Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

469. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, June 11, 1979, 3:30–5:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Central America

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary
  • David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
  • Viron Vaky, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
  • Frank Ortiz, Ambassador to Guatemala
  • Lawrence Pezzullo, Ambassador to Nicaragua

• OSD

  • Charles Duncan, Deputy Secretary
  • ADM Gordon Schuller, Director, Inter-American Region

• JCS

  • Lt General William Smith, Assistant to the Chairman

• DCI

  • Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director
  • [name not declassified] Office of Political Analysis

• OMB

  • Dr. John White, Deputy Director
  • Bowman Cutter, Executive Associate Director of Budget

• AID

  • Robert Nooter, Acting Administrator
  • Abelardo Valdez, Assistant Administrator for Latin American Bureau

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron

• NSC

  • Robert Pastor

MINUTES

U.S. Policies to Central America. Warren Christopher opened the meeting by suggesting that since the section in the PRM background paper on U.S. interests and objectives (page 6) was so general, he assumed that it was not objectionable.² He asked whether there were any comments on this section, and if not, perhaps the discussion should shift directly to country-by-country strategies. (S)

Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan suggested that the first objective should be “the reduction of violence and instability in the region,” and that we should give highest priority to that. Only after there is a stable foundation can we begin to talk about moving “toward more open political systems.” (S)

Christopher said that he was less certain about the sequence. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski took exception with Mr. Duncan’s remark. He said that we should begin with the statement on the need to move “toward more open political systems” as this is an appropriate chapeau, which incorporates all of the other objectives. (S)

Mr. Duncan accepted the objective “a reduction of violence and instability” as the second objective which should be listed on page 6, and all agreed with that. (S)

General Smith, however, suggested that a philosophical issue is at stake—a question between the need for orderly change, or just change for the sake of change. He and Mr. Duncan agreed that the first priority needs to be to calm the situation in Central America. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski repeated his suggestion that that objective be the second one, and all agreed. (S)

Nicaragua

At Christopher’s request, Ambassador Vaky provided an assessment of the state of affairs in Nicaragua. Vaky said that there is currently a stand-off between the FSLN and the National Guard, but that the National Guard could probably last out the violence. However, the Sandinista strength has increased to some degree. The polarization between the extremes has also increased. A valid question is whether Somoza can hold out until 1981. The conflict is becoming particularly dangerous because of the internationalization of the arms flow to both sides, and the prospect that other countries could enter the conflict. (S)

In response to a question from General Smith about whether the real problem in Nicaragua right now is the increasing violence, Ambassador Vaky said that is not the case. The issue is Somoza—a personal, dynastic problem. The problem is how to address the need for a transition of power from Somoza to someone else; that is the only place to look for an answer. (S)

Mr. Carlucci agreed with Mr. Vaky’s assessment. The question is not if Somoza will fall, but when and under what circumstances. While Somoza may get through the current fighting, Carlucci wondered how much longer he would be able to survive. The Center in Nicaragua is being chewed up. The left is much stronger than before. The possibility of a revolutionary council-style of government is very real. The Cubans have also escalated the degree of their involvement. (S)

In response to a question from Mr. Christopher about whether Carlucci’s assessment represented a revision of a previous assessment of Somoza’s staying power, Carlucci said it did. It is now unlikely that Somoza will be able to last until 1981 according to the CIA. (S)

Mr. Newsom interjected that the National Guard is also having trouble recruiting at this time, and this could be an important factor. (S)

Carlucci speculated that Somoza could go as a result of a seizure of power in Managua by the FSLN, or it could happen from a coup from within the National Guard. However, the choices for the National Guard at this time are not very comforting, and he thinks it is too early to consider the possibility of a coup from within the Guard. (S)

Christopher said that a set of new circumstances required that the U.S. adopt new decisions for Nicaragua. He noted a recent report that the Presidents of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador had met recently with Somoza, and the subject was probably how and under what circumstances they would help Somoza prevent a Sandinista victory.³ Furthermore, the internationalization of support for the Sandinistas is a very serious problem. Thirdly, there is a greater likelihood that the radicals will seize power, and that these radicals will be closely allied with Cuba. The newest and most important element is the inability of Somoza to maintain law and order until 1981. The problem is essentially how do we help a peaceful transition emerge. (S)

Duncan said that the reason that Somoza cannot maintain law and order until 1981 is the Sandinistas. They exist because of the support they are getting from Cuba, Panama, and Costa Rica, which permits the Sandinistas refuge. He asked whether we shouldn’t lean on these countries, and also on Somoza to calm the violence. (S)

