some actions by us against South Africa cannot worsen the situation.

However, there would be opposition to this approach in this country. And we would run the risk that we could lose South Africa’s willingness to be cooperative with us, even more than they have already, on Rhodesia and Namibia. There is also the possibility that a tough line by us will only contribute to South African intransigence and lead to more repression in South Africa.

B. Current Status and Background

For the better part of three centuries racial discrimination in one form or another has existed in South Africa. But in the past 30 years or so it has been extended and institutionalized in a way now unique in the world. White supremacy is maintained by a complex system of interwoven coercive economic and social controls. The South African system of laws in which a privileged minority maintains dominance over the majority is the only one in the world based on color.

Violence: The growing polarization of the races in South Africa and increasing militancy of young blacks, along with the essentially inflexible attitude of the white ruling establishment, point to continued sporadic outbreaks of violence. The response to those who deplore this is that South Africa’s system of racism and repression constitutes a form of violence against South African blacks.

Because of the laws at its disposal and the power of its security apparatus, the government can probably forestall any widespread uprisings by blacks for the foreseeable future. But the longer that black aspirations are met with repressive measures and minor concessions, the more likely violent confrontation will become, possibly culminating in outside involvement.

The Prospects for Positive Changes: There are differing perceptions of change in the white community. Supporters of the government believe that it has gone to great lengths to meet black aspirations, has brought about significant improvements in the conditions of blacks, and is doing all it can to remove unpalatable aspects of discrimination. White liberal ferment is at an all-time high. Among English-speaking white South Africans, opposition to government policies is growing. Even Afrikaner public opinion leaders and some businessmen show growing dissatisfaction. But this vocal, articulate element of Afrikaner and English-speaking white society represents only a small percentage of the electorate—ten percent at best. It is generally believed that the bulk of the Afrikaner community, and many English-speakers, are opposed to any fundamental alteration of South African laws and customs. The vast majority of black South Africans, on the other hand, are strongly opposed to the system.

Recently, our Ambassador in Pretoria reported that key government figures, including Prime Minister Vorster and other Cabinet members, “adhere to the traditional apartheid policy both because of personal orientation and how they read the mood of Afrikanerdom. The rank and file prefer the system.”

Despite sustained internal and external pressures for change, positive modifications of apartheid have been marginal. The forces acting against fundamental changes in race relations continue to be formidable. The National Party’s approach to race relations remains very much influenced by traditional attitudes of innate conservatism, racial prejudice, and fear of black domination. In white society, these factors persist, rooted as they are in history and religion and sustained by an economic system dependent on cheap labor. Furthermore, racism has been fed by certain events in black Africa in the past decade or so (e.g., the Congo crisis, Amin’s excesses in Uganda) which have added to many whites’ certainty of their superiority. Political equality for blacks is equated with catastrophic black rule and “an end to Christian, western civilization.”

In any event, although the South African Government has made some adjustments in its racial policies and has indicated it will do more to improve the condition of blacks, it insists it will not share political power in such a way that blacks would have full participation in the political process. The SAG and those who support its domestic policies maintain that “separate development” is the only way through which racial harmony can be achieved in South Africa.

C. US Policy

Over the past 25 years the US has consistently condemned apartheid. During the Eisenhower years, the US took a cautious position on the South African issue.

From 1961 through 1968, the US stance against South Africa hardened. We voted in support of resolutions condemning apartheid but abstained on those which called for specific measures against South Africa. We demonstrated our opposition to apartheid by unilaterally instituting a partial arms embargo against South Africa in 1962 and expanding that by supporting a voluntary comprehensive UN embargo in 1963. In 1964 we placed restrictions on the use of EX–IM Bank facilities to promote exports to South Africa.

In 1969, it was decided that the whites in South Africa would continue to retain power for the foreseeable future and that our interests would best be served by communicating with them, and all other ethnic groups in South Africa, in order to exert more influence on the course of events there. Another element of this conceptual shift was the idea that, as the South African economy developed, dependence on black labor would lead to the erosion of apartheid and move the South African Government away from its intransigence. At the same time, we would continue to show our opposition to apartheid through various restraints on our political, economic, and military relations with the South Africans.

