Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

117. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 22, 1979, 0811Z

1238. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (C) Namibia: Contact Group Ministers Meet Front Line and SWAPO Together March 20, 4:00 pm.

1. (C–entire text).

2. Contact Group met with Front Line Ministers and SWAPO representatives. Front Line Ministers had previously talked to SWAPO representatives and persuaded them to join in meeting with CG. Meeting was opened by Botswana FonMin Mogwe.

3. Mogwe (Botswana)—We appreciate the chance to meet you again² and we took the liberty of inviting SWAPO along. There are three areas which we would like to discuss (a) liaison offices, (b) designated areas inside Namibia and (c) the first sentence of paragraph 12 (of the SYG’s Feb 26 report). On the first point, SWAPO does not favor liaison offices, but the decision as to whether to accept them is not up to SWAPO, but to the Front Line states. Angola has not accepted the idea. SWAPO, like Angola, thinks that the function of an UN office already in country might be extended, not for monitoring, but for certain liaison functions.

As for bases inside Namibia, we hope that the matter has been cleared up. SWAPO requests bases inside Namibia. We have raised the question with them about their introducing people from outside after the ceasefire or three weeks later.

They say that is not so. When the ceasefire day arrives, SWAPO is not interested in introducing people from outside Namibia. Only their people inside should be confined to bases. SWAPO cannot estimate the numbers at this point because a wartime situation still exists. We are waiting for D-Day.

The third point, which worried us all, refers to the first sentence of paragraph 12. SWAPO tells us that they accept the principle in that sentence which is also reiterated in the Luanda communique. The main question is, who will do the monitoring. SWAPO accepts confinement to bases, but this will be monitored by the countries concerned, not by liaison officers. Liaison officers would be the wrong instruments to do this.

Vance—I am pleased to hear that you accept the first sentence of para 12. This is very important. The SYG said that he got the same understanding from his talk with you. We would also like to thank SWAPO for coming to this meeting which had originally been scheduled for a little later in the day.

Chakulya (Zambia)—I also would like to thank SWAPO for agreeing to that sentence.

Muyongo (SWAPO)—I sent a small paper to the Ministers,³ so I won’t go into yesterday’s discussions again. I think Dr. Owen brought one point up, though, which was not answered. The question was who was to do the monitoring—liaison officers or the officials of the neighboring states. We will not permit liaison officers to monitor our bases.

Owen (UK)—That puts the main onus on SWAPO and the Front Line States. We need some sort of linkage between UNTAG and the Front Line States in discussing the fulfilling of the UN mandate. This might take the form of supervision or control, which could not be done by UN civilian personnel. But what is necessary in other words, is to return the surveillance or information function to UNTAG.

Muyongo—We enjoy close cooperation with neighboring countries where we have been living. Their Heads of State have agreed to “scrupulously observe” the ceasefire agreement. So the question of further control does not arise.

Owen—The point is that the interpretation of this is not just up to us. We believe in what you say. If we had been the only ones involved, we would have had an agreement years ago. We don’t doubt the Front Line Presidents’ intentions, but others do.

There are two different positions here. One is complete surveillance by UNTAG military elements. That’s what South Africa wants. The other is inspection only by Front Line officials. What we are looking for is a “half-way house” something between these two, or an area which will set up procedures to provide for contact between UNTAG and Front Line officials.

Vance—This liaison is really a problem to be worked out between the SYG and the Front Line States.

Mogwe—I agree. We have accepted this in principle.

Chakulya—Yes, fine, Zambia agrees too.

Van Well (FRG)—We have all agreed to the undiminished responsibility of the Front Line States. There is no problem of sovereignty here. All we want is some form of liaison. For example, could liaison officers accompany Front Line representatives around the countries to observe SWAPO forces? Or are they restricted to capitals?

Hunwana (Mozambique)—Our experience is that we all have UN refugee offices in our countries. We have worked out procedures with them, for example, as to how to visit refugees, how their food should be delivered, information about their camps, what to do about attacks by Rhodesia or South Africa, etc.

The same procedure should take place with UNTAG. We will arrange locally how the liaison offices will operate. The principle has been accepted. It is difficult at this point to define every detail. There is no problem unless negotiations are reopened. If we reopened them, even those countries which have accepted the idea of liaison offices would have to look at the question again.

Chakulya—There can be no “half-way house” or “three quarters way house.” The UN will send representatives from headquarters or from UNTAG for discussions in the capitals. As UN members we want to see the plan fulfilled. I don’t see Dr. Owen’s point. This is all I can say. I don’t see any problem. There shall be no monitoring. Our minds are clear.

Vance—I won’t speak for Dr. Owen, but I do think these explanations answer his questions. The question is one between Front Line States and the UN.

Mogwe—It can’t all be worked out in advance. Some points must be worked out on the spot.

Vance—Do you have any questions about point 2 (designated locations within Namibia)? I understand that no one will be introduced into the country after ceasefire day. What happens in the ten-day period between the signing of the acceptance letter and the actual ceasefire?

