114. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State1
Secto 3016. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (C) Namibia: Meeting of Contact Group March 20 8:30 AM.
1. (C–entire text).
2. Contact Group met for one-half hour internal discussion before arrival SAG delegation.
3. Vance—We only have 35 minutes until Pik comes. The South Africans have requested that there only be three on each delegation. I agreed. Before they come, we have three things to discuss: A) our approach to Pik Botha; B) the Angolan Resolution in yesterday’s UNSC meeting2 and C) how to deal with the Front Line States about the implications in paragraph 12 relating to SWAPO forces. First let’s discuss the meeting with Pik. A draft paper was circulated giving some ideas. Do you have any comments?
Jamieson (Canada)—I tried to think last night about what would happen. Botha will probably go through his same routine especially about the composition of UNTAG. One thing occurred to me, we must try to identify the number of SWAPO armed forces inside Namibia. If we’re only talking of two or three hundred and if we could put an upper limit on these forces, it would seem more credible. There also seems to be a lack of confidence in the Front Line States’ ability to monitor. There seems to be no possibility of an UNTAG presence in the Front Line States.
Vance—It is clear that there can be no UNTAG presence there, but there needs to be an agreement between responsible officials of the Front Line States and UNTAG ceasefire experts. Also the Front Line will have to lean on SWAPO as regards the restriction of SWAPO forces to bases.
Jamieson—We need a better definition of bases. We don’t know how much mobility is involved. Do SWAPO forces have to be confined [Page 314] to bases or is it enough if there are no incursions into Namibia? Could we advance the idea that “confined to bases” means not crossing the border. Or would it be better to corral them in one location. Another problem occurs to me also. What would be the legal status of the SWAPO soldiers once they arrive in Namibia? Will SWAPO wish to have them active in the political campaign or prefer them to keep their arms and stay out of the campaign. They can’t have it both ways. Maybe we can draw SWAPO out on this question. If SWAPO is looking for an activist group, people who might be used as election cadres, perhaps we would have some leverage. We come back to the three alternatives for SWAPO forces: A) stay out of the country, B) return to the country disarmed as civilians or C) keep their arms and stay in camp.
Vance—What are the provisions for registration and participation in the elections?
Lapointe (Canada)—The agreement calls for peaceful participation in the elections by everyone in the country.
Stirn (France)—I would like to suggest a question to be asked of Pik Botha. Would the SAG accept the idea of two or three hundred SWAPO troops being assembled near the frontier? What guarantees would there be that these people would not go back and forth across the frontier?
Owen (UK)—SWAPO numbers have become very difficult. We can limit SWAPO to about 100 or 1500 but perhaps its better not to mention any numbers.
Stirn—I only use two to three hundred as a tentative figure. Let’s see where Pik would suggest placing these people.
Owen—I think we should toughen up the draft in the ceasefire letter and be more specific. One thing might be to find out if SWAPO’s forces had been in Namibia for at least a month.
Vance—How could we prove that?
Owen—We would have to require some sort of evidence. I think we should tell Botha that his bombing raids have incurred international odium. It seems to me we need a strict implementation of the ceasefire which would tie in with the Angola resolution and the Security Council. We need to find out about this concept of bases which after all came from the South African generals.
Jamieson—I would like to ask if Pik is likely to maintain his standard line or whether there might be some deviations this time.
Vance—Pik says he is under tight instructions, but of course he can communicate quickly with South Africa if need be.
Owen—We need people earmarked to deal with each of the different internal groups. We must try to separate them from the South Africans; otherwise that will be their only source of information.
[Page 315]Jamieson—Do we need to think more about the ultimate disposition of SWAPO forces after the election?
Vance—That’s answered on page 2. Another problem arises—that of “designated locations” in the Feb 26 report that came out in the plural. I think we need to stick to one location.
Jamieson—I agree. We should not be too specific, if we’re talking of 2500 or so we’ll need several locations, but if there are only a few people involved, one location should be enough.
Van Well (FRG)—We may need another report from the SYG to solve this problem. It has to be made clear that the placement of SWAPO forces in bases can only be valid on the day of the ceasefire. However, that implies that there must be some idea in advance of how many to expect. Only those appearing on the day of the ceasefire can be regarded as legitimate armed personnel. I think we might consider two designated locations, each able to provide for up to 200 people. These would have to be prepared in advance. We must tell Botha that he has to accept the idea of these locations. They will be centers not military bases. In this respect it would be analogous to the camps where the SAG army will be placed under similar guidelines. The internal parties asked who UNTAG would consult with. I expect this means the Administrator General. The August report of the SYG which everyone seems to accept, says that there will be monitoring of the bases in which troops are restricted. We could ask the Front Line States to monitor the forces in the centers in their countries. This might help Botha. Perhaps UN liaison officers would be able to go along with Front Line monitors and operate together. I agree with Mr. Jamieson that it is fruitful to find out the number of SWAPO forces involved. We have to know how many will arrive in Namibia, train personnel to look after them, find locations, etc. SWAPO must know how many people they will bring in on the date of the ceasefire. We should launch an appeal to them to tell us. After all, they know the exact number of SAG military personnel.
Vance—This has been very helpful. Now lets move on to the Angola resolution. Is it coming up to a vote today? Does it involve sanctions? I don’t believe anybody has seen it yet.
Owen—I think we should do our utmost to spin out the debate on the Angola resolution and stall for time. That way we can tie together what we are doing here and get the ceasefire letter sent out at the same time.
Vance—I share that view.
Jamieson—Will there be any move to have Angola agree to the monitoring of outside forces?
Owen—What other meetings should we schedule?
[Page 316]Vance—Let’s get through with the South Africans first. Then we can caucus among ourselves and decide what to do. Maybe we should see the Front Liners later.
Jamieson—What is your assessment? I’ve heard both sides are against the agreement but maybe South Africa will want to keep it on the rails.
Vance—My view is that Pik would like to keep it going. He will be difficult, but he has not come here to sabotage the talks.
Owen—I have to go home at 8:00 tonight but I could come back Thursday or Friday.
Van Well—We must keep in mind the UNSC debate. What happens there depends on progress here. If we state that there is no progress here, the debate will become a violent one. We could change this around and come to an agreement by working at night. However, we should not open up the prospect of a long conference. We have to keep the pressure on them and tell them that we need to come to a quick agreement. Also, we can’t hold off the Security Council debate for too long.
Vance—Is this place reasonably secure? There is a Reuters dispatch which states that Mr. Rhodie will make public his paper about the scandals which can force Pieter Botha to resign. Anyway, we should wind up here by Wednesday or Thursday so that by the end of the day we should have the outlines of an action paper.
Stirn—I agree. I have to leave tonight and I can’t come back until Saturday.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790129–0890. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Khartoum, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Maputo, USUN, Ottawa, Paris, and Pretoria.↩
- UNSC Resolution 447 (1979), condemned South Africa’s aggression toward Angola and demanded that South Africa “respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of Angola.” The resolution was adopted on March 28, by 12 votes to 0, with France, the United Kingdom, and the United States abstaining. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 225–233)↩