Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

472. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 19, 1979

SUBJECT

• SCC on Central America—July 20, 1979 (C)

The central questions for the SCC are how can we keep Nicaragua from becoming another Cuba, and how can we keep the rest of Central America from becoming another Nicaragua? Or, to put it a little differently, how do we bring the influence of friendly neighboring countries to bear on the internal political process in Nicaragua in a way which keeps the extremists from taking over, and how do we put the examples of “Nicaragua” to best use in encouraging Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala (HEG countries) to make the kinds of reforms necessary to prevent a repetition of the polarization that afflicted Nicaragua? (Agenda at Tab A)² (S)

Harold Brown’s memo (Tab B) suggests we bolster the HEG countries and abandon our human rights policy.³ I believe his argument rests on a weak and perhaps erroneous premise: that U.S. support is necessary and sufficient to stabilize these regimes. The central crisis in HEG is the increasingly widespread alienation of the people of Central America from their government; we are witnessing the wholesale delegitimization of narrow-based military governments. That is why popular front organizations have mushroomed in number and size in El Salvador. They do represent a threat to the democratic process, but so, too, do the government’s executions (including the killing of 24 people on the steps of the Cathedral, filmed by CBS). (S)

But I agree wholeheartedly with Brown that we should not let our human rights policy drag us into a policy of withdrawal or disassociation. Rather, what is needed is some bold steps on our part and on the part of the governments in the region, and we need to continue trying different paths until we find the one that works. And we need to counter everything the Cubans do. (S)

The formula we must adopt is simple, and we should seek to reach private agreement with the governments first and then announce it publicly in order to make our policies and intentions clear and reduce the opportunity for extremists to misconstrue our motives. The HEG governments should announce a series of political and social reforms (described in more detail below), and the U.S. will support them to the hilt. We should not deceive ourselves into thinking that such reforms are not necessary, or that U.S. support is sufficient to overcome the crisis of delegitimization in the absence of these reforms. If we decide to “look the other way” to acts of repression, we will be merely boarding a sinking ship. (And at the same time, we will be violating U.S. human rights laws, and Congress is likely to respond by tightening them.) (S)

I believe we can sell that formula—reforms for support—to the Honduran and Salvadorean Presidents now. Both are very worried by Nicaragua. The Salvadorean President has asked for a meeting with the President, and I believe if we make clear that we are ready to support them with economic and security assistance and with political/psychological support, they will buy it. But the formula should be supplemented by covert and overt support to moderate groups and covert and overt opposition to extremists. We should also seek to engage other Latin American democracies and seek to draw all five Central American governments into a tighter, more interdependent matrix in which increasing amounts of foreign aid are channelled through Central American regional institutions to be allocated according to a formula or plans made jointly by them. (This procedure would not only increase the possibilities for regional integration, it would dramatically increase the leverage of HEG on the new Nicaraguan government.) (S)

The important point is that this strategy needs to be implemented boldly with high-level trips to the region, occasional visits by leaders from the region, public statements, etc. (S)

El Salvador

On Monday,⁴ the Salvadorean President Romero asked for a meeting with the President. I think it makes sense to bring him up here, but I think we should save the President until we really need him, and we will. I recommend we set up meetings for Romero with the Vice President, you, Secretaries Vance and Brown, and General Jones. The message to be conveyed is a simple one, and if he agrees, we should make it public. We should inform President Romero that we are prepared to provide economic and security assistance (as suggested in McAuliffe’s memo at Tab C) if he is prepared to publicly state his commitment to free, internationally-observed Congressional elections in March 1980.⁵ This would mean that he would have to reform the electoral code, gain the full support of two critical political parties (the Christian Democrats and MNR), and fully investigate any allegations of massive repression. (The church killings still have not been investigated.) (S)