Christopher said that even if we were able to stop arms flow to the Sandinistas, the basic problem would remain. He reported that the Andean group had adopted a strong resolution on Nicaragua, and sent two Foreign Ministers (from Venezuela and Ecuador) to Managua to meet with Somoza. Ambassador Bowdler met with the two Foreign Ministers in San Jose, and apparently the Foreign Ministers really hadn’t thought through their objectives.⁴ They seemed to think that they could just talk Somoza out of the presidency. Nonetheless, Christopher said that he thought that the first point in the paper on “U.S. strategy on Nicaragua,” which relates to the need to consult with the Andean nations, was the best place to start, and he asked whether there were any comments on this idea.⁵ (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that he thought the strategy paper was a good and useful one, but one way or another, it would be necessary to convey several basic points. What is needed at this time is a clear statement by the United States in favor of self-determination. The situation in Nicaragua is evolving in the midst of seeming ambiguity of U.S. policy. We need to clearly reaffirm our view that Nicaraguans should be permitted to exercise the right of self-determination and to have free elections. Secondly, we should explore with other nations in the Americas the possibility of inter-American peacekeeping force. In doing so, we should make clear that there really are two alternatives facing Nicaragua and the people of the Americas: (1) That the National Guard will win this time, but there will be another cycle of violence and repression; or (2) that the National Guard will disintegrate, and the left will seize power in Nicaragua with serious spillover implications for neighboring countries. (S)

Brzezinski said that he did not expect that the idea of an inter-American peace force would be accepted immediately, but it is important to get the nations of the Americans to start thinking about the idea. Moreover, it would be necessary to get the force in place in order to prevent the emergence of a political vacuum, and to assure the opportunity for Nicaraguans to make a clear determination on their political future. Thirdly, Dr. Brzezinski recommended that we issue a very tough statement against foreign intervention, and this should apply equally to Panama, Cuba and others helping the Sandinistas, as well as to any nations that might be helping the Nicaraguans. This would be consistent with the approach of this Administration against intervention in inter-American affairs, and it also is quite consistent with the draft strategy paper on Nicaragua, which Christopher has circulated. The important point is that the United States would not be getting involved in Nicaragua by itself, but within the context of working with other nations in the Americas. (S)

Christopher agreed on the necessity of the U.S. going beyond the current apparent position of ambiguity. Somoza has been able to suggest that our policy wavers and is ambiguous. Christopher also agreed with Brzezinski’s point about the need to condemn intervention coming from all sides. He asked for other views on the idea of a military force. (S)

Ambassador Vaky said that we should consult with other nations, but the idea of a military force should be the very last step and should only occur once a process is in motion, and once it is clear that it is within the context of a political transition and the departure of Somoza. Vaky suggested that we try to gain agreement from the Andean countries for introducing a specific resolution at the OAS, calling for either a plebiscite or whatever, calling for a cease-fire, an interdiction of arms, and perhaps the sending of a high-level mission to the area. It was necessary to make clear that we are talking about a process which did not include Somoza; it perhaps could include a mediation effort, but Brzezinski said it would have to be one “with teeth.” Vaky stressed the need for looking at the OAS force only in the context of a solution to the succession problem. (S)

Brzezinski said that the force should also include the Brazilians or other governments from South America. This would also provide some reassurance to conservatives within Nicaragua. (S)

In response to a question about the chances of getting something like this accepted, Vaky said that it was not very likely to get a two-thirds vote. (S)

Pastor insisted that this idea should be broached not because we expect immediate acceptance, but as Dr. Brzezinski suggested, because we want to plant a seed now which could flower when we really need it. Moreover, we want the nations of the hemisphere to understand the intensity of our concern, and that will be conveyed by a discussion of a peace force. (S)

Christopher summarized by saying that he found Dr. Brzezinski’s three points quite useful in sharpening the strategy paper, and he thought they should be incorporated. (S)

Newsom asked whether it is realistic to think that others will really consider military force, and Ambassador Pezzullo said that Somoza is much more of a pariah in the Hemisphere than is thought in the United States. The situation in the OAS is not really that divided. Somoza has alienated so many people that he has even given anti-Communism a bad name. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that in connection with the positive political program, this strategy gives others an opportunity to think of an alternative other than violence or a revolutionary take-over. (S)