Muyongo—What we have in mind is that our internal forces would be regrouped and told where to go.

Vance—Does that mean nobody new will be sent in?

Muyongo—Nobody new will be needed there.

Young—That point should be made very clear. The South Africans are very nervous about that ten-day period. They might shoot at everyone they think is entering. A clear understanding is needed to prevent incidents.

Muyongo—During our ten-day reorganizing period, if we are attacked, we won’t sit on our hands. Can we get promises SA won’t attack us?

Young—The image they see is one of thousands of SWAPO cadres coming across the line, saying “here we are, put us in bases”. That’s what those people down there fear. We’ve said we don’t see it that way, but if they see a lot of people moving around, they will try to stop them. We should avoid such situations.

Muyongo—As the SWAPO representative, I will not talk about DTA or the other groups. The problem is with the South Africans. Our forces are different from theirs. Theirs have fixed bases; ours have mobile ones. Our forces need to be told where to go. Can we be told they won’t attack us. We repeat that we don’t intend to send anyone across the border.

Mogwe—We have not only assurances from SWAPO but also commitments from the Frontline States. The logistics need to be worked out.

Vance—I think it’s clear. What Andy was talking about was protecting the SWAPO people while they are regrouping.

Honwana—SWAPO needs quite a long time to communicate with its soldiers. They have no sophisticated means of communications like the South Africans. On ceasefire day every single South African soldier will know about it. You have SWAPO’s assurance that once the letter is signed, the war is over. Afterwards there will be no further movement across the border. We don’t want them shot at while they are regrouping. So please send this assurance to the SAG. The Five should tell SA to stop shooting at SWAPO at the same time.

Vance—I think that’s helpful. We will transmit the message.

McHenry—UNTAG will arrive before the ceasefire, but they will not have time to deploy, so there could be some problems. We must think about that more, but we will transmit your message.

Vance—That makes sense, and we will transmit this information.

Chakulya—I have a follow-up question. While there are assurances from the Front Line States and SWAPO, can we have assurances from SAG that they will not attack SWAPO camps while they are regrouping, not only within Namibia, but outside as well?

Vance—We will transmit that message. This has been very helpful to me.

Young—Do you plan to do something publicly with your statement? On page 2, there is some confusion. Now that we have an understanding, perhaps the statement could be rewritten to reflect what we have done.

Gurirab—Let’s agree the statement is confidential.

Mogwe—I hope we haven’t committed ourselves to something new. I haven’t seen the statement.

Owen—We have clarified the problem outside the country; what about inside now?

Young—What members of SWAPO forces are we talking about inside Namibia (10,000–20,000 or 100,000)?

Muyongo—No one can tell the figure. The war is still going on. We are speaking of numbers on that particular day, i.e. ceasefire day. Don’t squeeze us.

Jamieson (Canada)—We are not squeezing; we are only seeking clarity. Would you prefer to have your forces confined to base only or could they have other options? For example, would they prefer to return to bases outside the country or would they perhaps remain inside to take part in the political campaign? What are the options you want for your people?

Muyongo—I hope you don’t think all of Namibia is full of SWAPO soldiers. We will tell them to go to a given base and that is what they will do. They will then be confined to base.

Jamieson—But we have heard that if everyone was in camp, there would be no problem.

Muyongo—If everyone in Namibia was in SWAPO, they would all be in camp. We solved this problem yesterday.

Van Well—It is legitimate to ask about motives. There will be an election campaign. You would think they would prefer that to staying on base. Also there must be some preparation. We need an orderly procedure. If there are 10, 50, 200 or 3000, it makes a difference in facilities. We need an indication of the dimensions of the problem.

Foum (Tanzania)—We are beginning to have apprehensions. SWAPO is a political organ with a political wing and a military wing. SWAPO has said that its military operatives will be confined to camps. The others will be free to take part in the political process.

Mogwe—The Front Line must go to the UN meeting. Maybe you would like to stay on with SWAPO?

Muyongo—What we are discussing now is after the ceasefire is agreed to. Are there other motives behind this? It is SWAPO’s business to see who takes part in political activity, nobody else’s. People confined to base will take orders from us. Why is there such interest in this question now?

Vance—I don’t understand the questioning of motives. There are no hidden or ulterior motives. What we are attempting to do is to clarify the problem and to clear up misunderstandings. Today’s clarifications have been useful. Mr. Van Well’s questions had no motives behind them.

Gurirab—I appreciate that. However, we inferred from the question and the way it was brought up yesterday that an attempt was being made to eliminate the “restriction to base” part of the agreement. If we were wrong, we will stand corrected. We simply are not interested in the other two options.

Vance—There was no attempt to eliminate that at all; only to clarify. We asked if all your people would go into camps and your answer was “yes”. (Gurirab nodded agreement) So again, thank you all very much for coming.

Young

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790132–0349. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Khartoum, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Maputo, Ottawa, Paris, and Pretoria.
2. See Document 116.
3. Not found.