Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

470. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 13, 1979

SUBJECT

• PRC on US Policy to Central America (U)

Attached is the Summary of Conclusions of the PRC meeting on Central America which Warren Christopher chaired on June 11th. There was a consensus that the area demands our highest attention because of the increasing violence and political polarization, and also because of the possibility that Communist guerrillas could seize power. In order to try to reverse the perception of US vacillation or withdrawal, the PRC recommends a strategy to the region and to its four northern nations—Nicaragua, Guatelama, El Salvador and Honduras. (S)

In addition to the strategies recommended in the attached, we also believe that we should explore with the Europeans, Canadians and Japanese the possibility of establishing a Central American Development Group (modeled on the Caribbean Group) to coordinate aid to the region, to encourage regional economic cooperation, and to provide added leverage in pursuit of our objectives. At the same time, we should seek agreement with these countries on a common approach to the political problems in the region. (S)

In addition, I recommend that we begin Congressional consultations urgently in order to explain our overall strategy to the region. (U)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions and the strategies set out in the attached.² (U)

That you approve the idea of our exploring with Western Europeans, Canadians and Japanese a common approach to the region and a possible Central American Development Group.³ (C)

That State be instructed to urgently hold consultations on the Hill.⁴ (U)

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

Washington, undated

U.S. OBJECTIVES TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA

—movement toward more open political systems, free elections, and democratic processes;

—reduction of violence and instability;

—strengthening of centrist and moderate groups and the linkages among them;

—a diminution in the appeal and power of radical elements and Castro-linked groups;

—economic and social development which would improve the services and opportunities available to the people and reduce the vulnerabilities and frustrations that lead to political tensions;

—renewed momentum toward greater regional economic cooperation and integration as an effective framework to foster modernization and reduce intra-regional tensions, including demographic problems;

—better observance of human rights, an end to terrorism from both left and right, and a cessation of such practices as political assassination and torture;

—resolution of the area’s international conflicts, especially the Honduras—El Salvador dispute; and

—a friendly perception of the U.S. and willingness to cooperate with us for larger goals, including strategic considerations related to both the Panama Canal and the hemisphere’s security.

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁶

Washington, undated

US STRATEGY ON NICARAGUA

1. Consult with Andean nations, Mexico and others to share our appraisal of gravity of Nicaraguan situation, and to secure support for an OAS Meeting.⁷ In our consultations, we should explore in a preliminary way the possibility of establishing an Inter-American military peace force that would have balanced representation (including, for example, the Brazilians) and would provide the necessary stability to permit a peaceful and democratic transition to a new government.⁸ The PRC stressed that such a force should only be contemplated within the context of a process by which the Nicaraguan government would change. (While the PRC did not expect agreement on such a force at this time, all agreed it would be useful to broach the idea now in order to register the intensity of our concern over the possibility of a chaotic or a Cuban-style outcome and also to encourage countries to think about it now so that they may be more prepared to act in the future.)⁹ (S)

2. Join others in calling (or call, if necessary) for OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers, on an urgent basis, to consider present Nicaraguan situation as a threat to peace. U.S. would make a clear statement at the OAS (or elsewhere) in favor of selfdetermination, calling for a negotiated transition of power and free elections as soon as feasible, and expressing U.S. willingness to assist. It would also be a tough statement against foreign intervention, applying equally to those who are providing support to the Sandinistas as well as to those who are helping or could help the Nicaraguan government.¹⁰ (S)

3. Take steps through private demarches and, if possible through the OAS to halt arms flow to both sides (e.g. from Israel and Argentina as well as from Cuba and Panama) so that the parties can be persuaded to negotiate.¹¹ We should seek an OAS resolution calling on all countries to cease providing arms to the parties to the conflict, and privately and on a selected and bilateral basis, we should explore the possibility of future steps, including an embargo, to enforce that resolution.¹² (S)

4. Instruct Ambassador Pezzullo, upon arrival in Managua, to

(a) join others in helping to build an effective moderate opposition, to provide for a transition of power as soon as feasible,

(b) point out to Somoza the necessity of accepting a negotiated solution with free elections, and the steps to achieve same, and

(c) encourage National Guard and Liberal Party to support negotiated solution.¹³

5. Maintain present “cool” position with respect to economic and military aid.

6. Take other available steps to support moderate opposition and promote negotiated solution.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 27, Latin America, 5–7/79. Secret. Sent for action. Under cover of a June 12 memorandum, Pastor sent Brzezinski the summary of conclusions of the June 11 PRC meeting on Central America for Brzezinski to submit to Carter. Pastor noted: “There is a great deal of urgency in getting a decision. Vaky would like to get a cable out to all our posts instructing our Ambassadors to seek support for an OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers along the lines decided by the PRC. If we want the meeting by early next week, we should get the cable out by tomorrow.” Aaron approved on June 12; according to a handwritten note on Pastor’s memorandum Brzezinski hand-carried the summary of conclusions to Carter on June 13. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject, Box 25, Meetings—PRC 111, 6/11/1979)
2. The summary of conclusions is attached but not printed. The strategies are printed as Tabs A and B, below. For the minutes of the June 11 PRC meeting, see Document 469. Carter approved and wrote: “See notes re embargo” in the adjacent margin. Brzezinski sent the approved summary of conclusions, under cover of a June 13 memorandum, to Vance, Brown, McIntyre, Gilligan, Jones, and Turner. (Carter Library, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 27, Latin America, 5–7/79)
3. Carter approved the recommendation.
4. Carter did not indicate his preference with respect to this recommendation.
5. Secret.
6. Secret.
7. Carter underlined “consult with Andean nations” and wrote “ok” in the adjacent margin.
8. Carter underlined “explore” and “Inter-American military peace force” and wrote “ok” in the adjacent margin.
9. Carter placed a checkmark in the margin next to this sentence.
10. Carter wrote “ok” in the margin next to this paragraph.
11. Carter wrote “ok” in the margin next to this sentence.
12. Carter underlined “including an embargo,” wrote “no” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence, and wrote “? Embargo against Israel?” in the margin under this sentence. A revised version of “U.S. Strategy on Nicaragua” eliminated the phrase “including an embargo.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 8, Central America: PRC Meeting: 6/11/1979)
13. Carter wrote “ok” in the margin next to this paragraph.