Those restraints include public statements reiterating our opposition to apartheid; support for a USG-imposed arms embargo; a prohibition on naval visits; restrictions on military contacts; neither discouraging nor encouraging US investments in South Africa; denial of EX–IM Bank direct credits, except for discount loans up to $2 million, but extension of limited loan guarantees; encouraging enlightened employment practices by US firms there; refusal to recognize the Transkei; and maintenance of correct but not close government-to-government relations. Our policy includes a normal trade relationship and cooperation in the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. In recent months, because of the belief that South African cooperation is vital to the success of negotiated settlements for Rhodesia and Namibia, we have entered into greater consultation with the SAG on these issues.

Our South African policy has drawn criticism from black South Africans, most black African states, and critics in the US as supporting the South African Government. It has been charged that the failure of the US to take firm, more decisive measures in opposition to apartheid is an expression of racism.

The South African Government would dispute the view that our policy supports its goals, and has been annoyed or dismayed by our opposition to its domestic racial policies. In this, the SAG has found support in this country from persons, both inside and outside the government, who believe we have not treated South Africa fairly and that our best interests lie in closer political, economic, and military ties with her.

D. Discussion of Specific Options on South Africa

The advent of the new Administration has given additional stimulus to arguments about what we should do about the South African question, including differing perceptions about the extent of influence the US can bring to bear on South Africa.

Some argue that US investments in South Africa, representing only 16% of total foreign investments in that country, are not substantial enough for us to be able to use that economic connection as leverage with the South Africans. Others maintain that our investments are more important than just the scope of direct US investment would indicate, for US interests have part-ownership in some major foreign firms and banks that are represented in South Africa. In any case, generally it is conceded that US-South African economic links present us with a possible means of exerting some influence on South Africa.

More important in the minds of many of those who are in one way or another involved in the question of US-South African relations, is the psychological factor. The very high value South Africa attaches to American friendship gives us leverage (how much is, of course, debatable). South African whites seek acceptance by, and much closer participation in, the Western community of nations. Moreover, they generally view the world as consisting of two camps—monolithic communism and the free world. They perceive themselves as locked in mortal combat with communist forces. And they believe that only the US has sufficient power to save them from destruction and their country from falling into the hands of black radicals aided and directed by the Soviet Union. Thus they want to convince us that they are deserving of a much closer relationship with us.

In any event, we cannot escape involvement in the South African question. Our position as a world power, our membership in the UN, our relations with the rest of Africa, and our present and future economic interests in South Africa all guarantee this. Moreover, the issue involved is one of the major ethical issues of our time. But our decisions must also take into account the viewpoints and the needs of our allies, especially Great Britain, whose commercial relationship with South Africa is extremely important to the British economy.

Policy choices will affect many specific cases involved in the US-South African relationship. Some of these will require decisions in the very near future. For example, ERDA wants to enter into an agreement with SASOL, a South African government corporation, regarding the acquisition of economic information concerning South Africa’s coal gassification technology. And as noted in earlier discussion above, South African willingness to exert more pressure on Ian Smith could be crucial in forcing Smith to back down and agree to negotiate again. Moreover, South African cooperation is essential if there is to be a relatively rapid and peaceful transition to true self-determination and independence for Namibia. Another issue impending soon (before May at the latest) is how we will vote on probable UN Security Council resolutions calling for a Chapter VII finding, a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, and cessation of new investments in that country.

E. Options

1. Maintain our present policy. It is highly desirable to maintain a relationship with the white ruling establishment which permits a dialogue with them. By avoiding stronger measures against South Africa, we may obtain some modifications of its current racial policies. At the same time we would maintain the widest possible contact with black and brown South Africans and by the actions of official Americans in that country show clearly our opposition to restrictive racial practices there.

Because of South Africa’s key role regarding Rhodesia and Namibia we would avoid any actions that could significantly impair our current cooperative venture. We would, however, continue to criticize apartheid and would maintain the current economic and other restraints on our relationship. And we would take pains not to make decisions or take steps which could be construed as payment to South Africa.

The principal advantages of adhering to the approach we have taken toward South Africa over the past years is that we have access to the South African political leadership and can exert some influence on them. The extent of our influence on developments in South Africa has been limited, but it is preferable to having no influence at all. As noted in broad option 1, of current importance is our ability to work cooperatively with the South Africans on the Rhodesian and Namibian question. Moreover, the current economic benefits of our policy would be maintained, as would our access to minerals, our overflight and landing privileges and our access to South African naval intelligence on ship movements. Another factor in favor of this option is that some Americans would react negatively to any fundamental departure from the way we have been handling the South African question.

On the other hand, the restrictive elements of our current policy have resulted in some loss of trade opportunities for American business. They also have promoted within the South African Government a negative attitude toward the US which at times adversely affects certain of our interests. Moreover, the policy has harmed our bilateral relations with some African countries, and our standing with the OAU and in international forums. Some influential Americans inside and outside the government, including some leading figures in Congress, consider our approach to South Africa as morally wrong and not in the best interests of the United States, and will oppose an Administration attempt to maintain the current policy. It can be argued that although certain economic and strategic interests are served by this policy, in the long run avoidance of a race war in South Africa (and its manifold adverse consequences for the US) and our clear identification with the cause of equality and justice for all South Africans is the best insurance we have of continued economic and strategic benefits to the US.

[The Defense and State Departments, as well as some outside experts, have differing views about the strategic importance of South Africa to the United States. Defense, acknowledging the need for consistency between our policies and basic American principles, notes that we must not lose sight of the importance to US security of unimpeded access to important minerals in South Africa and uninterrupted use of the sea lanes around Africa by ships supplying the US and our European Allies with Middle Eastern oil. Currently approximately 60–70 ships round the Cape daily and this would increase if the Suez Canal would close. Due to critical currents and sea conditions in the Cape of Good Hope area, desired sea lanes are restricted to approximately 30 miles, making sea traffic highly vulnerable to interdiction.

State agrees with this, but emphasizes that our relations with other African states and access to their mineral wealth and coasts must also be weighed, as well as the adverse long-term effect prolonged racial strife could have on the availability of South African minerals to the US. State also agrees that it is vital to keep African sea lanes open, but believes that if hostile military action were ever taken to interdict the route from Western European waters around the Cape of Good Hope to the Persian Gulf (a World War II type of scenario), it is unlikely that this would be done in the remote area of South African waters. State does not agree, therefore, that South Africa is highly relevant in this context.

Commerce and State also have different priorities which have led to disagreements in the past. Commerce’s brief is to expand US exports and it wants to do as much as possible within existing policy to achieve this goal. State, recognizing the importance of exports, nevertheless believes that any expansion of USG trade promotion activities in South Africa would lead to unacceptable international and domestic political costs.]

2. Using quiet diplomacy and consultations with the South Africans to achieve our ends, warn the South Africans that our relationship is reaching a watershed. We value our relations with South Africa, but unless it clearly turns away from apartheid, we will be forced to reconsider aspects of our relations. Privately convey this message to Vorster and keep a dialogue going through quiet diplomacy. Take no immediate steps to change our current relationship, but act as our interests dictate on specific issues.

This course of action would probably present, for a time at least, the same advantages and disadvantages as option 1: There would be no public perception of any change in our policy, disappointing some and encouraging others. The difficult moment under this option would come when we tried to decide whether it had been effective and, if not, what steps to take. Temptations to avoid action would be strong, but so would pressures to move ahead, perhaps too quickly. Moreover, the South Africans might not take our words at face value, so that the impact on that country could be limited.

3. Convey the message privately to Vorster, but begin to take steps that show we cannot in any event conduct business as usual. That is, modify our voting pattern in the UN; do not enter into any relationship such as the ERDA proposal; resume protests over events in South Africa when appropriate; etc.

