111. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State1
Secto 3004. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (U) Namibia: March 19 Meeting of Contact Group Ministers and Front Line and Nigerian Representatives.
1. (C–entire text).
2. Contact Group met at Ministerial level at 1000 am March 19 with representatives of the Front Line and Nigeria to discuss major issues holding up a Namibia settlement. Angola did not attend. Following is detailed account of the meeting.
3. Vance—We appreciate the work of the Front Line (FL) and Nigeria have done with the Contact Group (CG). This has led to substantial progress. In resolving the remaining problems, we need your judgment and advice. I wish to invite the FL and Nigeria to express their views.
Mogwe (Botswana)—(The Foreign Minister pointed out that the meeting would have to be kept short because the FL wished to be present at the Security Council (SC) while Angola presented its case against South Africa in connection with South African raids into Angola.)2 Let’s identify the issues. We are prepared to address them, but what are they?
Vance—We have identified the following issues:
A) Confinement to base of SWAPO forces in Namibia;
B) Confinement to base of SWAPO forces in neighboring states;
C) UNTAG troop composition, which is under discussion by the Secretary General with South Africa and SWAPO. The SYG is meeting with SWAPO and South Africa to discuss the third. Let us address the first and second.
Harriman (Nigeria)—On the two questions of confinement to base inside and outside of Namibia, what are the proposals and is there any sign of disagreement with SWAPO?
[Page 296]Vance—We haven’t spoken with SWAPO about this yet. SWAPO wants their meeting with us postponed until after the SC meeting (on the Angolan complaint).
McHenry—On the issue of SWAPO outside of Namibia, what is needed is a positive statement indicating that SWAPO accepts the idea of restriction to base. The SYG believes the wording of the SWAPO letter to him leaves some doubt whether SWAPO accepts restriction to base outside of Namibia.3 The problem on the second point is not whether SWAPO accepts restriction. It is a feeling on South Africa’s part that SWAPO may try to abuse this situation. Summarizing, SWAPO has accepted “inside” restrictions but remains vague about those “outside.”
Owen—What we are trying to do is to build up confidence we are not renegotiating the plan. The FL position statement in Luanda was most helpful.4 There may have been a misunderstanding about liaison offices. An armed UNTAG presence in neighboring countries was never contemplated. Civilians would be used. We should concentrate on whether we can get a mechanism for liaison between the governments of the FL and UNTAG forces on the Namibia border. Past UN peacekeeping operations have always had contact with governments across borders. There is a practical, concrete need for liaison between UNTAG forces and Angolan, Zambian, and Botswanan forces. These are confidence building measures which could help and which don’t contradict the settlement proposal.
Mogwe—On the civilian front, the liaison officers would provide contact between the UN and the FL governments. On patrolling, Botswana has accepted the principle of “scrupulous observance” of the proposal. Patrolling along the border is a technical problem to be worked out between commanders of the UNTAG forces and the Botswana forces.
Owen—We agree. It’s important that the SYG have contact on the national level and that UNTAG have contact with national forces. We need language of that sort which will help build confidence, perhaps using the Luanda communique (as a foundation). It is also of vital [Page 297] importance that South Africa give a commitment on its side. The South African bombing raids must not go on. Language and practical arrangements are needed.
Harriman—We must give emphasis to the fact that UNTAG forces will be along the border. The FL have agreed to “scrupulously observe” the proposal. With regard to the liaison concept, I understand that two of the FL States have agreed.
Owen—There is anxiety about the border for both South Africa and SWAPO. There are technical aspects to these issues.
Vance—There are technical means that have been used in monitoring elsewhere. They can be made available to UNTAG forces. This is what the Foreign Secretary has been referring to.