Before he comes, we should send someone like Vaky down (next week) to explore the possibility of scheduling Presidential elections (not scheduled until 1982) earlier—say by October, and to get the military to oversee (rather than participate in) the elections much as the military in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru has done. (Indeed, we ought to consider encouraging the Andean military leaders to give advice to their Central American counterparts.) An early election would be a quick and effective injection of legitimacy, and it would prevent the radicalization of the middle. Unlike in Nicaragua, Salvador has an effective and popular middle party (the Christian Democrats) with a popular national leader (Napoleon Duarte, whom I have met; he is a moderate, effective leader). Durarte won the Presidential election overwhelmingly in 1972 but was booted out by the military. If he could be protected (both the extreme left and right would probably like to assassinate him), he would probably win an early election, and he would stop the polarization in its tracks. We ought to try to convice Romero to accept him and an early election as the only way to save Salvador from revolution. For a long time, the military and the “14 Families” have viewed the Christian Democrats as “Communists” or as a threat to them; unless they begin to see them as their hope—not a threat—they will be in real trouble, and nothing the US does will be of any help. (S)

Honduras

Compared to El Salvador, Honduras seems easy—at least on the surface. We have received several reports suggesting that the Communists might try to grab Honduras by infiltrating the military and since we have very little information on what’s happening in the military, it’s difficult to assess these reports. You should ask JCS and DOD to look into this. (S)

Honduras’s human rights record is good, and we can in fact, go ahead with all of McAuliffe’s recommendations right now—and we should (Tab C). But the Honduran military still have doubts about letting the Christian Democrats (PDC) play any role in the elections next March, and so we should encourage them to accept the PDC. (S)

We may want to consider inviting the Honduran President with the Salvadorean for two reasons. First, the two countries are somewhat competitive, and the Hondurans have been doing a better job so that it looks like we’re rewarding the wrong one if we only meet with Romero. Secondly, the two countries have been negotiating a border dispute since the soccer war in 1969. They are reportedly very close to settlement, and a trip to Washington could be the catalyst to resolve it, and resolution of that problem would help heal the profound divisions in the region. Again, to make sure that a trip to Washington would accomplish these objectives, we should consider sending Vaky, McAuliffe, and perhaps me to speak to Paz first. (S)

Guatemala

Guatemala does not face the prospect of revolution, only isolated acts of political assassination, almost all of it being done by right-wing groups associated with the government. Our reports suggest that the former Army Chief of Staff Cancinos ordered the assassination of two leading moderates, Colom Arguetta and Fuentes Mohr. In turn, Cancinos was killed by a right-wing military rival, who tried to blame it on leftist guerrillas. A hopeless government of short-sighted leaders. Fortunately, the political situation does not show any signs of getting out of control. Still, I think we should try the Salvador strategy—reforms for support. I would encourage more selectivity with McAuliffe’s list on Guatemala. (S)

Nicaragua

Two issues should be addressed: (1) How, when, and how much reconstruction assistance? I think State is developing some specifics on this. I’m inclined to begin soon and modestly, after consulting with our Latin friends; but to escalate our involvement in a couple of weeks if things still look O.K.; and (2) What should our policy be to the new government? My recommendation: give them the benefit of the doubt; give them relief and later reconstruction assistance; hold them to their assurances; tolerate their trespasses for a while; and cross our fingers. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 30, Meetings—SCC 183, 7/17/1979. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw it.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Not attached; see Document 471.
4. July 16.
5. Not attached. Attached to another copy of the memorandum is an undated and unsigned memorandum entitled “Shoring up the Northern Tier.” The memorandum summarizes McAuliffe’s proposals, in which ISA/IA concurred and the JCS viewed “favorably,” for “security assistance actions” for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador in order to “give quick signals of reassurance to those countries which will feel threatened by the accession to power in Nicaragua of an FSLN-dominated government.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 7, Central America: 6–7/79) McAuliffe’s full proposal is in a telegram from Southern Command Quarry Heights Canal Zone, July 12, 1800Z. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 8, Central America: SCC 7/20/1979 Meeting)