This course of action (for example, in the UN) would send a clearer signal to the South Africans, and might to some extent mollify other critics of US policy. But it would not end such criticism, and would be sure to bring on attacks from conservative groups. It also could cause the South Africans to take the opposite course than that intended by the option; that is, instead of pushing the SAG toward more enlightened policies, it could lead to even more repressive practices in South Africa.

4. Make public the position we have taken with the South African Government (as per the two preceding options) and also begin to take some steps (see below) to demonstrate our need to at least modify our relationship.

This course of action, by destroying the confidentiality of our exchange with the SAG, would effectively limit its impact: the SAG remains unwilling to be seen as responding to pressures of any kind. Such a move could also end South Africa’s willingness to cooperate on Rhodesia and Namibia. On the other hand, an announcement of our approach to Vorster would provide a clear sign to the world that the Administration is moving away from past policies and places human rights considerations at the forefront of its concerns. It would probably improve our relations with black Africa; if it were accompanied by symbolic rather than strong measures it could modulate conservative reaction within the US.

5. Take steps to manifest clearly our full opposition to the racial policies of the South African Government. We could do this with a statement that our actions are intended as pressures on South Africa to change those policies. Or we could state that, simply because of our feelings about apartheid, we are changing our current relationship with that country. Steps that could be taken in this regard include the following:

—Do not enter into any relationship with South Africa which would be construed as supporting SAG policies. For example, prohibit ERDA from an official relationship with SASOL.

—Raise the level and sharpen the tone of our public denunciation of apartheid.

—Cease all trade promotion activities including EX–IM facilities. Remove our commercial officers.

—Actively discourage investment.

—Remove our military attachés.

—Close a Consulate.

—Support a Chapter VII finding in the United Nations and a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

—Reduce other USG agencies’ activities in or connected with South Africa. (State is compiling a list of such activities. If we choose any of the options which either could or would include a cutback, an interagency group could be set up to study what, when, and how this could be implemented.)

This option would probably end whatever chances we have of influencing the South Africans in the near term to take positive steps toward solving the Rhodesian and Namibian problems. A result would be increased violence in Rhodesia and Namibia. Moreover, depending on the extent of the steps we take to draw away from South Africa, we could contribute to the “laager effect” (i.e., a refractory response by the Afrikaners in which they would resort to more repression in order to preserve the status quo). In the short term, some of the steps could adversely affect our economic and strategic/intelligence interests in South Africa. Although the black Africans might approve of what we are doing, in the long run they could be dissatisfied with anything short of all-out sanctions to bring the white ruling establishment to its knees. Thus if this option is adopted, lest we raise African expectations unduly, and thereby possibly encourage them to take actions we could not support, at the outset we should make clear both that our ability to influence the situation is limited, and that we are not going to become involved militarily.

A change of distinct magnitude from our current policy towards South Africa, while receiving support from some quarters in this country, would be opposed by others and could become an unwanted political issue for the Administration. It should be noted, too, that support for a Chapter VII finding could lead to demands in the UN for actions which we could not endorse and provide a precedent we do not want.

On the other hand, clear evidence that we are changing our South African policy would be a significant factor in improving our position in the rest of Africa. For a time, our stock would rise in the United Nations and other international organizations. We could encounter a more cooperative attitude from Third World countries on North-South issues. And the Administration would win approval from anti-apartheid elements in the United States. Finally, since in the long run white supremacy cannot last in South Africa, our economic, political, and strategic interests in that country will best be served by measures that clearly put us on record in support of the majority there.

6. In any basic approach we adopt toward southern Africa, except for maintaining our present policy, we could convene a White House conference of American business firms and financial institutions which have interests in South Africa. This could be done in coordination with other key investor countries.

We would issue a public invitation to representatives of the top fifty (or more) US firms established in South Africa to a government conference on “Doing Business in South Africa.” American banks doing business with South Africa would also be invited to participate. State and Commerce would organize and conduct the conference. We would circulate the principal conclusions of the conference and would monitor closely the performance of American corporations in light of these conclusions, bringing pressure to bear on corporations which failed to carry out changes in company practice.