Christopher pointed to 4(a) on the strategy paper and asked the other members of the PRC what the U.S. should do if other nations in the Americas do not join with us. Should we do it ourselves? (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we don’t need to address this question at this time. We should reassess this question if and when others decide not to go along. (S)

Vaky asked whether Pezzullo, when he arrives, should engage in conversations to these ends right away. (S)

Pezzullo said that there really was no choice. If he arrived and did not engage in conversations, this would imply indifference to their problems. (S)

Christopher asked whether Pezzullo’s arrival should be delayed until after the OAS meeting, and Vaky said that he should go down right away to provide the kind of leadership necessary in our Embassy. (S)

In summarizing, Christopher said that the elements of the U.S. strategy, plus Dr. Brzezinski’s three points, produced an option somewhat between options 2 and 3 in the PRM paper. In addition, we should talk with the Cubans and also with Torrijos to try to stop the flow of arms to the Sandinistas, and we should issue a statement, perhaps at the OAS, on non-intervention. If Torrijos thought that our position was no longer ambiguous, he could conceivably be more cooperative. Carlucci asked whether this would imply that we should ask the Israelis to also cut their arms sales to Nicaragua, [less than 1 line not declassified] explained that in fact they had sent a full cargo ship recently to the government of Nicaragua. (S)

Brzezinski asked whether or not we could get an OAS resolution on an embargo, and Vaky thought that we could not get one right away. Rather, we should try to get a resolution asking others to desist from transferring arms, and perhaps later on this resolution could be enforced. (S)

Christopher said that we had raised the issue of who should speak with the Israelis at an earlier meeting, and Secretary Vance had felt that the time was not appropriate. He said he believed the time would never be appropriate with the Israelis, but this is as good a time as any. Dr. Brzezinski agreed that we should get in touch with the Israelis and ask them to stop transferring arms to Nicaragua. (S)

Ambassador Pezzullo said that we will be in a much stronger position at the meeting of Foreign Ministers if we have already communicated to those who transfer arms to the region. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski summarized his views again. If the situation is really as serious as the paper suggested, and he thought it was, and he also thought the paper was very good in explaining that, then, it is very important for us to register immediately the intensity of our concern with other Latin American states. In that context, we should raise the issue of the inter-American peace force, but also stressing the importance of using this force to encourage the change and including the transition problem in Nicaragua. He does not expect that they will buy this idea, but they need to start thinking about it. Particularly, they ought to think about this inter-American force as an alternative to U.S. intervention. Secondly, it was important to try to get all parties to desist in the transfer of arms to the region, and to look into ways to enforce this. He thinks that the American people would be prepared to support an embargo around Nicaragua to stop the transfer of arms, but he wouldn’t want to do it against the other Latin Americans since that would undo all that we have tried to do with the Canal Treaties. We should try to engage them in a cooperative effort. In that case, such an embargo would probably obtain needed support in the United States. Finally, he believes that the time has come for us to take a very strong position because the situation has become so serious. (S)

In response to a question from General Smith about what kinds of enforcement we should contemplate to stop the arms flow, Dr. Brzezinski said that we should be prepared to physically enforce the embargo. If we believe that this is a serious situation, and that the transfer of arms is having a negative impact on the situation, then we should try to get others to join with us to begin an embargo. (S)

Ambassador Vaky said that it would be easier to move into an embargo than into an OAS blockade which he didn’t think stood any chance. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed that he didn’t think a blockade was what he was talking about. (S)

In answer to a question from Pastor, Vaky said that he thought a peace force would be more likely than an embargo, although he was dubious about the possibility of getting either. He also thought that a peace force would be able to stop the arms flow in and of itself. (S)

Carlucci confirmed that the PRC discussion assumed that Somoza’s departure was part of the process. All agreed with that statement. (S)

With regard to Brzezinski’s point about the need for an election, Christopher said that should be our standard position, but we may have already reached a point where Somoza will have to step down, regardless of whether elections are possible. (S)

(Dr. Brzezinski left at this point.) (U)

David Aaron said that there is no other way. He said that he didn’t expect the Latin Americans would do anything until we applied force. And we should always be prepared to do it ourselves. In reviewing the last mediation effort, Aaron said that he didn’t think Somoza believed the U.S. would do anything when we suggested he stand aside, and for that reason he refused. (S)

Vaky and Pezzullo both agreed that the inter-American peace force would not be able to remove Somoza; its principal purpose would be to fill a possible vacuum. In summary, Christopher said that we should go down the path suggested by the strategy with Zbig’s modifications, and also include a demarche to the Israelis. This will take several weeks, but we should aim for MFM next week, after full consultations. (S)

David Aaron said that there was a fair chance that in three days Somoza won’t be there. He asked whether we shouldn’t go out and do everything right now. Vaky said that there was less than a 20% chance that Somoza will be gone in that short a time. (S)

Christopher agreed that we should move on each of these elements in a strategy as rapidly as it can be done effectively. (S)

In response to a question from Vaky about whether we had done any contingency planning, Christopher said that DOD and JCS should look into contingencies under the assumption that the Guardia falls apart soon. (S)

Newsom said that the assumption underlying this strategy is that we would be assuming a major part of the responsibility for the process this time. (S)

David Aaron agreed with that statement, saying: “The peso stops here.” (U)

El Salvador

Christopher introduced the second subject by saying that we need to have certain goals in mind as we pursue a strategy towards El Salvador. In particular, we need to seek free and fair elections and a greater commitment to human rights. To do so, we need to show Romero that we really care about these, and try to encourage him to take the necessary reforms. (S)

Vaky said that we are dealing with a relatively weak government in Salvador. President Romero has sought a dialogue with key elements, and has stated his intention to move towards free elections and to recreate a national consensus. The municipal and legislative elections of 1980 provide a peg for us to adopt a new strategy. The question is what tactics do we use. Should we strengthen Romero? If so, how? (S)

Christopher asked Pastor to comment, and Pastor said that we should let our strategy be guided to a certain extent by the views of certain opposition groups. We do not want to get in front of these opposition groups, or take steps which will lose either our credibility with this group, or diminish the credibility of the dialogue. Still, we want to err on the side of the positive, and lead with the carrot. We need to take steps on our side, but should only respond when it is clear that more than just words are coming from the Salvadorean president. We should match words with words, and steps with steps. (S)

Vaky said that we shouldn’t let ourselves be hostage to any of the opposition groups. He said that Romero needs some indication of our support before he can go forward anymore. It is important that we make a public statement of our position, in favor of dialogue. (S)

Christopher said that Archbishop Romero is very important to such a strategy, but that he is hostile to the government. He asked whether or not President Romero can be reconstructed. (S)

Vaky said that the Archbishop has not condemned the government like the Archbishop of Managua has done to Somoza. Vaky said that if we had a process in motion, then the opposition is more likely to give the dialogue a chance. (S)

Christopher stressed the importance of not just approaching opposition groups, but the church as well. He expressed great concern about the terrifying repression in the country. He asked Vaky where such a statement should be made, and Vaky said that perhaps a speech would be the right vehicle, but he hadn’t really thought that through yet. Nooter said that an aid loan was ready to be signed, but in answer to a question from Pastor, he said there was no need for it to be signed until October 1, 1979. (S)

Pastor asked whether a high-level visit wouldn’t be the most appropriate vehicle for such a speech and for a new strategy as well. Newsom said that this may not be the most appropriate time for such a visit. (S)

Newsom said that the question is whether we should wait until a state of seige is lifted before going ahead with the aid loan. While the state of seige is on, it is difficult for us to sign such an aid loan. (S)

Vaky ticked off the number of steps that Romero has taken, including, and most importantly in his mind, the repeal of the public order law. (S)

Christopher said that we should make a statement on the signing of the aid loan, which is clearly one that encourages the Romero government to take more steps forward, and also makes clear to them what our expectations are. (S)

Vaky said that if Romero does not solve the problem now, he will be overthrown from the right, and estimated the chances of that would be about 60%. (S)

In answer to a question from General Smith about what the U.S. government and the Salvadorean government should do about terrorism, Vaky said that one of the avenues is to expand the dialogue. (S)

Christopher repeated that we should engage the church in the dialogue, and he hopes that the Ambassador will do that. (S)

Vaky said that a statement should be made soon. In answer to a question from Pastor about who is currently participating in the dialogue, and whether such a statement would not undermine our own objectives, Vaky said that the Christian Democrats are not participating in the public dialogue, but the church and MNR are. (S)

Guatemala

Christopher said that the Guatemalan regime is a stable and conservative one, which apparently sanctions official assassinations. Recently, the Chief of Staff of the Army was assassinated. He was the one who had been implicated in the murder of two leading centrist politicians. (S)

Vaky said that it is not a popular government in Guatemala. Furthermore, there is some indication of government involvement in political assassinations. The MNR under Sandoval is certainly involved in certain political assassinations, and is connected with the government. Vaky also pointed to the problem of integrating the Indian population, which is a long-standing problem in Guatemala’s history, and could lead soon, as it has in the past, to massacres. But at the same time, there is a growth of a middle class and of professional groups, which have been denied participation in the political process, but who want to participate. In the long term, the only chance for a stabilizing process in this country is to include these middle groups in a participatory process towards a credible election. This is not an urgent problem. Tactically, we have more time. But the question is the same: how do we get the government moving in a more positive direction? Vaky said that there is a guerrilla problem, but that is not that serious. But he said that official terrorism is much more of a problem, because many in the government suspect anyone or any group that suggests a change from the status quo. (S)

Christopher asked how do we encourage the Guatemalan government to move in positive directions. Vaky said that it really comes down to a tactical question: Do we insist that the Guatemalan government take certain steps, or do we take the lead? He said there are two immediate operational issues: one is for a $6 million basic human needs rural enterprise loan, and the second is a request for a presidential helicopter, which will be unarmed, though armored. (S)

Duncan said that we should give them some encouragement. He said that we should give them the helicopter. (S)

Christopher said that we should give the basic human needs loan, but this does not necessarily imply that we should give a whole list of items to them. As to the helicopter, we should see if this produces any improvement in our relationship. Perhaps, we should give them the helicopter only if they are more helpful with Somoza. (S)

David Aaron said that was a serious recommendation. (U)

Ambassador Ortiz insisted that we have very little leverage with the Guatemalan government, and we shouldn’t think that we have much or that this will affect them much. (S)

Christopher said that any aid that we give to them should be conditioned with a demarche restating our concern with officially sanctioned assassinations. (S)

Honduras

Christopher said that Honduras is basically moving in the right direction, and that we should think of ways to help them move in that way, particularly as it applies to the election in 1980. (S)

Vaky asked whether it would be possible to reprogram FMS and IMET toward Honduras. He said that we cut them out largely for budgetary reasons. (S)

Duncan said that he would agree to try to reprogram money to Honduras if this was possible. He was reminded of David Jones’ statement at San Antonio where he said that we have very good military relationships in Latin America, and we should try to keep these as they are a good source of contacts.

David Aaron said that we should give a lot of help and aid to Honduras. It would be much better to our overall policy and image in Central America if we find a way to reward them than to have a vague human rights policy to the others. That would set a good “demonstration effect” for the others. (S)

Nooter said that the aid levels to Honduras are already double that of our aid program to the other countries, but that only amounted to $18 million for Honduras for FY 80 versus $9 million for Guatemala. (S)

He admitted that the differences are not that great in 1979. Aaron asked whether or not we could stretch out the Guatemalan loan, and give some of that money to Honduras in this year. (S)

Nooter said that he could do that, but Vaky strongly opposed it. (S)

Christopher summarized by saying that we should try to increase aid monies to Honduras for the purposes of showing the other countries that we are willing to be especially helpful to countries with good human rights records. (S)

Central America

Pastor raised one broader issue at the end. He said that it would be very important for us to relate the specific country statements within a broader framework, describing U.S. concerns and policies to all of Central America. Part of the problem with the ambiguity of our policy is that we have not projected a sense that we have an overall vision toward Central America, and we should do so in a statement or speech. (S)

Christopher and others in the PRC agreed on that last point. (U)

(The meeting ended at 5:10 P.M.)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 76, PRC–111 6/11/79 Central America. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. See footnote 3, Document 468.
3. In telegram 3692 from Guatemala City, June 11, the Embassy reported that an American businessman had informed the Embassy of a June 9 meeting in Guatemala among Lucas, Paz, and Somoza: “This would seem to support information from other quarters of a discussion here, at Lucas’ invitation, by ‛Northern Tier’ leaders of what next in Nicaragua.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790266–1091)
4. In telegram 2441 from San José, June 11, Bowdler sent Vaky a report on his meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Venezuela and Ecuador, who comprised the mediation mission to Nicaragua and Costa Rica approved by the Andean Pact. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 8, Central America PRC Meeting: 6/11/79) In telegram 5336 from Caracas, June 12, the Embassy included the text of the communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers of Ecuador and Venezuela regarding Nicaragua. (Ibid.)
5. For the final version of this document, see Tab B, Document 470.