116. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State1
Secto 3018. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (U) Namibia: March 20 Meeting of Contact Group Ministers and Front Line and Nigerian Representatives.
1. (C–entire text).
2. Contact Group met at Ministerial level early afternoon March 20 with representatives of the Front Line and Nigeria for a discussion of major issues holding up a Namibia settlement. Angola did not attend. Detailed account of meeting follows.
3. Vance—We met with SWAPO yesterday afternoon2 and with Pik Botha for two hours this morning.3 Our concerns centered on two items: SWAPO forces in neighboring states and SWAPO forces in Namibia.
On the question of SWAPO forces in neighboring states, we emphasized the Luanda statement that the Front Line (FL) would ensure that implementation of the plan was carried out scrupulously. We discussed this with South Africa in general terms. Yesterday, however, talking with SWAPO, we ran into a serious problem which we did not mention to South Africa this morning.
In our discussions with SWAPO, a serious question arose as to whether they accept the first sentence of paragraph 12 about restriction to base. If it is a fact that they don’t accept it, it would be a serious problem. We believe the FL should take this up with SWAPO since it would undermine the settlement effort.
On paragraph 11, bases inside Namibia, we discussed this with SWAPO and South Africa. We believe it needs to be made more concrete what is expected to be entailed in the implementation of paragraph 11. In our view, it might be possible to bridge the differences between the parties.
At the end of today’s meeting, the South African representatives took note of our views and said they would return home to discuss [Page 333] these issues with their government. They said they would get back in touch with us.
On the UNTAG composition issue, the South Africans saw it as not being insurmountable. We are left to deal with paragraphs 11 and 12 and the need to make things more concrete. Again, I must highlight the problem on paragraph 12.
Owen—A lot will depend on the response of the various parties today, but through intensive consultation we may see our way through. We need a half-way house between the two poles of no UN involvement in monitoring and total UN monitoring. We must work on what is meant by having SWAPO armed personnel in Namibia and the anxiety that has been aroused about infiltration. We must find a way of discussing this as a matter of arms control. I find it extraordinary why SWAPO would want to put its people in bases inside Namibia. We need to clarify matters and to reopen negotiations (sic). We have got to have more detail and must sort matters out.
Van Well—This is a useful exercise that should and can be continued. The SYG’s February 26 proposal can be accepted, but on the two points—paragraphs 11 and 12—we need more details.
On the bases outside Namibia, there is a tendency to give the liaison offices the special mission of communicating with neighboring countries. It is important that the sovereignty of the FL be respected. If it is possible for Angola to accept liaison in connection with the already existing UN office in Luanda, it would help clarify the situation. We will also have to discuss the terms of reference for liaison offices. There is also the question of the border. We will need to work on language ensuring coordination, verification, and cooperation.
On the internal side, there is a confusing situation. We don’t know SWAPO’s objective in establishing such bases. We discussed three possible ways of dealing with SWAPO armed personnel in Namibia with SWAPO. SWAPO said it wanted such bases, but it gave no indication of the number, size, and so on. This problem has caused apprehension on the part of the internal groups and has complicated matters. It is important that we find out more from SWAPO about the proposed set up so orderly procedures can be considered and a more detailed ceasefire letter prepared. The ten-day period for SWAPO to inform its troops shouldn’t be used by SWAPO to build up its presence inside Namibia. We believe that urgency must be attached to this issue.
Vance—We will be meeting with SWAPO this afternoon.
Stirn—The core of the matter is the quest for confidence and trust. If things go smoothly, we can go on to work out the details. There are no major obstacles. It is just a matter of resolving difficult implementation details. We must make every endeavor to move in this direction.
[Page 334]Vance—Have any of the FL countries had a chance to discuss with SWAPO the apparent SWAPO change of position on paragraph 12?
Mogwe (Botswana)—One of the issues SWAPO doesn’t 100 percent agree with is on the liaison offices. We have accepted it because we have understood the concept of the liaison offices. If we start trying to extend the role of the offices, that will lead to trouble. So far as Angola is concerned, it has not accepted having a liaison office. They’ve said that there are already UN offices in Luanda, so why is there a need for a new office? Maybe they will accept additional staff in these offices. However, we don’t want to be associated with any monitoring.
SWAPO’s position as you have outlined it to us is new to us. SWAPO hasn’t raised it with the FL Presidents at any stage. Maybe it is a result of their being exposed to daily attacks by South African forces—even Rhodesian forces. What guarantee do they have that they will receive protection?
Vance—When we asked SWAPO about the disposition of its personnel outside of Namibia, SWAPO never gave us a serious answer and only said that restrictions could certainly not apply to its members who might be “going to school”.
Mogwe—Details must still be worked out because of these differences.
Honwana (Mozambique)—I agree with what Minister Mogwe said about the role of the liaison offices. Mozambique is associated with documents such as the Luanda statement. Mozambique feels that it would be best if no new issues were introduced.
I don’t see the question of restriction to base in neighboring states as a difficult issue. The FL have already pledged to make sure that SWAPO complies with the settlement proposal. The FL States already control the SWAPO presence on their territory—even every bullet and every rifle. Otherwise, there would be a dangerous situation. They will continue to do so.
On confidence building for South Africa, they say they have doubts. The Five should prevail on South Africa to stop the mistrust. We could also have cause for mistrust. However, as sovereign FL States we have given our pledge through the SYG, so South Africa should have confidence.