Especially in view of the current problems of the South African economy, and the importance of loans by American banks to South African Government institutions, this course of action could have a far-reaching effect on the internal situation in South Africa. However, if this effort by the Administration had no appreciable effect, unless the Administration was moving in other ways to help induce change in South Africa, it would be regarded as no more than a half-hearted or ineffectual gesture.

Tab 1

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT

Washington, undated

FIVE POINTS

(Announced by Smith September 24, 1976)

—Rhodesia agrees to majority rule within two years.

—Rhodesian authorities will meet immediately with African leaders to organize an interim government.

—Interim Government will consist of:

—Council of State—Half African, half European, European chairman with no special vote. Functions to include legislation, general supervisory responsibility, supervision of drafting of Constitution.

—Council of Ministers—African majority and African first minister. Decisions by two-thirds majority. Defense, and law and order ministers to be European. Functions to include delegated legislative authority, executive responsibility.

—U.K. will enact enabling legislation. Rhodesia will also enact necessary legislation.

—Upon establishment of interim Government, sanctions will be lifted and all acts of war will cease.

(Also announced by Smith)

—Substantial economic support will be made available by the international community to provide assurances to Rhodesians about the economic future of the country. A trust fund will be established outside Rhodesia, which will organize and finance a major international effort.

BRITISH PROPOSALS

(January, 1977)

—Guerilla activity will cease as soon as agreement reached on setting up of transitional government.

—British willingness to play part in transitional arrangement is conditional upon all other parties abiding by agreement.

—British will appoint Interim Commissioner and Deputy Interim Commissioner to head transitional government.

—Creation of Council of Ministers (COM) composed of equal number from each Geneva delegation plus additional similar number of whites.

—Leaders of Geneva Conference would be members of Council of Ministers and form an inner cabinet (Advisory Council).

—COM to have full executive and legislative competence, subject only to Commissioner’s reserve powers.

—If agreement can be reached, an African will be First Minister of Council. If no agreement, other modalities, e.g. rotation of chairmanship will be determined.

—COM to appoint committee to draft constitution.

—Interim Commissioner’s residual responsibilities will include external affairs, defense, internal security, implementation of independence program.

—National Security Council will directly control defense and internal security. Council will consist of the leading members of Council of Ministers, and chiefs of staff of Army, Air Force and Police (appointed by Commissioner).

PATRIOTIC FRONT PROPOSALS

(December 2, 1976)

—Appointment by UK of Resident Commissioner on advice of prospective Council of Ministers.

—Commissioner will appoint Prime Minister in accordance with terms of the Geneva Agreement.

—Commissioner will have formal executive authority.

—Resident Commissioner and the Council of Ministers (COM) will be the legislative authority.

—The Resident Commissioner must approve all bills passed by the COM.

—COM will be comprised of 25 members, four-fifths, including the Prime Minister, will be from the Liberation Movement.

—COM will establish a constitutional committee to supervise drawing of new constitution based on one-man-one-vote.

—Council of Ministers can recommend removal of Commissioner by two-thirds vote.

—Amendment of the transitional constitution will require two thirds vote. Some chapters will be unalterable, e.g. judiciary, public service, amendment procedure.

MUZOREWA’s PROPOSALS

11/17/76

—UK-appointed Governor.

—Election on one-man-one vote basis to select a Prime Minister who, once elected, will distribute ministries in Executive Council.

—Executive Council to consist of Prime Minister and 34 members to be nominated by candidates for Prime Minister on basis proportional to the votes each received. An established minimum percentage of votes cast prerequisite for naming ministers.

—Executive Council will administer country, appoint commissions to draw up a constitution and supervise pre-independence elections.

—Legislature will be composed of all members of the Executive Council and shall have power to make, repeal and amend laws.

SITHOLE’s PROPOSALS

11/15/76

—Unicameral interim administration.

—Rotating chairmanship by five Geneva delegation heads.

—Legislative Council of 75 members (15 from each delegation) with authority to make legislation, exercise executive powers and prepare constitution.

—Administrative Council composed of three members of each delegation sitting in Legislative Council who shall each head a government department.

—Defense Council made up of five delegation heads with responsibility for internal security. Zimbabwe freedom fighters will form nucleus of defense forces.

