119. Letter From President Carter to South African Prime Minister Botha1
Your government now faces a crucial decision regarding Namibia as you consider the proposals developed during the recent Proximity [Page 345] Talks in New York.2 As you make the historic decision about what course your government will take, I wanted to offer to you my observations.
In my letter, which Secretary Vance gave you on October 16, 1978,3 I stressed the importance which the United States attached to an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia and the beneficial consequences which would flow from such a settlement for all parties. Events since that letter have only served to re-confirm my belief.
At the beginning of my Administration, I decided that the United States would make a major diplomatic effort to resolve peacefully two burning problems—the Middle East conflict and the mounting violence in southern Africa. My purpose in both cases was to demonstrate that peaceful change and accommodation were possible. In both cases, my efforts were designed to reverse policy trends that were very adverse to all of us in favor of stability, development and security for the two regions.
In this context, I believe that an objective weighing of the benefits of the UN plan confirms that it offers the best solution for the people of Namibia and for all of the countries of the area, including South Africa. Through the UN plan, the continuing pressure of international and economic isolation or the threat of continuing guerrilla warfare can end for the new Government of Namibia. Granted international recognition, it can turn to the major problems of Namibia’s internal development.
Without international recognition, none of this will take place and nothing will be solved. The continuing violence inside Namibia will feed on the escalating violence in Rhodesia. The long, permeable borders of Namibia will increasingly be crossed. International involvement and opportunism will increase.
None of this need happen with the acceptance of the UN plan. While no one could promise that your acceptance of the plan offers an absolutely risk-free solution to the problem of Namibia, I believe this course of action is far and away the best for all concerned.
In your review of the situation, I urge you and your colleagues to reflect on how far we have come. In a situation of mounting guerrilla warfare and total mistrust, we have built on two years of painstaking negotiations, and we have developed a plan which SWAPO now completely accepts. This plan requires a guerrilla organization to test its strength at the ballot box in competition with other parties in Namibia. [Page 346] We have the firm commitment of the Front Line states to support the process.
For our part, as in the Middle East, my Administration is determined to press ahead, to insist on scrupulous adherence to the terms of the agreement by all sides, and to use favorable developments in Namibia to strengthen the forces of order, accommodation and regional peace.
The positive experience of cooperation in solving the Namibian problem can create a new atmosphere in your country’s relations with your neighbors and with the outside world, including the United States. I want very much to see such a development and I urge your government to join us in working towards this objective.4
Sincerely,
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 48, South Africa: 1979. No classification marking.↩
- March 19–23. See Documents 111–114, 116, and 117.↩
- See Document 94.↩
- In telegram 84266 to Cape Town and USUN, April 5, Vance transmitted Botha’s April 3 reply to Carter, in which he made the following points: The SAG agreed to the UN proposals on April 25, 1978, which called for SAG and SWAPO forces to be restricted to base and monitored by UNTAG. The latest UNSG report now says SWAPO will not be monitored by UNTAG, but by the Front Line, which was not acceptable to SAG. The proposals also now included establishment of bases inside Namibia for SWAPO forces there at the time of a ceasefire, creating new bases for SWAPO. This was not acceptable and negotiations should proceed based on the original proposals. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790155–0313)↩