Chakulya (Zambia)—My silence is a recognition of what Botswana has said. The mechanics must be worked out between the UN forces and the FL. Details would be worked out with individual FL governments. They are prepared to do everything possible. Details must be worked out in the field. Monitoring of SWAPO cannot be done outside of Namibia. It is not acceptable for any outside force to come into Zambia. However, Zambia is prepared to accept any settlement progress. Zambia is a UN member and is waiting to play its part.
Foum (Tanzania)—Can we be informed about the attitude of South Africa following the Luanda communique, which shows how far the FL are willing to go?
Vance—The CG Ministers have not yet had a chance to meet with South Africa. We are meeting with Foreign Minister Botha this afternoon. It is important to have the views of the FL before sitting down with South Africa.
Honwana (Mozambique)—We’ve discussed among ourselves the points being made, here and at Luanda, and have come to complete agreement among the FL. Nevertheless, we are surprised about the main issues holding up implementation. The FL States have gone a long way. They are the ones who need to have their confidence boosted. South Africa has shown that it is the party having the greatest difficulty complying with the plan, witness the South African Air Force’s bombing raids (in Angola). If we were to have full confidence we should ground the South African Air Force. The FL have given every sign of willingness to cooperate. If South Africa doesn’t cooperate, we can raise new issues ourselves. We must know from South Africa what their problem is, what is their difficulty, are there any new demands? If we know these things, then we can discuss matters further.
Vance—We will have to wait until afternoon to clarify the restriction-to-base-inside-Namibia concept. We support the SYG’s position. It would be helpful to have the position of the FL.
[Page 298]Mogwe—The ceasefire shouldn’t be an occasion for anyone to lose any advantage they may have. There are no SWAPO bases in Namibia that we know of. Even SWAPO wouldn’t claim that. But they say they have people in Namibia. The problem is the term “base.” Couldn’t we speak of “designated areas?” We will need clarification from SWAPO.
Vance—We’ll have to ask SWAPO.
Mogwe—Yes. We can’t say anything until we talk with SWAPO.
Owen—What is the problem about numbers? The problem is that SWAPO has mobile forces. It is being elevated into a basic problem by South Africa. Can’t we put it back into perspective? We must try to defuse two issues as major problems. Then we would have no obstacles to implementation.
Chakulya—SWAPO has already indicated how many fighters it has in Namibia. It has already given the numbers to the SYG. It is difficult to discuss this issue until we’ve had the opportunity to discuss it with SWAPO.
Vance—We hadn’t realized a number was being used for SWAPO inside Namibia, although we had a number they suggested for bringing inside from outside.
(End of session).
4. Asked by the Secretary in a subsequent discussion for specifics on SWAPO armed forces in Namibia, Chakulya reverted to the 2500 man figure which Nujoma first cited in his February 10 meeting with Ahtisaari.5 However, we do not take this as a definitive statement of the African position.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790127–1062. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Khartoum, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Maputo, Ottawa, Paris, and Pretoria. Vance was in New York for the Namibia Proximity Talks.↩
- The Security Council held a series of meetings on the issue March 19–28. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 225–229)↩
- In telegram 955 from USUN, March 7, the Mission transmitted the text of Nujoma’s March 6 letter to Waldheim. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790104–0841)↩
- In telegram 756 from Lusaka, March 5, the Embassy transmitted the text of the March 4 press communiqué, in which the Frontline States wrote the following: “(I) In accordance with the UN plan, SWAPO armed forces inside Namibia will be confined to base and monitored by the UN. (II) In accordance with the UN plan, there will be no monitoring of SWAPO forces outside Namibia. In this connection, the summit and SWAPO, while categorically rejecting South Africa’s demand to have SWAPO forces outside Namibia monitored, reaffirmed their commitment to scrupulously ensure the observance of the ceasefire agreement.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790101–0405)↩
- Not found. In telegram 583 from USUN, February 10, the Mission transmitted a message Nujoma read to Ahtisaari, which contained “SWAPO’s comments and recommendations to the UNSYG on the implementation of the UN plan.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790065–0669)↩