Tab 2

Paper Prepared in the Department of State ⁶

Washington, undated

PROPOSALS FOR A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT

Major Provisions Security Council Resolution 385

1/30/76

—Calls for free elections under UN supervision and control for the whole of Namibia as one political entity.

—Declares that in determining date, time-table, and modalities for elections there shall be adequate time for UN to establish necessary machinery and for Namibian people to politically organize for the elections.

—Demands South Africa solemnly declare acceptance of Resolution’s provisions for holding free elections.

—Demands South Africa withdraw its illegal administration of the territory.

—Demands South Africa release all political prisoners, comply with Declaration of Human Rights, abolish application of racially discriminatory and and repressive laws and practices, especially bantustans and homelands, and grant amnesty directly to all political exiles.

—Decides to meet again on or before August 31, 1976 to review South Africa’s compliance with the resolution, and appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter in case of non-compliance.

NOTE: In explaining U.S. note, Ambassador Moynihan stated that “. . . It is clear that the Council is leaving open the exact form of UN supervision of these elections, leaving it to be worked out subsequently by the United Nations. We believe in this way the Council wisely avoids prejudging the exact nature of the UN role until this matter can be specifically considered.”

South African Basis for a Proposal

9/19/76

1. The Constitutional Conference will be held in Geneva to conduct further talks on independence.

2. The United Nations will designate an observer to the Geneva Conference.

3. South Africa will designate a representative in Geneva to maintain contact with the participants to the Geneva Conference and in order to negotiate issues which bear on South Africa’s relationship with an independent Namibia.

4. The Conference will decide the modalities of the election and the nature of its supervision prior to final independence.

5. The work program of the Geneva Conference may include any aspect of the process of independence which any of the participants wish to raise.

6. Subject to paragraph 3 the South African Government commits itself to accept whatever constitutional proposals are approved by the Conference.

7. The South African Government accepts the proposal of the Conference for independence by December 31, 1978.

(In subsequent discussions with the South Africans, we have obtained their commitment to a substantial release of political prisoners. In order to make clear that a new conference is not an extension of the Windhoek venue, South Africa has also agreed to send only a representative delegation from Windhoek to Geneva.)

SWAPO’s Conditions for Talks

1/14/77

1. Geneva should be the venue for the Namibia Independence Conference. This Conference will not be an extension of the Windhoek Constitutional discussions. SWAPO categorically rejects the Turnhalle tribal talks under any circumstances. The Namibia Independence Conference in Geneva will be on entirely new basis reflecting the unity of the whole people of Independent and Sovereign Namibia as a unitary State.

2. SWAPO insists that before any talks the South African Government must release all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees. Some of the leaders now in detention, restriction and in prison are likely to be part of the SWAPO delegation to Independence Talks.

3. SWAPO has been and is still ready to talk with the South African Government regarding the modalities for transferring power to the people of Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO.

4. SWAPO demands that the participants at the Namibia Independence Conference shall be SWAPO, South Africa and the United Nations.

5. SWAPO demands that the United Nations shall convene and chair the Conference.

6. South Africa must make prior commitment to withdraw all its armed forces from Namibia and to end its repression of the Namibia population.

7. The date for independence must be within nine months from the start of the Geneva talks.

8. The Namibian Independence Talks must start immediately.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 1, NSC Meeting: #5 Held 3/22/77, 3/77. Secret. Prepared in response to Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–4. Jeanne Davis sent the study, chaired by the Department of State, to Mondale Vance, Harold Brown, Turner, General George Brown, and Young under a February 5 covering memorandum. Brackets are in the original except where used to indicate where material has been omitted.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Documents 194 and 195.
3. UNSC Resolution 385, adopted unanimously on January 30, 1976, reaffirmed the United Nation’s legal responsibility for Namibia and demanded that South Africa allow a UN-organized election for a new government, the release of all political prisoners, and South African withdrawal from Namibia.
4. See footnote 2, Document 43.
5. Secret. Tabs 1 and 2 prepared by Davidow on February 1.
6. Secret.