The exact details have to be worked out. In each country, in Angola, in Zambia, the situation is different. Each has developed its own means of effecting control. It would be difficult to work out a single document on how SWAPO is to behave at the time of the ceasefire vis-a-vis the neighboring states. As for SWAPO’s restriction to base, the “school” problem, and so on, these are details. The important thing is that the FL States will and can guarantee that things should work out.
[Page 335]Vance—We are concerned about SWAPO’s apparent change of position on the question of restriction to base. We have not discussed this with South Africa. What we need to know is what are SWAPO’s intentions?
Honwana—I’m not prepared to comment on that. Maybe the stopping of mistrust is most important. Are the Five confident that the FL will comply with ceasefire terms?
Vance—Yes, we are.
Honwana—Then we are on the way. The other is detail, not a main issue.
Owen—While we accept it, the important thing is that some don’t. We’re losing some of our friends in Namibia—those who refused to take part in the (December) elections. The important thing is to see that the UNTAG mandate is fulfilled. We may have need for some give. Without raising the sovereignty question, we need give and confidence on the liaison office issue.
Harriman (Nigeria)—This is definitely an element we’ll have to discuss with SWAPO.
On the question of confidence, at the ceasefire there will be 30,000 or more South African troops in position. They won’t have to move away immediately after the ceasefire. Why are they worried?
About the bases inside, three options were cited yesterday on what might be done with SWAPO personnel. The best option would be to put them in locations—maybe “base” is not a good term to use. I don’t understand fully SWAPO’s position on this given the experience of the Windhoek bomb. Anyway, I don’t see that this is a serious problem.
Jamieson—Do the FL representatives believe that SWAPO will cooperate as a sine qua non of the FL’s assurances on the plan’s implementation.
Foum—Luanda was a commitment of the FL to cooperate. We feel SWAPO will cooperate if South Africa undertakes to do so. With daily South African attacks going on now, how can we expect SWAPO and Angola to go along now? The real question is how we can get South Africa to assure that it will go along and cooperate.
Jamieson—The South Africans stated this morning their desire for a period of tranquility so that the election process could go on.
Foum—We hope to see this attitude reflected in the Security Council.
Chakulya (Zambia)—I’m worried about the time factor. South Africa set the date of September 30 for the elections—I’m not sure whether this was decided on with SWAPO. Only a few months are left, and we have reached no conclusion. South Africa has deliberately created problems over monitoring and the FL countries. This monitor [Page 336] ing question has taken up the time which should be left to SWAPO for electioneering. It has given the South Africans more time. South Africa has begun the election campaign. SWAPO, meanwhile, has nothing—no materials, no money, and only a few months to go. The result will be that SWAPO will come out the worst.
The confidence question has been mentioned a couple of times. If South Africa believes it enjoys the trust of the world, the FL States also want to enjoy this trust. SWAPO doesn’t exist in thin air. They are in Zambia and Angola, where there are governments. These governments accepted their presence there. It is not fair for South Africa not to accept the sincerity of the FL Heads of State. As to the claimed lack of ability of the FL to implement the Luanda understanding, we are prepared to and will discuss details arising from commitments made by our Heads of State. However, details will have to be discussed on the spot. South Africa must be made to learn to trust our leaders and SWAPO, because sooner or later it is going to have to learn to live with a SWAPO government. Confidence can only be proved through action. Speaking of the question of restriction to base, how could it be right to say that the aggression, attacks, and killing caused by South Africa in the FL countries are valid reasons for the South Africans to change their mind about how far they can trust?
SWAPO has a responsibility to these (FL) countries. The question of SWAPO’s restriction to base is not an issue for South Africa. We run our own affairs and know how SWAPO operates. I’ve heard, although I’m not certain, that SWAPO has 400 men or less in Namibia. Why with 30,000 or more troops and powerful machinery are they scared?
It is time for South Africa to demonstrate to us what they are saying about being trusted. It is up to the Five to go back to them. I hope another time consuming round of Proximity Talks going into June or July won’t be necessary. South Africa is using a tactical method of delay to try to make sure that SWAPO loses the election. The time factor is of tremendous concern. The FL should be trusted.
Vance—The question of time is of the greatest importance and concern to us. South Africa is also concerned about time. The lack of confidence on both sides—SWAPO and South Africa—is a fact of life. Ways must be found to lessen this lack of confidence. Restriction to base is part of the proposal. That’s why SWAPO’s comments yesterday gave us such a shock. . . We have just learned that South Africa is leaving behind members of its party to discuss necessary details.
Owen—We must keep the momentum going. Unless we are able to flesh things out in detail, we won’t be able to restore confidence. We have to grapple with this problem.
Van Well—I was struck by the concern of the internal people over their lack of information and clarity on the question of restriction to [Page 337] base in Namibia. We need to try to find orderly procedures to resolve this and not to leave it in the clouds.
Jamieson—Everyone has said they accept the SYG’s report. Therefore, we shouldn’t try to minimize SWAPO’s departure in such a fundamental way from it. It would be a wide wedge, if known, for those who don’t want to see progress here.
This morning, Botha raised no question over lack of confidence in the FL’s commitment and desire for a peaceful solution. The concern this morning was that if SWAPO deliberately flaunted the FL then no one would be able to do anything about it. You and your countries are the key. We couldn’t have gotten so far without you.
Chakulya—On the 400 SWAPO, it has only been mentioned. Its only what some have said.
End of session.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790130–0961. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Khartoum, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Maputo, USUN, Ottawa, Paris, and Pretoria.↩
- See Document 112.↩
- See Document 115.↩