Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

471. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, June 25, 1979

SUBJECT

• Limiting the Consequences of a Sandinista Victory

As you are aware, there are a variety of steps being taken to deal with the situation in Nicaragua. However, we ought to consider the consequences if we are unable to achieve a satisfactory solution. It therefore seems to me desirable that we begin immediately to examine what we might do to prevent the destabilization of neighboring countries, especially El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

Should the Sandinistas prevail in Nicaragua, and especially if the resulting government goes Marxist-Leninist, we are likely to see two types of general effects. The leftist oppositions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras will be encouraged in their efforts; Nicaragua likely will be available to them as a base of operations, possible safe haven, and source of, or conduit for, materiel support. The right in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras will likely react sharply to protect their positions; they (including especially the military) will want to take measures to ensure that “it can’t happen here.” In sum, a Sandinista victory will strengthen the leftist insurgents and increase the likelihood of left-right confrontations in these other countries.

It would be useful specifically to take account of these possibilities in our policies toward El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The recent PRC on Central America made specific recommendations concerning these countries (Tab A), but, at that time, a near-term Sandinista victory seemed less likely than currently is the case.² The situations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras actually differ substantially, making different strategies appropriate:

—In El Salvador, the current president, Romero, is one of the very few El Salvadoran military leaders who would be receptive to United States’ suggestions for internal political liberalization. He faces a very significant (and recently quite successful) leftist opposition—the take-overs of the Venezuelan, French, and Costa Rican embassies³ are only the most recent manifestations of the very substantial internal terrorist threat—who almost certainly will be emboldened by the Sandinista (and their own) successes. Concurrently, his military will want to crack down hard on this opposition and will want to replace him if he does not respond.

—The US cannot reasonably expect a better government in El Salvador than President Romero represents and our near term efforts should be directed toward maintaining Romero in power. El Salvador is, however, a tinderbox and helping Romero may require both providing him assistance (beyond the aid loan recommended by the PRC) to demonstrate that his “dialogue” with the US Embassy pays dividends and looking the other way somewhat if, to offset the terrorists, he takes steps that also violate rights in country. This would require our adopting (especially in forums like Deputy Secretary Christopher’s committee⁴ which reviews our many non-military assistance programs) a policy toward El Salvador designed toward encouraging stability by giving more weight to actions that would buttress Romero and less weight to actions which would squeeze him because of human rights violations.

—In Guatemala, the military and ruling elite are sufficiently strong and the opposition sufficiently weak that a Sandinista takeover likely will have only long-range, rather than immediate, significant effects. Given the substantial involvement of the government in assassination of potential moderate leaders, we probably do not want to do more than the PRC recommended ($6 million rural enterprise loan, helicopter for President). Indeed, long-range United States strategy may best be served by selecting moderate military leaders and seeking to protect them from government attack.

—In Honduras, as in Guatemala, there is no significant leftist threat. Indeed, the advent of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua could remove them from their safe havens in Honduras and thereby eliminate one of the significant problems the country now faces. The other significant problems (apart from Honduras’ general politico-socio-economic plight) are the influx of refugees from Nicaragua and the Honduras-El Salvador border dispute. Neither of these will be much affected by a Sandinista victory in Nicaragua.

Our strategy in Honduras, therefore, should be directed to ensuring that the military do not (in reaction to the Nicaraguan situation) refuse to go through with its plan shortly to hold elections. One useful thing the United States could do would be quickly to implement the PRC strategy to “try” to increase economic aid, FMS, and IMET levels. This would be a demonstration of US support at a time when the Honduran military might most appreciate it.

In sum, the strategy laid out by the PRC and approved by you is sound so far as it goes, but it should be expanded as outlined above.

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 30, Meetings—SCC 183, 7/17/1979. Secret.
2. Not attached; see Document 469.
3. See footnote 4, Document 374.
4. The Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance was known as the Christopher Committee for the chairman Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher.